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As the football industry continues to reach unprecedented levels of economic growth, elite 
clubs continue to capitalise on the financial riches on offer across Europe’s most popular 
leagues. In the quest for financial growth, historic clubs and their supporters continue to endure 
administration, bankruptcy and mismanagement at the hands of powerful owners. This has led 
supporters to call for a greater say in how their clubs are governed to safeguard their futures 
against over-commercialisation, unscrupulous investors and financial irregularities. A cross-
case study of clubs in England, Spain and Germany, representing the three most wealthy 
leagues in world football, examines fundamental factors in models of football governance. The 
clubs studied are Everton, Athletic Bilbao and Schalke. The case study findings identify three 
new models of football governance: the “ghost” model at Everton; the “barrier to rights” model 
at Athletic Bilbao; and the “umbrella” model at Schalke. Additionally, the study investigates 
the role that supporters play in the way a club governs, and in so doing, explores the influence 
and relationship of different stakeholder groups.  
The subsequent research findings identify five key issues in football governance that obstruct 
a meaningful relationship with supporters: 1) a lack of constitutional clarity leads to weak 
football governance; 2) a weakness exist around ungoverned roles on boards and executives; 
3) there is weak governance knowledge of the role and responsibilities of supporters; 4) a lack 
of understanding on the benefits of supporter relations; 5) and that ungoverned groups of non-
stakeholder supporters can weaken club operations. To address these issues, the study proposes 
the GLOVE model of football governance, which enables clubs to govern and capitalise on a 
meaningful relationship with their supporters. Football governance under the GLOVE model 
provides access to different stakeholder groups, types and relationships without compromising 
the integrity of the business. As a result, the model offers a framework of football governance 
that reinforces club-supporter relations with a collective responsibility for club operations, 






CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
“I don’t have a team anymore. I don’t have a result to listen out for on the radio on a Saturday 
afternoon. Colleagues – mainly fans of Premier League teams – keep asking me if I have chosen 
a new club. More likely, I will just stop paying attention to the game altogether” (Guardian, 
2019). 
1.0 Research Background and Rationale  
In October 2019, Jeremy Corbyn, MP and the Leader of the Labour Party claimed that clubs 
are too important to be left in the hands of bad owners, who put their business interests ahead 
of everything else, marginalise supporters and even put the financial security of clubs at risk 
(Guardian, 2019). Similarly, Julian Knight the new chairman of parliament's powerful Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee claimed football has become for the most 
privileged and well off, which goes completely against the working-class roots of the game 
(Telegraph, 2020). These comments stem from the strength of feeling amongst football 
supporters, who feel they have borne the brunt of commercialisation at the hands of powerful 
owners or have even left to pick up the pieces when their club enters administration or 
liquidated. Evident in August 2019, when Bury FC was expelled from the English Football 
League (EFL) due to financial difficulties, which had a devastating effect on the local 
community and left supporters without a team to follow (ITV, 2019).  
 
Cocieru, Delia & Katz (2019) claim that football supporters hold a unique relationship with the 
team they follow, who choose not to change their club allegiances, no matter how badly they 
are treated. This has led supporters to create phoenix clubs to start at the bottom of the 
footballing pyramid in the event of liquidation, rather than follow another team. For example, 
at Chester FC (2010), Darlington (2012) and Parma (2015).  Hamil et al (2013) goes a step 
further and claims that supporters are the lifeblood of football. Yet, due to the rise in 
unscrupulous investors, clubs have been left on the brink of administration because of 
mismanagement and financial motives of self-interest, during their short time as owners 
(Cleland, 2017). Consequently, clubs continue to fail financially with supporters left to endure 
the knock-on effect of mismanagement, over-commercialisation, unscrupulous investors and 




This was the case at Bolton Wanderers before and after the club entered administration in the 
2018-2019 season. From the beginning of Ken Anderson and Dean Holdsworth’s reign as new 
owners in 2016, their takeover was surrounded by financial issues, board room disputes and 
internal legal proceedings. As the pair battled for sole control of club ownership rights in a high 
court case in 2017, key information was drawn into the public domain, which disclosed secure 
loans against the stadium, training ground and the hotel, which involved several third-party 
companies. During 2018, Bolton’s financial issues and mismanagement started to have an 
impact on the supporters, as the club failed to pay outstanding bills, unsecured creditor 
payments and staff wages, running up debts of £25mn (Chart 1.1). 
 
 Figure 1.1. An Overview of Bolton Wanderers Creditors 
 
 





The impact on Bolton supporters was immeasurable as unpaid wages (playing and no-playing 
staff) lead to the postponement of games on the grounds of safety, player strikes (Brentford, 
May 2019) and the welfare of the academy squad (Doncaster, August 2019); slipping the club 
into administration. This resulted in the club being imposed with a 12-point deduction and two-
year transfer ban by the English Football League (EFL) as they were relegated into league one, 
with further point deductions for failing the play against Doncaster FC. Even the quest to take 
Bolton out of administration by the now new owners (Football Ventures) impacted directly on 
supporters, due to the numbers of secure parties’ intent on protecting their financial interests, 
instead of the club’s future. For example, former owner Eddie Davies Trust had £23mn secured 
against the stadium, local businessman Mike James had £6.5mn secured against the club’s hotel 
and board director, Brett Warburton had £2.5mn secured again the training ground land. At the 
11th hour, the 134-year-old club survived, leaving the club decimated, entering the new 
2019/2020 football season relegated, with a 12-point deduction, a threat of future points 
deduction, without any senior players, under a transfer embargo, re-financed loans against the 
club, no season tickets or official kits and untold reputational damage. Yet, no matter how 
badly Bolton Wanderers have treated their supporters, these groups are grateful just to have a 
team to follow, no matter how poorly they are treated, or the circumstances they are left to 
endure in the aftermath of mismanagement.    
 
The case at Bolton Wanderers is not an exception throughout the football industry, as the rise 
in commercialisation has contributed to many supporters feeling marginalised from decisions 
made by directors at board level (McLeod, 2018). Krabbenbos (2013) claims that football 
supporters are merely for the financial benefit of a club, purely to increase its revenue for an 
owner’s benefit. This was the case at Manchester United when the Glazer Family brought the 
club in 2005 for a reported £790mn, as the club’s shareholding is valued at 3.8bn on the New 
York stock exchange (Fobes, 2018). During the family 14-year reign at United, they continue 
to commercialise club relationships with its supporter groups, with year on year increases on 
match day experiences, merchandise and hospitality (EADF, 2019). Bolle (2015) explains that 
supporter felt their role within a club is purely a financial one, through commercial ticket and 






Undoubtedly, the role of football supporters is important to the management of their clubs, 
either as consumers (Pick & Gillett, 2018), customers (Garica, 2015), merely as followers 
(Giulianotti, 2002), protest groups (Hewer, Gannon & Cordina, 2017), or even as legitimate 
group of stakeholders (Anagnostopoulos, 2011). Yet, the diverse role of supporters within a 
club has continued to split options both in the academic literature and throughout the football 
industry on whether to engage or totally disregard the feelings of supporters from the way their 
club is governed. Evident when Liverpool FC owners, Fenway Sports Group (FSG) went on to 
claim their supporters were mere “customers as part of a chain of franchises” (Fenway Sports 
Management, 2016). In 2019, the owners at Liverpool went a step further to protect their 
investment within the club and took steps to trademark the word, Liverpool to protect against 
inauthentic products. This sparked outrage amongst Liverpool’s supporter groups and across 
the city, including mayor Joe Anderson and the local council. Supporter group, the Spirit of 
Shankly went on the claim the word ‘Liverpool’ is not for FSG or anybody else to own, as it 
belongs to the city of Liverpool and its people” (Guardian, 2019).  
 
Rallying efforts, involving fundraising, lobbying, volunteering, campaigning, networking and 
ultimately taking control of the ailing clubs (Porter, 2019) have not just been confined to 
English clubs, but also across the most commercialised football league across Europe. Spanish 
football has also felt the effect of discord from its supporters, as the club look to capitalise on 
private investment against the wish of its members. This results from when the Spanish 
Government introduced the Sociedades Anonimas Deportivas (SAD) regulation to force 
football clubs into public limited ownership. Barajas & Rodriguez (2010) claim the SAD 
regulation affected how the clubs were governed, turning socios members into mere followers 
overnight, which forced owners to focus purely on financial performance. Consequently, 
supporters at SAD own clubs have taken part in protest and action against decisions made at 
board level, as they no longer have a say in business decisions, which has directly affected their 
relationship with the club. Evident at Alaves when supporter groups boycotted the kick-off and 
staged a mock funeral. Displaying banners that read football was dead, as the match against 
Levante was switched from a traditional Sunday kick-off to Monday night, so the club could 






Yet, four clubs kept their sports member status in La Liga, Real Madrid, Barcelona, Athletic 
Bilbao and Osasuna as they were deemed profitability at the time. However, there is a notable 
difference between the role that Spanish supporters hold in decisions at member-based clubs, 
which is depended on the club they follow. For example, supporters at Valencia have little or 
no say in the way their club makes commercial decisions, but supporter members at the FC 
Barcelona can vote in presidential elections and monitor financial budgets (Burns, 2011).  
However, members clubs of FC Barcelona and Real Madrid make decisions with an air of 
commercialisation and manage supporters as hyper-consumer, not with the respect of 
legitimate members (Llopis-Goig, 2012).  While on the other hand, Athletic Bilbao continues 
to engage supporters with the ethos of a sports club and keeps a deep-rooted affiliation with its 
local communities, shown in Vaczi (2016) ethnography of Basque Fandom.  Yet, even when 
supporters have a say as members, clubs still go bankrupt through the mismanagement by those 
in powerful positions. This was the case at Osasuna when ex-presidents Miguel Archanco and 
Patxi Izco and ex-board members Txuma Peralta, Angel Vizcay, Juan Pascual and Diego 
Maquirriain was found guilty of the misappropriation of funds, false accounting, falsifying 
documents and corruption, which sent the club into financial crisis (Diario De Navarra, 2017).  
 
Similarly, German football has also had an influx of powerful owners and conglomerates who 
want to invest in Bundesliga clubs. German supporter groups are believed to hold legal 
responsibilities in the club with similar rights to prominent figures within the club (Chairman, 
CEO and Sporting Directors). A key factor behind the inclusion of supporters in German 
football is the 50+1 rule, which states the 51% of the voting rights should be owned by an 
association, not individuals or private companies. This gives supporters the legal right to 
scrutinise all decisions made at a senior level, mainly from a role on the supervisory board. 
German supporters feel the 50+1 rule continues to protect against the reckless action of owners 
and safeguards the democratic customs of German clubs. However, there is a growing 
realisation that the 50+1 rule is outdated, as multinational corporations continue to wrestle the 
majority of shares from supporter associations (Bundesliga, 2019). Furthermore, several 
German clubs have shown a blatant disregard for the 50+1 rule and are owned by global 
corporations, with no punishment from the German Football Association (Deutscher Fußball-
Bund, DFB). For instance, Volkswagen’s (Car Manufactures) control Wolfsburg FC, Bayer’s 
(pharmaceutical) control Bayer Leverkusen and Red Bull Energy control RB Leipzig, which 




This has been the case at TSG Hoffenheim, in a long-running battle for over a decade between 
the owner Dietmar Hopp and the different supporter groups, as his private ownership has led 
supporters to protest against the over-commercialisation across Germany football. After taking 
over the club under the 20+1 rule in 2014, Mr Hopp soon became the face of creeping 
commercialisation and the rise of backdoor ownership throughout Germany. Evident in 2017, 
when Cologne supporters drew the German Football Association’s attention with personal 
insults aimed at Mr Hopp and his investment in Hoffenheim. This action was also replicated 
by Borussia Dortmund supporters in 2018 when their team travelled to the Rhein-Neckar-
Arena (Hoffenheim’s stadium).  To avert any further action against the owner, Hoffenheim 
brought legal action against five supporters, who were convicted for defamation (death threats 
and offence chants) (DW, 2019). Throughout Germany, Hoffenheim and Leipzig have been 
labelled test tube clubs (newly formed through private financial wealth, without traditions), 
vilified and slandered by more traditional sets of supporters, in a proxy fight to protect their 
own right against future challenges of private ownership (De Waele et al., 2019).   
 
This resistance to private ownership, commercialisation and mismanagement across football 
clubs has seen a rise in supporter ownership, to provide the “formal mechanism that allows 
supporters a greater say in how their clubs are run” (Martin, 2007, pp.636). Supporters can 
protect against the over-commercialisation, financial irregularities and mismanagement of 
clubs, as it places supporters at the heart of the club and facilitates democratic decisions making 
(Brown & Walsh, 2000; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012; Morrow, 2015; Tobin, 2017). This has 
seen supporters create new clubs in the cases of FC Utd and AFC Liverpool, or via takeovers 
to keep the club in existence, as was the case at Portsmouth, Darlington and Exeter City. Even 
starting up phoenix clubs at the bottom of the football pyramid to save historic names and 
traditions, as in the cases of Chester FC, AFC Wimbledon and Leyton Orient. Yet, similar 
issues witnessed in the commercialised club also happen when supporter own their own clubs. 
Accusations of financial mismanagement, power struggles at board level, resignations and 
gagging orders have been reported at supporter-owned clubs (Guardian, 2016). These issues 
highlight a lack of the expertise or skillsets between a supporter’s base needed to fill key 
management positions, particularly when controlling their own football club as non-profit 






This was the case when Portsmouth supporters relinquished their stake in the club in 2017 to 
wealthy American Billionaire, Michael Eisner of The Walt Disney Company, who paid £5.7m 
to become the club’s majority shareholder (Portsmouth FC, 2017). The fallout from Portsmouth 
buyout highlights supporter groups do not have the finances to compete, or even to takeover 
well established professional football clubs, particularly in Europe’s top leagues. Mick 
Williams, one of the founder members of the supporter’s trust and club director claimed in a 
statement, “another round of fund-raising amongst the trust’s member-shareholders will not 
necessarily generate the money needed to sustain the club” (Guardian, 2017).  
 
Although several academic studies have advocated the model of mutual ownership, particularly 
to interject supporter into clubs, the realism is the rising levels of revenue and investment 
within the club has made in difficult to wrestle the ownership away from powerful owners and 
conglomerates. Even in the event, a professional football club does enter administration, there 
is a long line of investors, ready and waiting with the funds to capitalise on the clubs 
fixed assets and potential investment opportunities. This was certainly the case when Bolton 
Wanderers entered administration, as 30 potential parties were asked to show proof of funds of 
£25mn (Bolton News, 2019). It has become increasingly difficult for newly formed supporter 
trusts to raise the funds to even access a club’s private information, never mind start the due 
diligence process, or even more unrealistic prove supporter groups can service the secure loans 
and ongoing monthly financial commitments run-up by previous owners. For example, in the 
case of Bury FC, where supporters (average attendance of 3,900) were asked to “chip in” to 
the tune of £4.2mn by owner Steve Dale to save the club from extinction, which failed when 
the club was liquidated in 2019 (Telegraph, 2019).   
 
In recent years, Supporters Direct (started in England, but spread across Europe) has 
championed the role of supporters as the best set of stakeholders to monitor the actions of 
owners and club executives, going on to champion the importance of supporter/club relations. 
Yet, parliamentary debate, lobbying and legislation posturing by Members of Parliament have 
failed to change the attitude of powerful club owners towards football supporters, who continue 
to raise the price of season tickets and merchandise year on year without any meaningful 
dialogue, transparency or explanation (Maguire, 2019). This has certainly been the case at 
Charlton FC with the factious relationship between the owner Roland Duchatelet and their 
supporters. Supporter groups continue to claim all communication has broken down and there 
remains a lack of transparency by the executive management team, which has led to financial 
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issues in the club. This dispute between the owners and supporter groups has had a lasting 
effect on both sides of the relationship, with supporter missing the match through protests and 
the club left with an owner who claims, “investing in football was the mistake of my life” (Talk 
Sport, 2019).  
 
In the season 2018/2019, Charlton was promoted from league one to the championship during 
this unprecedented tension between the club and its supporters. Continuous action from 
Charlton supporters has seemingly not affected the team’s performance on the field, but left 
the two factions at war, in what has been described as ‘the battle of the valley”. This supporter 
action against Roland Duchatelet forced him into selling the club to East Street Investment.   
An important question to arise from the sale of Charlton is whether the new owners will entrust 
supporter with critical decisions at board level, or inevitable makes their decisions to protect 
their personal investment and wealth. There is an argument that other industries and sectors do 
not include consumers and customers within business decision, but this may political change 
as MP and former Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, John McDonnell continues to lobby 
for regulative change in the way companies are governed in the future, emphasising on 
openness and transparency at board level. An independently commissioned report went on to 
explain how the Government could legislate to diversify ownership with the redistribution of 
power within companies, as “stakeholders, especially employees, consumers and pension 
scheme trustees, together with long-term committed shareholders should be represented on the 
board of large companies” (Labour Corporate Governance Review, 2018, pp. 2).  
 
To achieve greater stakeholder representation, particularity in football clubs both the British 
Government and Supporters Direct has change tact away from supporter ownership with a push 
towards how clubs are governed and managed. There is an acceptance that the majority of 
football supporter will never be in the position to own a club, due to the rising level of debt in 
failing clubs and owner’s reluctance to share the rising financial revenue on offer throughout 
the game (Figure 1.2).  This has led to parliamentary debates on how football governance can 
counteract the balance between the riches on offer throughout the game and the protection of 
clubs. In addition, Damian Collins, ex Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Committee for 
three-years claimed good governance was necessary to protect clubs against the rising 
“financial instability and increasing levels of debt, which remains a serious problem throughout 




Figure 1.2. Championship Club Growth 2018 
 
 
Source: Football Financial News, 2019.  
 
A cross-party football governance committee claimed “the governance of football is 
cumbersome and power lies with the clubs, especially in the Premier League. Real reform in 
relation to the ownership of clubs, transfers of players, the influence of fans, the role of agents 
and investment in the grassroots - amongst other issues has stalled” (Football Governance 
Committee, 2016). This has led to an increase with national supporter trusts and European 
movements, such as Football Supporters’ Federation, the Federation of Shareholders and 
Partners of Spanish Soccer, Unsere Kurve and across the UK & Europe, Supporters Direct. All 
these organisations have come together to lobby for a greater say in how their clubs are 
governed, towards a more inclusive relationship with owners to support the future success and 
sustainability of their clubs. Calls for a more inclusive way to govern football club has also 
come from owners, in order to find a better way to engage supporters in the daily management 
of clubs. Andy Holt, the owner and chairman of Accrington Stanley one of the football leagues 
founding clubs dating back to 1888 claims, “owners are expected to fund the game’s losses and 
claims the football authorities are not doing enough to fix the problem and there is a need to 
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find a way forward which is fan-friendly and financially viable” (Football Supporters’ 
Federation, 2019).  
 
Making steps to achieve this, the England Supporters Direct and Football Supporter Federation 
have merged to become Football Supporters’ Association (FSA), bringing together political 
weight, funding and knowledge people. In October 2019, the FSA set out a resolution to the 
FA Council against the continued threat against the survival of several clubs throughout the 
English game, as these failings indicate that the current financial and governance regulatory 
framework in the professional and semi-professional game needs strengthening (FSA, 2019). 
As the debate continues across the football industry on the benefits of supporters being 
involved in decisions within their clubs, the evidence shows supporters are the lifeblood behind 
a club’s financial and social sustainability, either as customers, consumers or stakeholders 
(UEFA, 2019).  
 
A changing political landscape toward board diversification in companies and the power of the 
newly formed supporter association and club trusts continue to add pressure on the industry to 
find a reasonable solution that includes supporters in how a club governs its business. 
Although, academic studies and numerous political commissioned football governance review 
have added to the football governance debate. Owners and their Board of Directors are unsure 
to the benefits of supporter inclusion, or even how to engage groups at different levels of a 
club’s governance structures. Recently, this has been evident at Blackpool, Charlton Athletic, 
Bolton, Bury, across Germany with the lax 50+1 rule, or in Spain with a mixed role for 
supporters. This has left supporters confused as to their relationship with their clubs, what 
groups they should join, or even whether to involve themselves in action to have a voice within 
the club. Therefore, a better understanding of different models of football governance will help 
to broaden the knowledge on the fundamental factors behind how a club governs and the effects 








1.1. Research Questions  
 
1.1.1. What are the fundamental factors behind a club’s model of football governance?  
 
1.1.2. What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in models of football governance? 
 
1.2. Research Aim  
To conduct a cross-case analysis on different models of football governance to contrast how 
multiple clubs classify the role of supporters and to understand the influence that these groups 
hold within different clubs.  
1.3. Research Objectives 
 
1.3.1. To identify and contrast models of football governance across different professional 
football clubs.  
 
1.3.2. To examine how different models of governance are constructed and to identify the 
roles and influence of supporter groups within each club 
 
1.3.3. To correlate the attributes of supporters across selected clubs to understand different 
levels of influence and the salient power of various groups, in conjunction with how a 
club governs.  
 
1.3.4. To develop a model of football governance that enhance relations between a club and 







1.4.  Overview of the Chapters  
The study aims to identify and analyse different governance models, currently in operation 
throughout European football to understand how different clubs classify supporter 
relationships. (refer to chapter one). Firstly, the study reviews and discusses the existing 
knowledge already gathered on football governance, which explores how clubs control club 
operations with governance and how these effect supporter relations. These governance models 
provide an early indication of how clubs perceive the importance of supporter relationships and 
the role different groups hold across European clubs. While at the same time, the review 
investigates different types of supporter relations to understand the role of groups in the context 
of their own clubs. This pays particular attention to how managers use their power within clubs 
and operationalise the role of supporters in football. (refer to chapter two). 
As a consequence, theme analysis provides codes and themes to understand the data captured 
on different types of salient relationships in football and how clubs have classified the influence 
of supporter groups within a club setting. To achieve this, case studies were selected as the 
research approach to explore different types of supporters and the relationship various groups 
hold as a result of how their club governs (refer to chapter three). This research conducts single 
cases with a set protocol on Everton, Athletic Bilbao and Schalke, as each club differs with the 
way they govern, this explores the nature and type of supporter relations, in terms each model 
of governance. These cases provide reports which contrast each model of football governance 
to establish different classifications of supporter relations and helps understand their influence 
(refer to chapters four to six). 
Cross-case reports draw on the findings from the three case studies to provide a cross-analysis 
on the divergence between how the clubs govern and the different types of salient supporter 
relations within the respective clubs. (refer to chapter seven). The conclusion considers the 
impact of the single case studies, answers the research question, addresses the aims and 
objectives and explains the study’s contributions to knowledge, particularly with the creation 







CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 “Corporate Governance is about the way power is exercised over corporate entities. It covers 
the activities of the board and its relationships with the shareholders or members and those 
managing the enterprise as well as with external auditors, regulators and other legitimate 
stakeholders” (Tricker, 2015, p. 4). 
2.0 Chapter Introduction 
The literature review aims to explore how governance has evolved within football and why 
clubs choose different models to manage their corporate affairs, stakeholder and supporter 
relations. The objective of the chapter is to understand how clubs select their chosen model of 
governance and how they manage supporters as part of a complex football industry. An insight 
into why clubs select different models of governance across Europe will offer an insight into 
the environmental conditions and how these can affect supporter relations. A closer look into 
how managers classify supporter relationships across football clubs draw on stakeholder theory 
of corporate governance to assess differences between the salient attributes of different groups. 
This investigates different models of football governance to understand a supporter’s salient 
influence, which provides an insight into the fundamental factors on why managers within 
clubs classify these relations so differently from club to club. An insight into a supporter’s 
salient influence helps to understand the nature of their relationship with owners and managers 
(administration) and how clubs decide which groups to govern, or to exclude.  
2.1 The Principles of Corporate Governance  
Until the 1980s, corporate governance was a province of lawyers, in a world of specific rules 
based on the statutory rights of shareholders and the election of directors, but with little regard 
to what corporations actually do (Gilson, 1996). Consequently, the concept of corporate 
governance started to acknowledge the inner workings of an organisation to reflect the 
“systems, structures, practices, procedures and the corporate culture that organisations have in 
place to minimize risks and exposures and to optimize performance and accountability” 
(Bryson, 2016, p. 235). This moved the literature on corporate governance away from purely 
the statutory responsibilities of directors and shareholders and onto the performance of those 
tasked with managing organisational accountability and performance. Consequently, corporate 
governance started to rationalise how organisations manage their business affairs in a number 
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of complex areas, which now embraces the culture, ownership, different legal regimes and 
other structural differences within an organisation (Mallin, 2016).  
2.2 Theories of Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance over time has been used to explain or describe the different crisis in 
various industries and sectors. Evident when Jensen and Meckling (1976) used the uncertainty 
that the financial recession placed on firms between 1973 and 1975 to amalgamate the theories 
of agency, property rights, finance and the ownership structure of a firm into one theory of 
managerial ownership. The authors use the new theory to explain that a firm’s statutory 
responsibilities of ownership, which they argue should be separated away from managerial 
control to maximize decision making. The power of a principal-agent with ownership powers 
and managerial control was again thrust into the spotlight with the Maxwell Crisis in 1991, as 
Robert Maxwell, the sole owner had full control of the company to plunder the Mirror Group’s 
pension scheme and assets for a reported £440mn (Aras, 2016). This resulted in the UK 
Government bailing out the company for £100mn to safeguard pension investments, this led to 
a lack of trust in public companies and the introduction of the UK’s first Corporate Governance 
Code produced by the Cadbury report in 1992.  
To combat the control and power of a principal-agent, the stewardship theory of corporate 
governance was used to empower managers to control companies, as a board of directors only 
held the legal responsibilities as owners. Yet, managers act as stewards to protect and maximise 
a shareholder’s wealth through the power to perform, which utilises a company’s core functions 
(Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). A key theme throughout the stewardship literature is 
it refers the term stewards to subordinates, in the sense the power will always lie with the 
shareholder directors, no matter how much control board allows its appointed executives 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Wasserman, 2006; Schillemans & Bjurstrøm, 2019). However, the 
use of stewardship theory in corporate governance merely shifts the agency problems from 
owners over to managers, as the control of the company still resides with a few powerful 





Resource dependency theory of corporate governance acknowledges the need for 
environmental linkage between an organisation and its outside resource, which connects a 
company’s external factors by co-operating the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer, 1972). 
This places the dependency onto the board of directors who absorb critical elements of the 
environmental uncertainty within the company (Yusoff & Alhaji, 2012). To achieve this, 
directors need to build external networks of information, so companies can draw on the 
experience and knowledge needed to deal with the transactional experiences throughout its life 
cycle (Rao, Al-Tahyaee & Syed, 2007).  This variety of board members can provide multiple 
avenues of knowledge and experience to enhance company strategic and tactical performance 
(Siciliano, 1996). However, directors strive to minimise a company’s dependency is 
tantamount to maximising power (Bode et al., 2011), which can often become over-dependent 
on structures, performance and power-sharing relationships that formed purely at board level 
(Combs et al., 2007). 
An overview of the three most notable theories in corporate governance, agency, stewardship 
and resource dependency helps to understand organisations govern (Tourani-Rad & Ingley, 
2011). Yet, all three theories require powerful individuals or groups to govern their said 
organisations. Agency theory explains the effect of a principal-agent as the main shareholder 
in a company and argues how governance can counterbalance their unlimited powers gained 
from ownership control (Fama & Jenson, 1983; Liang & Renneboog, 2018). Similarly, 
stewardship theories merely shift the balance of power from principal owner shareholders over 
to the executive director, who act as stewards but “do not have the skills, knowledge, time or 
resources to effectively monitor management” (Tourani-Rad & Ingley, 2011, pp.131). Even, 
resource-dependent theories strive for power maximization through interlocked boards, which 
can demonstrate power imbalance, ownership concentration and CEO ownership (Zona, 
Gomez-Mejia & Withers, 2018). However, all three theories revolve around the delegation of 
control by a board of directors, either through ownership powers, or non-executive and CEO 






2.3 Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Governance  
Stakeholder theory adopted by Corporate Governance in broad terms is managerial, but it does 
not necessarily presume that managers are the only rightful focus of corporate control and 
governance (Donaldson, 1995). As a consequence, stakeholder governance considers a wider 
group of constituents rather than focusing on shareholders, as the maximation of shareholder 
value become less self-evident (Mallin, 2013).  Garcia-Torea, Fernandez-Feijoo & Cuesta 
(2016) claim corporate governance broadens with the emergence of different stakeholder 
groups, therefore a board of directors can increase their effectiveness with a move towards 
good governance mechanisms. The engagement of stakeholders throughout the organisation 
creates a sense of shared value (Charreaux & Desbrières, 2001) and through the strategic 
alignment of governance, people and culture (Vom Brocke & Rosemann, 2014). However, 
although there is growing pressure on managers to include a broader set of stakeholders in 
organisational decisions, there is a distinct lack of clarity on which groups to include within 
the mechanisms of governance, as it remains difficult to understand the influence and salient 
attributes of certain groups (Ayuso et al., 2007).  
Sternberg (1997) claim the inclusion of stakeholders is fundamentally misguided, incapable of 
providing better corporate governance, business performance or business conduct. Similarly, 
Post, Preston and Sachs (2002) claim stakeholders are still a residual risk to the company, the 
same as shareholders. The difficulty from a managerial aspect is identifying influential groups 
of stakeholders, as each has its own goals and wishes (Hage, 2007). Therefore, managers are 
tasked with separating the needs and demands of multiple stakeholder groups, emanating from 
a range of social, environmental, economic and ethical expectations (Unerman & Bennett, 
2004). Yet, the relationship between managers and stakeholders continually breakdown, due 
to the lack of knowledge and engagement on the type of role stakeholders should hold within 







2.4 Corporate Governance and the Identification of Stakeholders   
In the management literature, Donaldson and Preston (1995) started to acknowledge that a 
group of stakeholders can have a growing influence in an organisation and therefore, the actions 
of managers need to reflect the impact of different groups. While in the same period, Mitchell, 
Agle & Wood (1997) seminal model of stakeholder classification works on a convergent 
framework of legitimacy, power and urgency to assess the salient influence of different 
stakeholder groups. As a result, this theoretical framework goes on to recognise different types 
of stakeholder groups as dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dangerous, dependent, 
definitive and non-stakeholders as their role in an organisation. Significantly, Mitchell, Agle 
& Wood’s power, legitimacy and urgency has developed as a seminal theoretical framework 
used to understand the attributes of different stakeholder groups and it has been used across a 
range of academic disciplines, organisations and industries (Currie, Seaton & Wesley, 2009; 
Neville, Bell & Whitwell, 2011; Biscaia et al., 2018).  
The operationalisation of stakeholders has developed as a typology to explain the relationship 
between an organisation and its respective stakeholders (Mainardes, Alves & Raposo, 2012).  
These classification typologies have helped managers to understand the influence of various 
types of stakeholders and the relationship these groups hold within an organisation (Stoney & 
Winstanley, 2001). Freeman, Harrison & Wicks (2007) used these typologies, but with a focus 
on how stakeholders can increase an organisation’s performance point towards solely at 
economic value. Although economic performance has been the theme behind stakeholder 
classification studies as a link to organisational effectiveness (Zellweger & Nason, 2008), there 
has also been a realisation that synergy between an organisation and stakeholders is more likely 
to produce a sustainable competitive advantage (Tantalo & Priem, 2016). However, there 
remains uncertainty on how managers select relevant stakeholders, address the power and 
influence of different groups and the nature of their relationship with an organisation (Andriof 






A major criticism of stakeholder classification is that organisations cannot be accountable to 
all possible stakeholder groups, as only those with legitimate authority over the business should 
be considered (Sternberg, 1997). Mitchell et al (1997) typology framework also used 
legitimacy as a tool to understand the power, influence and type of relationship different 
stakeholder groups hold in an organisation, yet the quest for a feasible classification of 
stakeholder types has become saturated. Consequently, the stakeholder literature has gone on 
to provide over 100 articles primarily on stakeholder definitions, which classify different types 
of groups and their influence, or who can be influenced by an organisation (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995). This presents a real challenge to managers who still find it difficult to 
understand the legitimate attributes of their stakeholders, selecting some group, while 
neglecting other groups. These intricacies in football governance set out in the introduction 
highlight the complexities of different legal regimes and owners, compliance with governing 
body regulation and the impact of commercialisation, which all add pressure on club/supporter 
relations. Therefore, before the review can truly understand the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance, we need to explore the way football clubs are governed to consider and 
broaden the current conceptual scope on a supporter’s role and relationship.  
2.5 Do Models of Football Governance dictate the Relationship Supporters hold with 
their Clubs?  
The themes of corporate governance were originally adopted by football, so clubs held the tools 
to address serious financial and operational difficulties, which still challenge the whole industry 
(Cordery, Sim & Baskerville, 2018). As a result, both football governance and the subsequent 
models used by clubs continue to evolve alongside the growth in professionalism, 
commercialisation and foreign investment across Europe’s highest football leagues (Rohde & 
Breuer, 2017). The rising number of financial revenues on offer throughout European football 
has attracted state-owned companies, global conglomerates and wealthy individuals, all 
looking to capitalise on the growing popularity and financial profits on offer with the control 






Table 2.1. European Football 20 Riches Clubs by Revenue in 2017 
  
The majority of these clubs in table 2.1 play their football in European’s most commercialised 
leagues of England, Spain, Germany and Italy with the exception of Paris St Germain who 
plays in France. As there is no single, accepted definition of corporate governance (Solomon, 
2007) there is certainly an acceptance several forces and factors guarantee there will always be 
differences between football countries and jurisdictions, when trying to converge models of 
corporate governance. This is certainly the case in these football countries, as the main 
20 
 
principles behind why clubs adopt certain models over others have left supporters feeling 
confused, as to why they have different relationships to that of other club supporters. To fully 
understand this confusion, there is a need to review current models of football governance, 
both theoretically and practically across European football’s most commercialised leagues, 
explores how clubs govern and the affect these different approaches have on various supporter 
groups.   
In the cases set out in the introduction, these supporters feel exasperated by the treatment of 
powerful owners, who continue to make decisions on behalf of the club (Cleland & Dixson, 
2015). This has led these groups to believe that supporters are merely for the financial benefit 
of a club to increase its revenue for the owners’ personal benefit (Krabbenbos, 2013). In a 
similar view, it is deemed supporters feel their role within a club is purely a financial one 
(commercial ticket and shirt sales), as this is the only way to build some kind of communication 
with their beloved club (Bolle, 2015). These supporters also feel their loyalty and commitment 
has been used to the club’s advantage, as they continue to capitalise on their unwavering 
support (Tapp, 2004), in order to hyper-commodify groups into commercial revenue 
(Giulianotti, 2015).   
More importantly, the four areas highlighted by Millward (2012) document how directors 
continue to use football supporters as consumers to achieve a club’s strategic business 
objectives. These objectives led to football governance models have continued to affect the 
relationship between clubs and their supporter groups. This was the case at the Spanish club, 
FC Malaga who took up the option to receive three years’ worth of TV money in 2018 to save 
off financial difficulties. This was due to owner, Qatar’s Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser Al Thani 
removing his financial investment, compounded with a refusal to sell his stake in the club. This 
left supporter groups stuck in a spiral of decline, relegated into La Liga second division, selling 
their best players and facing bankruptcy, while still under the control of Sheikh Thani. With 
multiple roles of President, Vice President and Chief Executive, the Sheikh’s personal wealth 
give him the option to govern his ownership and control together, without any opportunity for 
the supporters to remove him from the club (Malaga, 2019). Dubal (2010) describes Malaga’s 
model of football governance as more of a dictatorship, where fans widely regard the owner as 
a thief, a dictator, or a self-interested charlatan. Likewise, May (2018) links the previous 
owners of Birmingham City FC, Carson Yeung with the mysterious nature of global capitalism 
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on the rise throughout football, as he used the club to launder money and sign commercial deals 
with various Chinese companies (The Guardian, 2014).  
It is claimed this form of dictatorship in football governance seeks to control an organisation 
from a hierarchical structure, with a top to bottom perspective which only serves to make a 
profit for owners, shareholders, or even to fulfil a contract of a franchise (Hamil & Walters, 
2010). Evident in the case of the Manchester City Football Group Limited when Sheikh 
Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan became majority owner of Manchester City. At a later date, 
the group also went on to purchase ownership rights of New York City FC (USA) Melbourne 
City FC (Australian) and Yokohama F. Marinos (Japanese). As a consequence, Sheikh 
Mansour became the chief decision-maker for all four clubs from his position as the leader of 
City’s Ltd company, with his majority voting rights as the principal shareholder at the top of 
the city group (MCFC, October 2017). A far cry from today’s board members at Manchester 
City and a polar opposite to the 1990s, when fanzine editor Dave Wallace joined as a supporter 
representative (Cleland et at., 2018). 
Kennedy & Kennedy (2012) claim the corporate centred approach adopted across European 
football has been created on financial buoyancy, which has led to fan exploitation, spiralling 
debt and the threat of bankruptcy. In the quest for financial growth and increased 
commercialisation of the football industry, as supporters have merely become customers to 
maximise the personal wealth of a club’s owner (Dimitropoulos, 2014). For example, in the 
way, Glazer family members purchased Manchester United in 2005 for £790mn with a 
leveraged buy-out and more recently in 2017-2018 financial year, when the club generously 
funded six family member’s a dividend of approximately $23mn (£18mn) (The Guardian, 
2018). Marjoribanks & Farquharson (2016) claim this powerful control and influence by 
football owners who reside at board level, as club boards transform into boards of governance 
who focus on the strategy in operational areas of football, finance, marketing and people. Yet, 
the globalisation of the English Premier League (EPL) has created a new role for football 
directors and chief executives, who are tasked with developing new areas of revenue from 
increased TV rights, as vessels to promote other business, overseas stock market flotation and 




Previously, football governance has been used in clubs as a vehicle to improve financial 
performance and stock market returns to the benefit of powerful individual and companies. In 
this case, clubs across European football at Juventus & Lazio (Italy), Celtic & Rangers 
(Scotland), Arsenal & Manchester United (England) and Borussia Dortmund (Germany). 
Flotation on stock exchanges across the world is seen as a way to maximise a sports business, 
to attract investors who can earn a positive return on their investment (Leach & Szymanski, 
2015).  While, Wilson, Plumley & Ramchandani (2013) claim football clubs on a stock market 
return a healthier financial benefit to that of privately-owned clubs. Yet, Prigge & Tegtmeier 
(2019) state these clubs are overvalued with inflated share prices. Therefore, the true 
performance of football clubs on the stock exchange becomes lost and clouded, in the tangled 
web of interlinked global conglomerate and associated holding companies (Williams & 
Hopkinson, 2011). For example, at Juventus, the Agnelli family hold 63.8% shareholding and 
have a direct link to FIAT Chrysler Automobiles through Andrea Agnelli, who resides on their 
board of directors (FCA, 2019).  
This lack of transparency shown by football club owners who continue to face increased 
political pressure to include supporters at the heart of their clubs, to check their conduct and 
business decisions during their time as custodians (Maderer & Holtbrügge, 2019). Especially, 
due to the socio-economic impact felt by local communities when football businesses are 
dissolved and ultimately face expulsion from their respective leagues. In was the case of Bury 
FC with their expulsion from the English League One and Reus Deportiu FC who was given a 
three-year expulsion from Spanish La Liga Division Two. Yet, Cocieru et al. (2019) claim not 
all football supporters want to become owners and the tipping point against powerful owners 
comes from a series of events. These events start from an initial course of dissatisfaction needed 
to bring about change and result in formal movements against the owners. As a result, increased 
commercialisation has a negative effect on the emotional relationship between fans and clubs, 







A similar argument offered by Prigge (2019) use the transformation of Hamburger SV a 
member of the Bundesliga, to make a case towards a profit/win maximization model of 
governance and a move away from 50+1 membership model. These changes within Hamburger 
saw its engaging and contributing supporter communities pushed away from members into a 
role as customers and consumers. Similarly, Rohde & Breuer (2016) believe the maximation 
of commercial revenue and financial performance is the main driver for the sporting success of 
elite clubs (both domestically and across Europe) and has become critical to transfer and 
infrastructure investment. In the event of this sporting success, supporter groups are believed 
to become passive in disputing the way clubs govern and make business decisions (Welford, 
García & Smith, 2015). However, this has certainly not been the case at Charlton FC, as protest 
groups Coalition Against Roland Duchatelet (CARD) still questioned the way the club was 
being managed, even with the club’s successfully promoted back to the Championship during 
the 2018-2019 season, forcing the sale of the club in November 2019.  
Supporter groups aim their frustration at the way individual owners govern and global 
companies who sit on a club’s board of directors, who seem to make decisions to safeguard 
capital investments, secure loans and assets (Silva, 2015). However, a position on the board of 
directors does not always come with automatic financial benefits or supporter backing as 
witnessed at Newcastle United, as disengaged supporter groups not only keep up their action 
against owner Mike Ashley (ashleyout.com) with a boycott on club merchandise against his 
Sports Direct business empire. Zheng & Garcia (2017) claim this supporter action against the 
club reduces political salience, economic interests, cultural functions and traditions.  
These contingent factors have been felt throughout the German Bundesliga, as the 50+1 
membership model has become threatened by increased commercialisation of historic 
members clubs. At the moment, the more clubs adhere to the ownership rule than do not, but 
the likes of Borussia Dortmund (stock market) Red Bull Lipzig (global conglomerate) and 
Hoffenheim (private ownership under Dietmar Hopp) continue to challenge how clubs 
govern its constitutions, under the lax rule. This also highlights a disparity in the way German 
football clubs govern the balance between supporter rights and increased private ownership, 
evident with the growing signs of discontent in certain clubs. For example, Borussia 
Monchengladbach supporters have an open line of communication to the club’s board of 
directors, while RB Leipzig supporters have been judged as obsolete in a statement by sporting 
director, Ralf Rangnick (Uersfeld, 2016). Traditionally, it is believed German clubs have 
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always held a strong affiliation with their supporters, but the diminishing powers under the 
50+1 rule cast doubt on these future relations. Furthermore, when I company sponsors a 
German football club it enables private owners (individuals or companies) to increase their 
stake in a club (for more information on the 20+1 sponsor rule, see Oltermann, 2016), changes 
the way a club constitutionally governs the role and relationship with its supporters.  
Robinson et al (2012, p. 394) goes on to explain the rule and “stipulates that 50 percent plus 
one vote of an incorporated German football club must be owned by the club members 
association”. The 50+1 rule was brought into German football in 2002, in light of a financial 
crisis with TV company Kirch Media who went bankrupt while holding the broadcast rights to 
all Bundesliga games. After the collapse of the TV deal, supporters were seen as a stable set of 
stakeholders to govern the club, but the relaxed nature of the 50+1 rule has introduced private 
investment into German football, via the backdoor. This has seen German football, similarly 
to other European leagues witness unprecedented levels of commercialisation, as a result of the 
growth throughout the European football industry (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012; Edensor, 2015; 
Garcia, 2016).  
As a result, the 50+1 rule has become more relaxed in its nature and although still present in 
some capacity, clubs continue to govern with the use of associations differently from club to 
club. For example, several German clubs have a supporter representative from the association 
on their board, while other clubs do not even submit their balance sheets, even to their 
supervisory board (Brase & Reichart, 2005, cited by Dietl & Frank, 2007). These examples 
suggest that German football has become too complex from the relaxed attitude towards the 
50+1 rule as more and more clubs continue to change how they govern, particularly to suit their 
own interests and needs. This is reflected by Ziesche (2017) who points out there are three 
models of governance currently in operation throughout German football; the standard type, 
club-fan hybrid (Hamburger SV, Borussia Dortmund, SG Eintracht Frankfurt, FC Union Berlin 
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Operationally, German corporations and football clubs operate a two-tiered board structure. 
This two-board structure offer clubs in the German Bundesliga the opportunity to include a 
wider set of stakeholders at a supervisory level in the club. The principal role of a supervisory 
board is for club stakeholders to supervise the actions of board members, mainly those who 
hold personal liability to ratify their more important decisions (Bacs & Nagy, 2014). While this 
seems the case at Bayern Munich, one of Germany’s most famous and successful clubs, it also 
raises an important issue on how clubs select and include certain groups of stakeholders in 
decisions. The club’s main stockholders, namely Adidas, Audi and Allianz, hold a position on 
the company’s supervisory board, yet 277,000 registered members, backed by football 
regulation do not have any representation on Bayern Munich’s two boards. As a result, 
members are left confused as to their role at Bayern Munich, as the club pay little attention to 
the 50+1 rule synonymous with German football, which states members should hold the 
majority of voting rights within each club (Rohde & Breuer, 2016). 
Increased commercialisation throughout the football industry has triggered the growing debate 
amongst academics, as to the role of supporters and how much power and influence these 
groups should have in their clubs (for a full review see, Garcia & Welford, 2015). There were 
calls for football governance to be used to facilitate a relationship between the principal-agent 
(majority owner) and supporter groups (Geeraert, 2016). On one hand, governance has been 
used to suppress the actions of supporter groups and maintain sole control over a club, as a way 
to protect an owner’s investment (Rohde & Breuer, 2016). While on the other hand, governance 
has been recommended as a way for supporters to voice their concerns on mismanagement, to 
appease their concerns on financial irregularities made by the self-interested actions of wealthy 
football owners (McLeod, 2016). To combat this, Tobin (2017) claim supporter trusts have 
become a viable option to govern their clubs, built from a growing argument that supporters 
are better placed to protect club interests.  
A rise in supporter roles in governance has been seen as a viable model to prevent clubs from 
falling into administration from the consequences of bankruptcy and resistance against foreign 
investment in a club. The high-profile takeover of Manchester United by the Glazer family 
used to leverage debt against the club, this acted as a catalyst to reopen the debate on supporter 
governed clubs throughout English football. Brown’s early work in 2000 claimed that the 
takeover by the Glazer family destroyed its supporter communities at United. As a result, a set 
of disgruntled supporters went on to create a new football club called FC Utd of Manchester, 
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which was set up as a fan-owned club, to re-establish United’s lost communities. In reality, the 
takeover and extra debt placed on the club was a step too far for many supporters, who had 
already consumed a year on year increase in ticket prices and merchandise (Dubal, 2010). 
However, the reason behind the creation of FC Utd of Manchester remains unclear and raises 
an important question, as to why supporters felt the need to start up their own club. 
Portsmouth was another club held up as a blueprint on how supporters can take over their own 
football club. This case was slightly different to that of Manchester United, as the supporter's 
trust became the club’s majority shareholders back in 2013. This was to save the club from 
being liquidated, which was triggered by a substantial unpaid tax bill to Her Majesty's Revenue 
and Customs (HMRC). This tax bill ran the club’s debt up to a reported £70mn, as a result of 
years of mismanagement and over-spending (Serby, 2014). Yet, on closer inspection, the 
funding behind the supporter trust was underwritten by the local council and a number of 
wealthy investors (The Guardian, 2013). The model of supporter-ownership at Portsmouth was 
said to incorporate 2,426 supporter-shareholders, who all paid £1000 for a share in the club.  
This instilled a new management team and galvanised a type of rescue ethos throughout the 
club, which was evident from increased gate receipts at home games, during the 2014-2015 
season. However, the supporter-owned club over time became an attractive investment 
opportunity, as it was debt-free and went on to record an operating profit of £118.000 at the 
end of 2015 (Portsmouth Financial Statement, 2015). This made Portsmouth FC ripe for a 
takeover from a number of wealthy individuals, willing to invest in the club’s infrastructure 
and playing staff.   
The takeover came to fruition in 2017, when the supporter ownership at Portsmouth was 
replaced with a wealthy American Billionaire, Michael Eisner of The Walt Disney Company, 
who paid £5.7m to become the club’s majority shareholder (Portsmouth FC, 2017). 
Portsmouth’s buyout has led many to accept that supporters do not have the finances to 
compete, or even to takeover well established professional football clubs, particularly in 
Europe’s top leagues. Mick Williams, one of the founder members of the supporter trust and 
club director recommended in a statement to other supporters that “another round of fund-
raising amongst the trust’s member-shareholders will not necessarily generate the money 
needed to sustain the club” (The Guardian, May 2017). This admission has highlighted the 
growing tension in two of the most coveted supporters owned clubs in England, Portsmouth 
FC and FC Utd of Manchester, as both have been plagued by director infighting, power 
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struggles and a lack of financial transparency at board level, similar to those clubs with 
powerful private owners.  
Evident, when FC Utd supporters stormed the pitch during a league game, for the club to act 
against the lack of democracy at board level and the way its elected leaders made decisions 
(MEN, 2016). This was also reflected at Portsmouth before the takeover, as an unsanctioned 
£3000 loan payment to a club employee and the late submission of annual accounts started to 
question how the club was being governed by the supporter’s trust (Pompey Trust, 2015). More 
importantly, these cases highlight that even clubs who are governed from supporters in key 
positions, still have stakeholder groups who continue to question the role of the board within a 
fan led structure (Ward, 2013). As a result of these issues, it also highlights there is still a 
disparity between different sets of supporter groups, even when football clubs are managed by 
themselves (Doidge, 2016).  
Alongside, the rise in the number of studies on models of supporter governance, academics 
have continually upheld the Spanish model of membership as an example of good football 
governance, due to the democratic rights that member clubs bestow on supporters (Brown & 
Walsh, 2000; Hamil, Walters & Watson, 2010; O’Brian, 2017). O’Brian (2014, p. 41) goes on 
to explain that Spanish member clubs “constitute a symbolic democracy which maintains a 
bond between governance, ownership and the club’s wider community and support”. It is 
believed, the democratic approach to governance with the use of members inside a club builds 
a strong affiliation to local communities, which in turn enhances supporter participation, social 
cohesion and relations (Parnell & Richardson, 2017).  However, the European Union 
competition commission ruled that Spanish members/sports clubs were given an unfair 
advantage over other clubs, due to the tax breaks offered by the Spanish Government. The 
ruling calls into question the inclusion of supporters as members in Spain, as “professional 
football is a commercial activity with significant money involved and public money must 
comply with fair competition rules” (European Commission, 2016).  
In the literature on models of football governance, the importance of supporters has been the 
subject of considerable discussion (Garcia & Welford, 2015). A closer look at the most 
commercialised leagues across European football only adds to the confusion on why different 
clubs have chosen to govern supporters with their own approach. It has been claimed, the way 
a club governs is due to the member's model (Spain), or even the 50+1 (German), but this only 
adds to the confusion around models of football governance. For example, Athletic Bilbao, 
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Barcelona and Real Madrid are all members-based clubs but govern differently. Similarly, 
clubs that fall under the 50+1 regulation, such as Schalke who adhere to the membership rule, 
whereas RB Leipzig governs under private ownership. As a consequence of supporter action 
and protest across English football, the British Government claims the way clubs govern is not 
fit for purpose. Therefore, as the use of governance and the diversification of model continues 
to spread across European football, there remains a need to understand how different clubs 
govern to further the knowledge on supporter relations and investigate how mangers decide if 
supporter groups really count as legitimate stakeholders when making business decisions.  
2.6 Do Supporters Really Matter to the way a Football Clubs Govern its Business?  
Scholars have argued that managers should include supporters as co-creators to increase the 
value of an organisation (Zagnoli, & Radicchi, 2010). An alternative view is these stakeholder 
groups should be managed with total disregard to maintain the financial performance, which 
protects only the interests of the shareholders (Acero, Serrano & Dimitropoulos, 2017).  It is 
evident, several studies have adopted stakeholder typologies on football relations to address 
and classify supporter groups, mainly to manage a club more effectively (Senaux, 2008; 
Walters & Tacon, 2010; Anagnostopoulos, 2011; De` Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015).  This 
has started a debate both academically and professionally on the role of supporters as legitimate 
stakeholders and questions which groups really matter to managers (Miragaia, Ferreira & 
Carreira, 2014).   
It is believed the attributes of supporters help to classify a group's salient influence, by the 
relationship they hold directly or indirectly with a football club (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015, 
p.107).  Trequattrini, et al. (2016) view reflects recent studies that claim supporter groups need 
a presence in how their club governs, even if only to achieve its strategic objectives, or to 
increase business and team performance. Similarly, Ogbonna & Harris (2014) state supporter 
relationships reflect a club’s culture and these are mutually beneficial to both parties, but 
groups across clubs continually fail to penetrate club structures. Several studies advocate the 
benefits of classifying supporters as stakeholders and places the emphasis on building key 
relationships with managers, but not from a club perspective. Largely, the legitimacy of a group 
of supporters is dependent on the assumption of managers, who hold the authority to make 
decisions toward the club’s strategic plan (Geeraert, 2015).  Therefore, it is viewed from the 
studies covered earlier, the majority of football clubs continue to classify supporter 
relationships to coincide with a club’s drive towards profitability and economic performance. 
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Zagnoli & Radicchi (2010) use a corporate approach to classify stakeholder relationships in 
football clubs and believe supporters can add value as co-creators. The authors believe that 
matching supporter’s inclination to cooperate as part of the club’s community, which improves 
the actions and choices of managers. However, the evidence suggests there is limited 
knowledge in the classification of supporters within football clubs. This was summed up when 
Hewer, Gannon & Cordina (2015) who claim supporters are still being classed with the 
characteristics of a customer and not that of a stakeholder. This position is reflective of the 
current issues throughout the football industry, pointed out when Stene (2016) addressed these 
issues and claim that clubs must embrace the community feeling amongst supporters, but again, 
in reality, he admits that often these groups are used as a way to maximise profits.  Moreover, 
the eyes of owners are firmly placed on a supporter’s corporate value, as clubs still fail to 
capitalise on the cultural aspects of their custodianship (Page & Spira, 2016). 
It is believed that managers have the power to influence Meso levels of supporter communities 
to draw on different levels of supporter relations, yet those in power must start to reflect the 
socio-political and economic environments of the club (Garcia & Welford, 2015). Taking the 
political agenda in football a step further, Morrow (2013) starts to explain the complex realities 
that occur when clubs manage supporters, as these groups have a varying degree of powers in 
certain situations. This is the case when owners and managers in football clubs continue to use 
supporters for multiple commercial benefits, mainly as a consumer and not with the power of 
legitimate stakeholders (Cicut et al., 2017).  Following on, the authors go on to claim 
stakeholder relationships in football are not always through pre-defined procedures and point 
out that a large number of supporter interactions remain informal. Yet, this default position for 
supporters as informal stakeholders in a club highlights their limited influence. Similarly, 
Ferkins & Shilbury (2015) points out there is still a need to explain and clarify the dilemma of 
multiple stakeholders, particularly when applied in a footballing context.  Therefore, the 
following section will investigate how previous studies have analysed the role of managers 




2.7 How do Managers in Football Clubs Classify Supporter Groups that Really 
Count?  
Giulianotti (2002) was one of the first to classify supporter groups with the use of a taxonomy 
and measure supporter groups towards a consumer relationship, due to the rise in hyper-
commodification in football. The author went on to classify supporter relations based on a 
degree of thick or thin solidarity with the club and use hot and cold attributes to understand the 
influence of several groups. However, a weakness in the study was that the more a supporter 
becomes detached from a club (Flâneur/Cold), the more these groups become a target of 
football consumerism by club managers. More to the point, the following taxonomy suggests 
a shift in attitudes from the manager inside a club to reflect supporter more as a traditional 
consumer (Figure 2.1).    
Figure 2.1. A Taxonomy of Spectator Identities in Football 
 
  





A notable addition to the literature was that of Zagnoli & Radicchi (2010) who set out to 
identify supporter relationships within a single club context of Fiorentina in Italy. The authors 
used primary and secondary typology (defined by Clarkson, 1995) to determine the influence 
that supporters have on the internal dynamics of a club. Firstly, this theoretical framework 
claim that supporter groups were co-creators in a club, with a role as primary stakeholders. 
Secondly, the authors then went on to defined supporter groups against similar attributes of 
other stakeholder groups, most notably management, sponsors and suppliers.  However, the 
study was driven with an eye on the economic benefit to Fiorentina, which reflects a 
stakeholder model used to drive the club’s revenue and profit. Another issue with the proposed 
model is it classifies supporter groups with the same power and influence as management, 
seemingly as primary stakeholders. Yet, in practical terms, it is unrealistic that supporter groups 
hold the same rights as club managers, particularly as these are responsible for decisions, 
actions and business strategy (Figure 2.2).    
Figure 2.2. A Stakeholder Map for Fiorentina Football Club  
  




Anagnostopoulos (2011) used stakeholder typologies in previous studies to classify supporter 
groups again with Mitchell et al (1997) seminal stakeholder framework of power legitimacy 
and urgency. The author used a yes and no typology as a framework to classify the role of 
different stakeholders in Greek football clubs. This study went on to classify supporters as 
definitive groups of stakeholders, those who need the full attention of club managers. However, 
the use of a conceptual lens through the eyes of managers, only reflect the subconscious actions 
of individuals from their own personal assumptions. This leaves supporters feeling 
marginalised from those in power, as certain groups are disconnected from the clubs.  
As a result, supporter groups can only increase their relationship with the clubs by changing 
the perception of managers, mainly with disruptive action, movements and protests against 
owners. This is in the belief, there is no feasible way for supporters to increase their position 
as stakeholders unless managers continually reclassify groups to reflect a change in 
environmental conditions or the characteristics of different groups (Table 2.2).  
Anagnostopoulos (2011) points out that while the early application of salient classification has 
some limitations, it would be also beneficial to use stakeholder typologies on separate football 
clubs to identify the different historic, cultural and local values that arise from club to club.  
Table 2.2. Stakeholder Types and the Attributes in Greek Professional Football 
 
    Attributes     
Stakeholder Type Power Legitimacy Urgency 
Employees ‘Definitive’ Yes Yes Yes 
Supporters’ 
clubs 
‘Definitive’ Yes Yes Yes 
Sport ‘parent’ 
club 
‘Dominant’ Yes Yes No 
Local authorities ‘Discretionary’ No Yes No 
Press ‘Dangerous’ Yes No Yes 
Organizing 
bodies 
‘Discretionary’ Yes Yes No 
Source: Anagnostopoulos (2011) 
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De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles (2015) later attempted to use Mitchell, Agle & Wood typology 
on one football club to apply the conceptual lens on Brazilian football. However, the study 
created a different set of results, particularly when taken in the context of football supporters. 
The authors went on to claim supporter groups were non-stakeholders, as this group held no 
salient power to influence their football club.  Yet, on closer inspection, the conceptual lens 
applied the typology slightly different to Anagnostopoulos (2011) study, which maybe explains 
the indifferent set of results. As an example, the study categorised stakeholders with three 
descriptors of demanding, dependents and irrelevant and not with the typologies of power, 
legitimacy and urgency attributes, previously used against Greek football clubs.    
A notable difference between the studies was that supporters and their groups (fans) came out 
as irrelevant to the club. However, another weakness in the study was the use of one set of 
managers from within one football club in São Paulo, Sociedade Esportiva Palmeiras.  While 
it can be recognised the study was conducted to focus on the history, cultural and local values 
of one club as advocated by Anagnostopoulos (2011), it can also be argued that the research 
conducted on one club, does not reflect the relationship that supporters hold in different 
countries, leagues and clubs to reflect how different clubs perceive the value of supporter 
relations.  Therefore, there is a growing recognition that the complex relations between clubs 
and football supporters make it difficult to identify different groups of supporters. Mainardes 
et al. (2012) claim this is down to the limited amount of studies that individually classify 
groups, which fail to understand stakeholders in their own set of unique circumstances.   
A continuum of studies has developed a body of knowledge on supporter relations to 
understand their attributes as stakeholders in a football club (Table 3.3). This theoretical 
framework developed by Mitchell et al. (1997) still resonates in studies today, which classify 
stakeholder attributes without really focusing the conceptual lens on different sets of supporters 
in their own settings. Biscaia et al. (2018) used Mitchell’s conceptual lens to understand the 
behavioural intention of supporters and identifies different groups from their stakeholder 
attributes. Yet, this study randomised the data collection without any reference to which 
football club they followed. Without any reference to a supporter’s football club, it is difficult 
to understand the environmental conditions behind the study’s self-perceived fan-identity 




Unfortunately, these previous studies have paid little attention to the influence that 
environmental conditions play when classifying supporter groups inside clubs. Therefore, it is 
believed there is a greater need to understand the influence of different sets of supporters in the 
context of their own club. This is reflected in the different ways a club supporter groups were 
classified in the studies by Anagnostopoulos (2011) and De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles (2015). 
This review starts to question why the attributes of these relationships were so different, even 
though the studies used the same theoretical framework of Mitchel et al. As a consequence, the 
next section aims to explore the limitations in the previous studies, which classify supporter 
relations with the use of different stakeholder typologies    
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2.8 A Critique on Stakeholder Typologies in Football:   The Classification or 
Declassification of Supporter Groups  
The use of power, legitimacy and urgency typologies was developed as a conceptual lens to 
classify stakeholders by Mitchell, Agle & Wood (1997) and followed by Mainarders et al 
(2012) seminal work on stakeholder types helps to understand the relationships between the 
organisation and its respective stakeholders. These typologies classify stakeholders as a way to 
understand their influence, as managers can then decide which groups are relevant to an 
organisation. There is a growing belief throughout the football industry that owners and 
managers hold too much power to decide which level to engage supporters within a club. As 
Henisz (2017) points out, supporters are aggrieved as they feel their loyalty has been taken for 
granted. The limited knowledge of supporter groups has also been compounded by the 
theoretical conceptual lens, which has been angled to reflect a manager’s perspective, as this 
can distort the classification process on the salient attributes of supporters, either to include, or 
exclude groups from a personal perspective (Patel, 2015).  
There is a belief that supporters are to be managed by football clubs either directly or indirectly 
as a wider set of stakeholders, due to their multilateral relationships that can affect club 
decisions (Junghagen, 2016). Yet, clubs have the power to determine the type of relations it 
holds with supporters, as managers hold the power to deselect groups based on how they wish 
to conduct business (De Siqueira Pajanian & Telles, 2015). These typologies used by clubs to 
classify groups of supporters have merely reflected the actions of managers. To reflect the role 
of managers inside clubs, supporters have become stigmatised with customer status through 
the persistent drive for owners to capitalise on football’s economic growth (Ogbonna & Harris, 
2014). Yet, it has become apparent that managers with governance responsibilities inside clubs 
find it difficult to keep pace with the continual shift in stakeholder relations, due to increased 






The varying degree of supporter relations and the effect of internal structures inside a club 
highlight the broad spectrum of supporter roles and types named throughout the literature. 
These range from full stakeholders in Greek football clubs (Anagnostopoulos, 2011) to 
irrelevant stakeholders in Brazilian football clubs (De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015). It is 
believed that the influence of a manager within the theoretical framework over relies on a single 
set of assumptions, as Fillis and Mackay (2014) claim managers make supporters feel 
marginalised from their clubs.  Yet, supporter groups remain loyal to their clubs, no matter the 
circumstances or treatment subjected to them by those in charge (Tapp, 2004). Meanwhile, 
supporters continue to believe they are entitled to a meaningful relationship with their club, 
other than a financial one (Buchholze & Lopatta, 2017). Yet, the stakeholder typologies used 
in previous studies fail to acknowledge that similar stakeholders form in different groups. 
Furthermore, stakeholder groups hold different attributes, especially when unrecognised can 
become a negative influence on a club (Adams, Morrow & Thomson, 2016).  The review 
identifies the need to identify whether a club’s culture, history and local values are embedded 
in the way clubs govern supporter relationships. This adds to the fact that the majority of studies 
on football stakeholders have been conducted in isolation with one club or an organisation 
(Anagnostopoulos, 2011; De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015; Buchholze & Lopatta, 2017). 
There is a growing acceptance from the previous studies, for the need to understand supporters 
beyond a single case and use “methodologies that include in their sample supporters at different 
clubs, different divisions and even different countries if possible, so their experiences can be 
compared” (Garica & Welford, 2015, p. 525). 
2.9 Supporter Pressure and Embeddedness within Football Clubs 
Traditionally, football has been viewed as a social network, built from economic activity in 
social relations, which in the sporting context of clubs and societies can be described as 
embeddedness (Green & Ghaye, 2018). While, some clubs have sort to strength environmental 
linkages and inter-dependency to embed its local supporter communities (Jakobsen, 
Gammelsæter & Fløysand, 2009), other clubs have become too embedded within the economic 
system and therefore, disembedded from supporters and their communities who birthed and 
stained the club (Webber, 2014). The latter has been witnessed throughout English Premier 
League, which has become its own economic system with the increase in stock market 
flotations, merchandising and sale of media right, with clubs courting the attention of global 
market relations instead of cultivating its local supporter groups (Edensor & Millington, 2008). 
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Furthermore, football clubs have even become disembedded from their geographical locations 
and local communities, trying the replace them with virtual supporter networks for the benefit 
of market relations, not local social relations. For example, at Manchester United local 
supporters have been priced out of Old Trafford for home games (Poulton, 2017), while the 
club’s global memberships scheme has risen to 254,000 in 2018/2019, a 15.2% increase 
compared to the previous season, used to push global merchandising and hospitality packages 
(Manchester Utd Annual Report, 2019). Yet, can football clubs continue to relax, or even 
dissembled social supporter relations from football societies to benefit the economic actions of 
owners? 
2.10 Can Football Clubs Really ignore Groups of Non-Stakeholder Supporters?  
The existing body of football research helps to identify embedded stakeholders with the use of 
a conceptual lens, which is still used to classify the salient attributes of supporter relations 
today. However, the theoretical framework has been applied to football supporters as one 
entity, where groups are deemed to have a non-stakeholder relationship when part of groups 
can have split relationships, either they hold influence, or cannot be influenced by an 
organisation (Mitcehl et al., 1997). In this notion, the theme of non-stakeholders has continued 
throughout the studies and become somewhat of a default category without any rationale, 
explanation or foundation on why certain groups are deemed irrelevant. This view is supported 
by Dowling & Legg (2017) who claim the term stakeholder is often used, but rarely do we stop 
to ask what a stakeholder actually means to those in power. There is a deep-rooted dependency 
on managers throughout the studies, which remain unchallenged since Mitchell et al developed 
the typologies back in 1997, which continue to this day to be used as a theoretical framework 
to operationalise stakeholder theory. This framework works from a bottom-up perspective with 
the rationale that all groups are non-stakeholders until managers acknowledge a group's salient 
attributes to make them into legitimate stakeholders. This also raises an important question as 
to how a supporter group can engage with their clubs and become a legitimate stakeholder 
when they are unaware of the relationship they already hold with the club, or what consists of 





This suggests stakeholder groups have no power to influence club actions when managers 
continue to classify a group as non-stakeholders. Therefore, non-stakeholders do not hold the 
opportunity to gain recognition as a legitimate group, should they wish to express their 
dissatisfaction, or increase their type of relationship (De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015). In 
light of this, it is highly unlikely for a group of supporters to build their influence from inside 
the club, as the typologies are controlled by managers. Therefore, the only form of influence 
that non-stakeholder supporters hold is with protests and action against owners, in a vicious 
circle that strengthens the resolve of managers to keep them as non-stakeholders to protect 
against a club’s interests.   
As a consequence, it is not just the direct actions of managers that fuel the tension between 
clubs and supporters, but the pre-classification of groups that dictates their ongoing and future 
relationships with a club. Another questionable area from the studies is the use of the 
conceptual stakeholder lens and where it is applied in an organisation. This contributes to the 
vast and diverse classification of stakeholder groups with football clubs, all with a broad 
spectrum of relationships that renders the quest for a singular definition so unfeasible (Miles, 
2012). Perhaps the most serious disadvantage to an unfeasible stakeholder definition is the lack 
of knowledge on the role of non-stakeholder supporters. Furthermore, studies continue to point 
the salient conceptual lens at stakeholder groups on a who’s in and why basis (Zagnoli & 
Radicchi, 2010). This suggests the actions of managers in football clubs continue to neglect the 
role of non-stakeholders, which heightens the scepticism within these groups and fails to 
incorporate the continual flow of people that can become associated with a club (Nissen, 2015). 
Yet, this limits a club’s ability to govern all legitimate or potential stakeholder groups and make 
relations between the club managers and supporter groups become so unfeasible, which leads 
to continual action against a club’s hierarchy. 
2.11 Can Football Supporters Influence their Own Stakeholder Relationship with the 
Rise of Supporter Trusts, Associations and Groups? 
The rise of supporter groups across European clubs have formed to protest against the increase 
in commercialisation throughout football (Fillis & Mackay, 2014; Millward, 2016), with the 
corporate takeover of clubs (MacLean, 2016) and as a method to empower and protect their 
local football communities (Totten, 2016). It is believed, the action of football owners or those 
leaders tasked with governing the club judge supporter groups as troublemakers (Numerato, 
2015). Yet, Turner (2017) outlines that supporters are a fundamental part of every club and 
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without fans, football would be nothing. In this case, the relentless action of supporter groups 
against clubs continues to gather pace, as recurring protests are held with an air of cynicism on 
the real motives of shareholder directors and the regimes they represent (Sanders et al, 2014).  
For example, the recent tension at Charlton FC has been triggered by the empowerment of 
Chief Executive, Katrien Meire to manage the club’s affairs in 2014. This is because owner 
Roland Duchatelet has taken a backseat in his native country of Belgium, unwilling to 
communicate with any supporter groups. The Charlton case is not unique, as other clubs have 
also faced some similar action from their supporters and spans right across European football. 
Vimieiro (2015) states dissatisfaction results from the rise of globalisation, which has used the 
loyalty of supporters as a form of taxation, as protests are the only form of communication 
these groups have with their club.  
There is realism from different academic studies that football owners continue to use 
governance to protect themselves, particularly with the growing tension amongst groups of 
supporters (Zheng & Garcia, 2017). The current action of certain owners has been said to 
classify a supporter's relationship with a broad spectrum, based on how they influence a club 
and its activities (Taylor, 1992). Evident when, Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles (2015) claimed that 
football supporters and their groups were irrelevant. Unfortunately, supporter-based studies use 
the theme of commercialisation, which still underpins research into football governance. The 
explosion of financial revenue has led many to believe governance can be used as a tool to keep 
pace on and off the field, no matter how good or bad it is for supporter groups (Spaaij, 2013). 
In simple terms, Morrow (2015) claims the relationship between supporters and their clubs has 
undoubtedly changed over time throughout football. Furthermore, Fitzpatrick (2016) goes on 
to claim that governance issues in football continue to widen the political debate, particularly 
around the role of supporter groups, as this only serves to fuel the decline in public confidence 
on how clubs are being governed. 
2.12 Critiquing Models of Football Governance and the Role of Supporter Groups 
A review of the literature has explored the different theoretical concepts of stakeholder theory 
in corporate governance, which has investigated the role of supporters inside the wide and 
diverse models in practice throughout European football. It has become evident from the 
review, many of the previous studies are too descriptive and simplistic in nature to explain 
current models of football governance in operation. For example, the 50+1 model of football 
governance to states how German clubs govern, similarly with the membership model across 
40 
 
Spain. These descriptive references used to explain models of football governance are also too 
dependent on structures of ownership, or even as legal and regulative frameworks, as clubs 
continue to govern differently within the confines of their management structures.  
The descriptive nature used to classify models of governance has always been heavily 
influenced by the control of club boards, particularly on how clubs can maximise profits and 
investments. For example, how across English football are governed from a board of directors, 
seemingly to maximise the profits for director-shareholders and associated holding companies. 
Especially in some of the leading clubs across English football, such as Manchester United, 
Liverpool and Chelsea. This monopoly at the top of commercially driven football clubs 
seemingly steers governance for the commercial interest of owners to capitalise on sector 
growth throughout the industry. This is representative of the current literature that uses “off the 
shelf”, or default and descriptive models of governance built in other industries to explain how 
football clubs govern the business. For example, profit maximisation (Dimitropoulos & 
Tsagkanos, 2012), utility maximation (Madden & Robinson, 2012) community ownership 
(Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012) and members associations (Franck, 2010). However, the majority 
of the studies on football governance have been based on single clubs with little, or no synergy 
or analysis to contrast the workings of how clubs can govern on a daily basis within these 
generically classified models of governance. Furthermore, the review highlighted the limited 
knowledge of why and how different clubs construct their unique way to govern. It can also be 
argued that previous studies on football governance rely too heavily on the role of managers, 
club strategy and commercial growth, or even regulative sports frameworks used to describe 
and identify a certain model. For example, the stakeholder approach by Senaux, 2008, spending 
power by Frank, 2010, or corporate social responsibility by Breitbarth & Harris in 2008.  
As a consequence, these various dimensions and descriptions used to classify football 
governance have left supporters confused in their role, particularly with their interchangeable 
salient powers from club to club. These complexities have made it difficult to obtain a sensible 
solution on how to govern the rising amount of disruptive supporter action against clubs. 
Similarly, if clubs do not understand the nature of its supporter relations, in terms of how the 
club governs, nor will it understand the impact that ungoverned actions have on a club. The 
vast majority of studies reflect the need to readdress the balance between the economic, social 
and political context of a supporter relationship. The view taken by Dimitropoulos (2014) is 
that governance can facilitate the relationship between the club and supporter groups to keep 
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an eye on commercial revenue and corporate risk, which in turn protects the future of the club. 
Yet, unless the body of knowledge grows on the relationship that supporters hold within 
different models of football governance and the influence of environmental factors (countries, 
league and clubs), it will remain difficult to understand the importance of supporter relations. 
2.13 Future Research Agenda  
The future research agenda aims to point the conceptual lens of stakeholder theory directly 
onto models of football governance, away from managers to reflect the true meaning of a club’s 
relationship with different groups of supporters. The limitation identified throughout the 
literature review highlight there is a need to investigate some unique models of football 
governance, to explore a true definition of how clubs govern their constitutions. This would 
benefit the body of knowledge around the construction phase of football governance and help 
to understand a true definition. Yet, before we can build the study’s knowledge of football 
governance, we must first understand the rationale and influence of how different clubs govern.  
Currently, models used throughout the literature use pre-empted frameworks of ownership, 
business and regulation as the rationale to investigate models of football governance. 
Therefore, by stripping back these descriptive models in Europe most commercialised 
European leagues, the research can start to understand how governance models are constructed, 
so that this research can extend the current body of knowledge on how to govern the ongoing 
relations between clubs and its supporters. However, before a club can effectively govern a 
group as stakeholders, there is a need to understand the attributes of various supporter groups, 
under different environmental conditions across European football clubs. Therefore, to truly 
understand the role that supporters play within a club’s model of governance, we need to 
investigate if the way clubs govern predetermines their type of influence before managers have 







CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.0 Chapter Introduction  
This chapter considers the philosophical conditions of the study and outlines the ontological 
and epistemological position behind the research approach. This scientific study aims to 
investigate a phenomenon that reflects real-life issues in the football industry, as it is important 
for the researcher to find his own approach and original perspective to explore the research 
phenomenon. Thematic analysis uses data collection techniques, data analysis and case 
reporting to explore the two research questions. These themes aim to interpret a contemporary 
set of research issues that arise from a relationship between football clubs and their supporter 
groups to explore real-life relations as they stand.  
3.1 Quantitative v Qualitative Research  
A research study requires the design to select between a quantitative (deductive) and qualitative 
(inductive) approach from the outset (Table 3.1). Creswell (2013, p. 247) claim the strengths 
of a quantitative research approach works on a deduction of relationships and use variables, so 
that “numbered data can be analysed using statistical procedures.” Whereas, qualitative 
methods act on a different set of principles to that of deduction and interpret the research themes 
from the social actions of those involved, rather than the external forces that have no meaning 
to the research phenomenon (Bryman, 2015). It is believed a quantitative research approach 
use a numerical analysis, yet often fails to study the phenomena directly (Cortina & Landis, 
2013). Therefore, the quantitative approach has been discounted, as it “tends to emphasize on 
relatively large-scale and representative sets of data and is often, falsely in our view, presented 
or perceived as being about the gathering of facts” (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996, p. 61). 
Table. 3.1. Comparing Qualitative and Quantitative Research  
 
Qualitative Research Quantitative Research 
Induction  Deduction  
Subjectivity  Objectivity 
Context  Generality  
Source: Morgan (2013) 
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For this study, a qualitative approach was selected to explore the complexities of social 
relationships, which originate from within a football club and its surrounding communities. 
O’Dwyer & Bernauer (2013) claim the use of a natural setting can enhance the narrative inquiry 
into a social business. Taken in this context, a focus on the real-life experience of those affected 
by a real-life sense of realism helps to understand a deeper working knowledge of a social 
world (Snape & Spencer, 2003). The use of history, culture, economic and political dimensions 
in a club can explore the social interactions as they materialise within a global football business 
(Giulianotti, 2012). Whilst, the selected qualitative approach uses the social dimensions of a 
football club, it is also important to consider the impact of external influences in the study. Yet, 
unplanned social science events can distort the validity of the evidence throughout the research 
process, when certain conditions arise outside of the study’s stipulated areas (Patton, 2005).  
To draw on the social dimensions that form in a football world, an inductive strategy draws on 
the patterns associated with observations and measures the characteristics of individuals as part 
of a social phenomenon (Blaikie, 2009). These methods of induction promote a subjective 
approach to different relations and draw on multiple social and cultural events that deepen 
knowledge of various human groups and their behaviours.  Merriam & Tisdell (2015) claim 
this use of environmental conditions from a social aspect, strengthened by the research settings 
provides an adequate explanation to the research question. This framework uses the research 
question to highlight the inductive nature of social behaviours in supporter groups, which 
provides an insight into how group relationships form. Creswell (2013) claims this highlights 
the societal effects of management practice. Therefore, these inductive considerations of 
supporter groups, in conjunction with social actions of a club, draw on different types of social 
behaviours, which “are often not directly visible, but they can be studied through 
their effects and expressions” (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006, p. 12).    
To explore these social dynamics of humanistic behaviours, the study promotes an air of 
subjectivity, as the research framework points toward the way football clubs govern to explore 
why many supporter groups “remain aloof and outside of the system, so that an approximation 
of reality can be obtained” (Lichtman, 2013, p.36). To investigate these unknown areas, 
subjectivity draws on the natural experiences of individuals and groups to explore the 
sociological relationships both with a sense of reality, but also from the discourse felt within 
different social groups (Tsoukala, 2008). Also, this research approach draws on the norms and 
values that resonate throughout the sport, which may explain the unique factors that materialise 
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from within social supporter relations (Carlsson, Norberg & Persson, 2011). In light of these 
factors, a quantitative approach was selected by the researcher to explore the social dimension 
of the football industry and place a focus on relationships and interactions between supporters 
and their clubs.  
3.2 Ontology Considerations    
It is believed that “paradigms are all-encompassing systems of interrelated practices and 
thinking that define for researchers the nature of their inquiry along three dimensions; ontology, 
epistemology and methodology” (Blanche, Durrheim & Painter, 2006, p. 6). Ontology seeks to 
comprehend real-world realities, like football clubs that take into consideration the nature of 
the social world, but in the context of its own environment (Richie et al., 2013). These 
paradigms can focus on realism to draw new knowledge of supporter groups, as this is a 
different way to look at the research issues that have arisen from an evolving football industry. 
Hepp & Roamn (2007) calls this outlook an organisational sphere as a way to apply the use of 
functional ontology onto the collective experience of individuals, which helps understand the 
realities of club actions. To draw upon these realities, draw and use the experiences of club 
managers and supporters, which seeks to understand the actions and behaviours through 
“deploys, expands and transmits in their personal interactions” (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000, 
citing Whittington, p. 117).  
The two main aspects of ontology are realism and idealism. Realism uses the world as a reality, 
in which “entities exist independently of being perceived, or independently of our theories 
about them” (Phillips, 1987, p. 205). To explore the way managers, act in a club it is important 
to use the thoughts and feelings of those impacted by these actions, to understand the 
complexities that arise from within the football industry (Tolson & Schofied, 2012). In this 
view, real-life emotions can reflect the nature of the current relations between a football club 
and different supporter groups to contextualise the perceptions of those involved with a sense 
of realism. Therefore, to investigate the social world of a football industry, it is important from 
an ontology perspective to explore the interactive realities that happen between a club and 




3.3 Epistemology Considerations  
Following on from the ontology paradigm, the epistemology philosophy needs to consider the 
logic, or methods behind the discovery of a study’s new realities to “explain what sensory or 
perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge” (Moser, 2002, p. 4). 
Lee & Lings (2008) claim this philosophical consideration makes a logical comprehension of 
practice, from an observed position to fully immerse the researcher within the research 
approach. Hughson, Inglis & Free (2004) goes on to claim this position helps to deepen the 
knowledge from the humanistic behaviours of managers and subordinates, as it is more 
important uncovers the feelings of human interactions. Creswell (2013) states these interactions 
reside alongside individual experiences, as it also draws on the everyday experiences with those 
who live inside these interactions. Therefore, to draw on the socialistic environments of a 
football club and the abundance of human interactions and structural experiences, the research 
question has been set to “orientate towards lived experiences (phenomenology) which interpret 
the “texts” of life (hermeneutics)” (Van Manen, 1990, p. 4).  
Furthermore, phenomenology understands how new experiences appear from a sense of living 
and being in certain situations (Lewis & Staehler, 2010). This type of experience builds 
knowledge from the social interpretive nature of realism to identify and interpret the collective 
assumption of individuals from inside a diverse world (Frew & Spiegler, 2012).  These 
hermeneutic interpretations of socio-cultures within football can uncover the human intentions 
of club managers and supporters as a part of life. Corbin, Strauss & Strauss (2014) advocates 
building knowledge from the notable differences between speaking, hearing, listening and 
keeping silent. This investigation on the socio-cultures that form in football clubs uses the 
expressions and actions of managers and supporters to explore the experiences of individuals, 
all in conjunction with the club’s economic, political and social environments (Table 3.2). 
Furthermore, an open inquiry uses the complex social world of football to investigate the social 
actions of different human relationships, which form inside different groups (Denscombe, 
2014).  Therefore, the intangible and complex nature of football clubs has reiterated the 
importance of a theoretical framework used to build the “phenomenological desire to 
understand and describe the phenomenon of entrepreneurial learning as it is ‘lived’” (Cope, 




Table 3.2. Consideration of Positivist and Phenomenology Theoretical Perspective  
 
Positivist Phenomenology 
Operationalizing concepts so that they can 
be measured. 
Using multiple methods to establish different 
views of a phenomenon  
Using large samples from which to 
generalize to the population. 
Using small samples research in-depth over time 
(5-25) 
Quantitative methods Qualitative method 
Source: Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson (2012). 
3.4 Theoretical Design of the Research  
The study’s qualitative approach accommodates both the ontology and epistemology 
perspectives, which have previously been explained in this chapter. This approach provides the 
research question with a framework to develop “how a project is conceptualized and how it is 
carried out” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010, p. 4). Klenke (2008) states the research theme, 
alongside the central theoretical theme can explore both the reality (ontology) and the 
knowledge (epistemology) to understand a chosen social phenomenon.  This draws on an 
“array of cultural knowledge, skills, abilities and contacts possessed by socially marginalized 
groups that often go unrecognized and unacknowledged” (Yosso 2005, p. 69). Therefore, the 
methodological rigour of the approach has provided a pathway into football clubs to draw on 
the inherited traditions and human experiences that manifest from supporter relations.  
3.5 Case Study Approach  
To investigate the research’s contemporary phenomenon, an empirical case study takes into 
consideration different realities from a real-life context, particularly when the issues are not 
always evident (Yin, 1994). As an approach, a case study can draw on the epistemological 
knowledge within a club, as Stake (1978) claim it explores the experiences and generalizations 
of the research from selected cases. To support the case study approach, the protocol sets out 
“how to define the case being studied, how to determine the relevant data to be collected and 
what should be done with the data once collected” (Yin, 1994, p. 2). The intrinsic nature of a 
case protocol can provide an academic rigour which underpins the research, yet still offers the 
opportunity to explore the impact of different groups and how they form in different club 
settings.   
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A single case design works with the “desire to know more about the uniqueness of the case, 
rather than to build a theory or how the case represents other cases” (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 
2010, p. 449). It has been deemed, the selection of one club under a single case design may 
portray the thoughts and feelings on a single supporter group, but this can limit the study’s 
ability to contrast the experiences of different supporters in more than one club. Similarly, a 
focus on just one club and its supporter groups may also limit the idiosyncratic knowledge 
gathered from multiple societies, cultures and economic environments (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Therefore, a single case study on one club was discounted, in order to explore how multiple 
clubs are governed to contrast the effect this has on supporter relations.  
A collection of case studies is believed to select more than one environment, in which to draw 
on the exploratory nature that forms from multiple approaches, as this represents an intrinsic 
study (Stake, 2013). The nature of this exploratory case study design was used to investigate 
the influence that governance has inside multiple football clubs. This approach contrasts the 
interactions that result from multiple relationships between football owners, managers and 
supporter groups. Therefore, multiple cases have the opportunity to contrast several models of 
governance across different clubs to deepen the understanding of the nature of relationships 
between different groups of supporters. For example, the most commercialised football 
countries of England, Spain and Germany provide a multiplex of ways to govern a club, as they 
need to address different environmental conditions. This offers the study an air of subjectivity, 
in the way various clubs choose to govern a football business, yet also provides an axis to 
classify different types of supporter relations across multiple countries. Furthermore, a contrast 
of multiple cases allows the researcher to explore the role of multiple groups, which helps to 
deepen the knowledge on the influence that supporters have towards how their club governs.   
3.6 Multiple Case Study Approach  
The multiple case approach is believed to be more compelling to the research, as it broadens 
the original research question (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). As multiple cases provide a 
spotlight on the research phenomena from different perspectives, it also offers the opportunity 
to recognise a “new set of questions and a major insight is seen to consider multiple cases” 
(Yin, 2011, p. 53). Furthermore, these new insights into football governance draw on the 
diversity of realities within relationships, as Stake (2013) claim multiple cases capture the 
feelings from the experiences of people in their own settings. These experiences set against 
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models of governance offer the methodology an opportunity to contrast the way different 
football clubs govern while exploring different groups.   
This offers the study the ability to contrast supporter relationships from case to case, against 
different environmental conditions within a club, as Eisenhardt (1989) claims this logic 
enriches the case evidence. Also, the evidence gathered from multiple cases promotes a highly 
iterative process to compare systematically, the emergent of results with the evidence from 
each case (Huber, 1995). Therefore, the use of football governance models within a multiple 
case approach, offer the researcher the opportunity to cast the conceptual lens onto different 
supporter groups to classify the nature of these relations in respective clubs. However, this 
methodology must determine the number of clubs before the researcher can truly utilise a 
multiple case approach in this study.  
3.7 Multiple Cases as Evidence  
It is believed, the number of multiple cases used in a “study can range from two to six or even 
more”, which should be selected from the researchers’ judgment to attain the research 
objectives set out in the study (Andrew, Pedersen & McEvoy, 2011, p. 138). Taken into a 
practical context, this requires the researcher to consider how resource-heavy multiple 
approaches can be in its nature. Yin (1994) claims this should be factored into the research 
design, particularly when decisions are made on the number of cases within a study. Whilst, a 
study with six to ten football clubs has the opportunity to explore a larger set of clubs to cover 
the majority of European leagues, along with a wider demographic population of supporters. 
In reality, too many cases would open the study up to an air of replication to the detriment of 
the research, as clubs across the entire European league use similar models of governance.  For 
example, the literature review highlights several clubs throughout Europe who govern in the 
interest of its powerful owners who have sole control, either individually or as a part of a 
company. Therefore, the use of a high number of cases, purely to increase the democratic 
population of supporter groups to represent the majority of European football leagues is 





To counteract these case issues, the use of literal replication helps select clubs to “state the 
conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found” (Steenhuis & Bruijn, 
2006, p. 4).  It is believed this approach can address the research aim and offer the study extra 
scope to self-select literal models of governance, which, therefore, broaden the knowledge on 
supporter groups and relationships from the careful selection of clubs as cases. Furthermore, it 
is sensible to suggest from the literature review, a three-case approach. These three cases have 
the opportunity to reduce the complexity of repetition (governance), but also to concentrate on 
events, conditions and relationships in a real-world context (supporter groups) (Robson & 
McCartan, 2016). As it is believed “for example, adding three cases to a single-case study is 
modest in terms of numbers, but offers four times the analytic power” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007, p. 27). Therefore, the following section needs to establish the criteria to select three 
football clubs as cases to represent a European study, which explores the research aim and 
objectives.  
3.8 Criteria for Case Selection  
Creswell (2012) claims that case selection is key to multiple-case design, as these need to 
illustrate the particular issues throughout the study, which are fundamental to the research 
question. As the research question relates to the relationship a supporter holds with their own 
club, the cases should reflect how different groups are governed. To explore this, the role of 
managers has been fundamental to how supporters have been previously treated by their clubs. 
However, the case selection has the opportunity to mitigate the role of club managers to 
concentrate on the relationship that supporters hold directly with a particular model of football 
governance. This can then explore the inner workings of a club with each case study and use 
the conceptual lens to identify different groups of supporters.  
These real-life football environments have the opportunity to contrast the role of supporters 
across different European clubs and more importantly to understand how much influence each 
group held in the constitutions of governance. As a starting point in which to narrow down the 
case selection process, the literature review has identified the rise in commercialisation 
throughout football has weakened supporter relations within certain clubs. As a consequence, 
the way a club governs these supporter relations differ from club to club, even under the same 
environmental conditions. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that supporters following clubs 
in England, Spain and Germany - three of the most commercialised leagues throughout world 
sport (Figure 3.1) continue to feel the impact of commercialisation, which has resulted in 
50 
 
regulative changes, movements of activism and social dissatisfaction. In light of this, the next 
sub-section aims to narrow down the selection of three clubs from England’s EPL, Spain’s La 
Liga and Germany’s Bundesliga to contrast different models of football governance.  
Figure 3.1. Top Professional World Sports Leagues by Revenue in 2016 
 
Source Market Watch (2016)  
3.8.1 Club Selection from England’s Premier League 
The EPL consists of 20 professional football clubs and in 2016-2017 was reported to earn on 
average an estimated £122m in financial payments per club (Figure 3.2). Furthermore, the 
position of powerful majority shareholders is firmly embedded at the top of English football, 
as set out in the Company law act. The evidence suggests this act reflects the current model of 
governance throughout the EPL, led by registered owners who hold the power to enact 
decisions in their interest.  It is evident that all 20 EPL clubs are governed under the influence 
of a majority shareholder and therefore, a case from the 20 EPL clubs offers the research an 
opportunity to deepen the knowledge on the impact on supporter groups in clubs which are 
governed under the control of a principal owner.  
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Figure 3.2. Premier League Payments 2016/2017  
 
Source: Premier League (2016)  
Following on, Everton football club was selected as the English case for the following reasons. 
In 2014, Everton FC financially outperformed bigger clubs across European football and 
increased its revenue by 43% (Figure 3.3), going on to grow its turnover from £120.5m to over 
£125.6m (Statement of Accounts, Everton FC, 2015). In addition to the increase in revenue at 
Everton, Mr Moshiri became the new owner and took over the club in 2006. This saw the 
Iranian born businessman become the principal shareholder, who has started to invest heavily 
in the club as the leading shareholder. While some supporters have welcomed the increased 
investment in their club, others have started to question his intentions. Therefore, with the new 
principal owner, the financial riches on offer in the EPL and their increased foreign investment, 






Figure 3.3. Everton FC Top the Revenue (%) across European Leagues     
 
Source: Money Football League, Deloitte (2015)  
3.8.2 Club Selection from Spain’s La Liga  
In contrast to Everton’s model of governance, Spain’s La Liga offers an alternative model of 
governance at certain clubs, which governs with supporters as active members.  Currently, 17 
out of 20 La Liga clubs govern similarly to Everton with a principal owner (individuals, or 
companies) and regulated under the SAD regulation. This is similar to that of English company 
law that state clubs are businesses with shareholders, paying the same tax rates as other 
corporations with similar legal responsibilities. For this reason, all 17 SAD clubs were 
discounted from the study, as these cases mirror Everton’s model of governance.  To contrast 
Everton’s model of governance, the three models described as sports member clubs provide a 
reasonable level of divergence to explore a different set of supporter attributes. Therefore, the 
three clubs who are governed as a member's sports club under Spanish sports law are Real 




These cases are governed as non-commercial sports clubs and incorporate members into club 
operations, structures and decision-making processes. For instance, the members of all three 
clubs vote in a president to lead the club’s board of directors. As discussed previously, Real 
Madrid and Barcelona continue to embrace the benefits of commercialisation on offer 
throughout the football industry, similar to other privately-owned Spanish and English clubs. 
Whereas, Athletic Bilbao claim the club’s relationship with their supporters is unique, with 
“values which are becoming increasingly uncommon in football and sports overall in the 21st 
Century” (Athletic Club History, 2016). The Basque only policy and the role of the members 
are instrumental to the way Athletic governs and reflect the values of their supporters and its 
local community.  Therefore, to deepen the knowledge on models of football governance, the 
unique way Athletic govern provides a framework to understand the relationships with their 
supporter groups, which contrasts with that of Everton’s model.   
3.8.3 Club Selection from Germany’s Bundesliga  
Finally, a case from Germany’s Bundesliga offers the study an opportunity to deepen the 
research on supporters, with a further contrast of Everton and Athletic Bilbao’s model of 
governance. This is largely due to the impact of the 50+1 rule across German football, which 
is seen to facilitate the relationship between clubs and their supporters’ groups. As a 
consequence, one majority shareholder cannot acquire 51% of the shares and therefore, the 
controlling interest of the club must remain with its supporters’ association. Therefore, it is key 
to point out that members in German clubs, differ from members at Athletic Bilbao and have 
a sense of co-ownership that is unwritten by German law. As a result, Bundesliga clubs that 
fall under the 50+1 rule present the study with an opportunity to contrast the two previous 
models of governance.   
It is also important to point out that a number of the 18 clubs in the Bundesliga continue to 
either exempt themselves from the rule, who blatantly ignore the 50+1 regulation without any 
punishment from the German FA. This is evident in four German clubs, namely Bayer 04 
Leverkusen who are owned by Bayer Pharmaceuticals, VfL Wolfsburg who are owned by 
Volkswagen Automaker and RB Leipzig who are owned by the Red Bull Franchise who now 
own a majority stake. In addition to these clubs, TSG Hoffenheim has become Bundesliga’s 
first privately owned club by Dietmar Hopp the co-founder of the global conglomerate of 
Systems, Applications & Products (SAP).   
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FC Schalke 04 have remained true to the 50+1 rule and committed to their members as co-
owners under this 50+1 rule and state, “once a Schalke fan, always a Schalke fan" is not just a 
saying but a way of life that shapes their relationship with the club in a very special way” (FC 
Schalke 04, 2017). These relations between the club and supporters reflect its rich heritage and 
working-class origins of Schalke, which resonates throughout its member's associations. In 
addition, Schalke openly promotes their model of governance as a way to engage supporters 
and build group relations, evident with a club’s involvement with Supporter Direct projects 
across Europe. Therefore, Schalke has been chosen as a case to contrast the two previous 
models of governance at Everton and Athletic to explore the relationship that Schalke’s 
supporters hold at a senior level within the club.  
3.9 Building the Theoretical Framework    
A theoretical framework reflects the stance of the research and draws on “the concepts, terms, 
definitions, models and theories of particular literature-based and disciplinary orientation” 
(Merriam, 1998, p. 66).  This framework establishes a casual set of links that can identify the 
research in its own context to address the multiple aspects of the research phenomenon (Yin, 
2013).  In an empirical context, the theoretical framework has developed from the literature to 
explore how football clubs classify the salient influence of supporter groups. Therefore, the 
case framework builds the conceptual lens from Mitchell et al power, urgency and legitimacy 
to identify the impact that club governance has on supporter relations, as it can offer a rival 
explanation on the role of different groups. This view is supported by Di Maria, Grandinetti & 
Di Bernardo (2012) who advocate the theoretical use of proposition, used as a framework can 
strengthen an iterative link between the theory and data.  
To build initial and gradual theory in an “explanation is similar to the process of refining a set 
of ideas, in which an important aspect is again to entertain other plausible or rival explanations” 
(Yin, 2013, p. 143). As a result, both the empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that 
supporter groups hold different roles in football and this requires further investigation in the 
selected cases. To achieve this, the actions of club managers are pivotal to the case studies and 
the conceptual lens has been positioned to identify different types of supporter relationships 
and their associated groups. To do this, the use of a conceptual lens provides the theoretical 
framework to classify supporters by their salient attributes, with the use of power, urgency and 
legitimacy (drawn from Mitchell et al., 1997) as an iterative typology to categorise the salient 
influence of different groups. This typology used Mitchell’s conceptual lens to explains the 
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attributes of individual groups in each case, which offers an opportunity to extend the theory 
on social science (Yin, 2013).  
The use of theoretical typologies in a framework creates a pillar to direct the research in a 
systemic way to address different relationship variables and explain the phenomena (Collis & 
Hussey, 2013).  These variables use supporter relations, in conjunction with how a club govern 
to draw on the thoughts and feelings of multiple groups. In addition, these typologies capture 
the feelings of club managers on how they view supporter groups, in conjunction with club 
actions. As Yin (2013) claims, this theoretical proposition before the field visit investigates the 
critical areas of the research, which in turn create a new set of ideas to offer a plausible or rival 
explanation. This helps to understand the reciprocal influence of both the club and supporters 
with a strict protocol from club to club, so case theory can explore the objectives and explain 
the research question (Blaikie, 2009). Therefore, the research question reflects the phenomena 
in the study and Mitchell et al theoretical framework provides the typologies for the protocol 
to shine the conceptual lens on multiple groups of supporters across multiple cases.    
3.10 Recap of the Research Questions  
3.10.1 What are the fundamental factors behind a club’s model of football governance? 
3.10.2 What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups hold as stakeholders with a club’s model of governance? 
3.11 Building and Piloting the Case Study Protocol  
In addition to the study’s theoretical framework, a case protocol can set the guidelines that 
outline the structure and areas to focus the case research project (Yin, 1994). It was also 
important to create a robust protocol to apply across multiple cases, which enables the 
conceptual lens to draw out similar sets of evidence from each club, but yet identify different 
groups of supporters. The use of Mitchel et al theoretical framework further provides a 
conceptual lens to shine on the supporters across the cases, to contrast the salient nature of each 
group across the clubs. Therefore, the formal case study protocol provides the reliability needed 




As a consequence, the protocol was structured to capture similar sets of evidence across the 
football cases with a direct observational approach to focus on describing, documenting or 
discovering characteristics that explore the research phenomenon, as a result of the relations 
between individual supporter groups and the club (Hancock & Algozzine, 2016). To achieve 
this, the single case reports were set with a thematic approach to explore the way each club 
governs to capture the characteristics of different supporter groups. The reporting framework 
of the protocol was rationalised, constructed and piloted when the researcher spent two months 
(April & May 2016) working inside Accrington Stanley, a professional club in league one of 
English football with direct access to the owner, the CEO and various supporter groups. More 
importantly, this offered the opportunity to pilot the case protocol, along with the theoretical 
framework, which started to understand the nature of relations between how a club governs 
and the effects on different supporter groups (Table 3.3). As a result of this process, a pilot of 
the protocol helped to refine the case structure and the areas of the conceptual lens to conduct 
case study research on a larger scale. 
Table 3.3. Pilot Classification of Accrington Stanley Supporters as Stakeholders 
 
Accrington Supporters 
Types with Attributes 
Power Legitimacy Urgency Stakeholder 
Types 
Supporter Club Members  NO YES YES Dependent  
Loyalty Members & Season 
Ticket Holders   
NO YES NO Discretionary  
Unofficial Ultra Supporter 
Group  







3.12 The Collection of Case Evidence 
“One of the main advantages of a case study design is the potential range of data collection 
methods are highly flexible” (Buchanan & Bryman, 2009, p. 477).   There are various types of 
strategies used to collect case evidence, which includes interviews, the use of archival data or 
documents and participant observations (Klenke, 2008). While, the evidence offers the research 
cases the opportunity to gather information, from the perspective of both clubs and supporter 
groups, it is also important that football clubs must be willing and able to participate in the 
study. Therefore, to secure this evidence, the methodology must align itself with key 
participants to build a rapport with those involved in the case research, as it enriches the 
explanation of the research phenomenon (Tracy, 2012). Yet, there is also a need to protect the 
case research against time-consuming, difficult and tedious actions that manifest away from 
the case protocol, particularly in areas that are irrelevant to the case phenomena (Yin, 1994).  
Therefore, the study draws on a multiple case design to capture evidence from the environments 
surrounding Everton, Athletic Bilbao and Schalke to take “advantage of unexpected 
experiences and opportunities rather than being trapped by them” (Yin, 1994, p. 58). These 
cases use multiple sources of evidence to draw on unknown knowledge from the defined 
actions and information on how a club is governed to conceptualise the realities of how 
supporter groups feel and describe the nature of their relationship with the club. To capture the 
actions in these football cases, the researcher has maintained an unbiased position in the 
collection of evidence, with no affiliation to either, the club or any groups of supporters.  
To reinforce this approach, the use of subjectivity in the cases comes from the researcher’s 
ability to listen and comprehend the information, but then code the evidence-based on its merit 
to the research (Darke, Shanks & Broadbent, 1998). All this considered, the researcher has 
maintained a central position when entering the field to explain the case conditions as observed, 
with no previous feeling towards any club or supporter group, which can distort the case 
findings (Meir, 2009). In addition, the theme of triangulation throughout the research with three 
countries, leagues and clubs continues throughout the collection of evidence process to 




A triangular approach has sourced evidence from different sets of information to enhance the 
“accuracy, validity and reliability of the evidence” and uses convergence to explain the 
“natural, flexible and relax environments” (Das, 2016, p. 550). Firstly, the interview of key 
participants can provide a rich source of primary evidence in case research (Yin, 2011). In the 
context of the research, the cases need to reflect the feelings between the club and its supporters. 
To explore these feelings within a club, the perception of manager actions from supporters is 
critical to understand the way each club governs and the subsequent impact on supporter 
relations. This helps to understand, what is reality (ontology perspective) and how reality is 
known (epistemology perspective) in a football club, through the eyes of key participants on 
different sides of the research phenomena.  
Secondly, in addition to primary interviews, evidence gathered from documentation provides 
another rich source of information to help understand these realities on how football clubs are 
governed and the rationale behind how managers act towards supporter groups. This 
investigation into documentary evidence helps the researcher to explore the thoughts, feelings 
and actions of club managers, with a concealed rationale behind their decisions. In addition, 
the rich source of information available on each of the three clubs, particularly in the 
constitutions and articles, helps to understand the fundamental factors behind why they have 
chosen their preferred model of governance.       
The final method used to collect evidence within a triangulated approach draws on direct 
observations from a neutral position of the researcher to conceptualise how the clubs govern 
their supporter groups.  This observes both the club and supporter groups during field visits, 
which conducts the case protocol to understand the actions, feelings and experiences, as Mills, 
Durepos & Wiebe (2010) claims this source of evidence contributes to the development of a 
strong case study. It is believed, the collection of evidence consists of different types of sources 
that are observed through the case settings, which along with an interview of key participants 




Figure 3.4. The Triangulation Approach to the Collection of Case Evidence  
Source: Marshall & Rossman (2010)  
3.12.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The use of semi-structured interviews enables the researcher to explore an “in-depth 
understanding of the interviewee attitudes, behaviours and perceptions to produce qualitative 
data with a detailed answer to the research question” (Christiansen, 2014, p. 517). With this in 
mind, an interview with individuals has recognised the real-life experiences that materialise in 
a football club, particularly with the personal knowledge held by managers and supporters.  
This is supported by Crowe et al (2011), who believes that an interview with knowledgeable 
individuals can provide the research with quality sets of data, in which to answer a 
contemporary phenomenon. As a result, drawing evidence from knowledgeable managers and 
supporters during interviews has explored the personal traits of both groups in the context of 
their football settings. This offers the research the opportunity to explore different 
environmental conditions in each case and draw on the experiences of individuals to build a 
deeper understanding of the mechanical impact of football governance.  
The use of semi-structured questions allows the interviewer to explore the case phenomena, 
which otherwise remains undiscovered in the context of the research (Stake, 2013). The 
selection of the study’s participants was randomly selected from two main groups. These 
groups were representatives from the clubs (with an active role to govern the club) and 
supporters (those who have an affinity with the club). These interviews with both set of 
participants groups (the club and supporters) were selected based on their willingness to 
participate in the study and without any pre-selection of supporter groups, which may prejudge 
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the stakeholder classification process. It is important to point out, the selection of supporters 
for interviews within different groups and relationships was considered by the research 
approach (for example, season ticket holders, members, etc) to offer a broad range of 
demographics between participants.  
Whilst, there are notable benefits to this approach, it was deemed it may introduce bias into the 
study, long before the research can reach its natural conclusion from the use of the protocol’s 
conceptual lens. Therefore, participants were selected on their willingness to take part in the 
study, so a natural consensus on relations could be gathered from club leaders and supporters. 
Due to the selection of participants from two groups, the methodology must also recognise the 
reality of football clubs, as the ratio of club leaders to that of supporters is disproportionate. 
For example, at Schalke, there are 30 representatives within a club’s governance structure, yet 
over 150,000 active members affiliated to the club. As a result, club representatives have 
greater working knowledge and influence over the way the club is governed. Therefore, the 
saturation of evidence from club managers was achieved in fewer interviews, in a shorter time 
to that of supporters, which took longer with more participant interviews.  
As a consequence, all participants were promised confidentiality and anonymity with regard to 
their responses, as this was deemed beneficial on two counts. Firstly, to enrich the case 
evidence during interviews. Secondly, to encourage the clubs to engage in the study, in light 
of the highly competitive nature of the football industry. Furthermore, the researcher believes 
the use of anonymity during the interview process builds a sense of trustworthiness and 
professionalism into the research approach to gain access to key participants as they are more 
likely to agree to face-to-face interviews (Given, 2008).  
The nature of a multiple case design offered the researcher the opportunity to conduct 
interviews with multiple sets of knowledge participants, particularly during field visits to the 
cities Liverpool (in the case of Everton) Bilbao (in the case of Athletic) and Gelsenkirchen (in 
the case of Schalke).  The researcher believed that both the football clubs and individuals used 
in the cases were made to feel at ease in their home city, in their own personal settings to enrich 
the evidence gathered from the interviews. This was also the case with the recording of 
interview comments, as individual participants were offered the choice between the audio 
recording and handwritten transcripts - this had the opportunity to draw out the information 
that would otherwise remain unknown (King & Horrocks, 2010). This approach was used in 
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the belief that natural responses captured without a guarded persona from participants, further 
enhance the depth of knowledge and meaning towards answering the research phenomena.       
3.12.2 Documentation as Evidence  
Football clubs, in their nature, offer a rich source of documentary information, which has the 
opportunity to produce an “audit trail of evidence to explore experiences, document changes 
in design and the researcher’s experience in the conduct of the study” (Given, 2008, p. 43). 
This access to club audit trail use records to investigate how boards continue to make decisions 
and to explore the nature of club decisions, particularly when classifying the role of supporters. 
This corroborates the action of the club from various sources of information and filters the raw 
data in line with the case protocol, which was built to answer the research phenomena (Zuur, 
Ieno & Elphick, 2010). Furthermore, the research on football governance takes into 
consideration several legal constitutions, annual reports and club meetings, which has the 
opportunity to strengthen the reliability of case reports with the use of written evidence.  Access 
to club documents can also contextualise the individualistic nature of actions taken informal 
club meetings and committees, as it conveys the thoughts, feelings and perceptions of powerful 
individuals in key roles on the board.  This approach uses documentation as evidence to explore 
the written word and also to understand the humanistic perceptions of real-life experiences.  
The popularity of football as an industry continues to make club information readily available 
and accessible to a certain extent, yet some information remains hidden from the public 
domain.  The information on offer in all the cases was obtained in an unobtrusive nature (Yin, 
1994) from the club and supporter groups, as it can enhance the case evidence. Therefore, a 
comparison of individualistic spoken words, used in conjunction with club documents. This 
exposes the perceptions of how different clubs classify supporters and the feelings of managers 
when they make club decisions. Therefore, the use of “primary documents, or eyewitness 
accounts written by people experiences particular event or behaviour” (Bailey, 1994, p. 294). 
The following use of Meredith’s (1998) protocol framework on how to select documents in 
case study research, highlights three important areas to reduce the theme of documentary 




Table 3.4. The Rationale for Case Documentation  
 
A Rationalistic Approach to Documentation Case Documentation 
Seeing oneself  Documentation that contributes to the 
construction of club governance structures 
(Club Constitutions & Annual Reports)  
Speaking or writing to someone who saw or 
experienced it 
Documentation that reflects the perception of 
club management and supporter group (Board 
meeting minute & supporter forums/meetings) 
Thereby helping to understand how and why 
elements of the phenomenon  
Documentation to explore the relationship 
between the club and supporter groups (club 
policies/procedures & supporters’ collective 
action)   
Source: Meredith (1998). 
3.12.3 Direct Observations  
The use of direct observations as case evidence explores the “view of a neighbourhood or an 
organisation with a new dimension that understands either the context of the research or the 
ongoing phenomenon to be studied” (Yin, 2003, p. 87). These interpretations develop 
observations directly from the eyes of the researcher, who focuses on the actual events of 
reality. Particularly, the nature of supporter relations in the real-life context of their own 
football clubs. Rodgers & Cowles (1993) claim that research observations have become a new 
concept, as it can serve as a primary source of data. These observations on football communities 
can connect the reality of real-life events in clubs with hard evidence to determine their true 
effects on supporters.  This source of evidence was captured during visits to different football 
countries that gathered a wealth of knowledge from different social settings, as governance is 
instrumental to the way the club conducts its business.  Therefore, the use of direct observations 
offers the study an untouched and independent perspective through the eyes of the researcher 
to reflect the influence that each club’s model of governance has on the role of different groups 
of supporters.  
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3.12.4 Secondary Sources of Evidence   
The use of “secondary data is raw data that has already been collected by somebody else” 
(Blalkie, 2009, p. 160). This source of evidence reflects an alternative view of the football 
industry through the eyes of others and provides an alternative source of evidence to a complex 
research issue (Vartanian, 2010). Such evidence draws on the data from previous studies, media 
commentary, external/internal investigations and Government report to provide an insight from 
a different perspective into the current issues in football. It is important to point out the 
distinction between primary and secondary data, as Tymieniecka (2002, p. 465) claim differs 
“between the now of perception and the not-now and that of retention (primary memory) and 
(secondary) memory”, which can reflect how supporter groups are viewed by several club 
representatives.   
3.12.5 Entering the Field  
The selection of multiple cases from within three European countries of England, Germany 
and Spain provides a framework for the case studies to contrast the way supporters are 
governed across different European leagues and clubs. This research approach prompts the 
researcher to visit each of the three football cities and conduct fieldwork to explore the 
phenomenon, which “observes and explains what occurred and to build theory” (Woodside, 
2010, p. 20). As a consequence, during these visits, the researcher was able to access the inner 
workings of the club to investigate the environmental conditions, which influence supporter 
relations and help to understand the perceptions of those managers in power. These 
relationships between the club and supporter groups position the research, as Eisenhardt, 
(1989) claims with a methodological fit towards the best set of results. In addition, it was 
critical for the field visits to gain permission from the clubs and have access to prominent 
leaders in which to interview from all three clubs. Their agreement to the research was 
completed before field visits and in line with the study’s ethical considerations, which protects 
the sensitive nature of club information from any third-party access outside of this study. 
Furthermore, on the completion of case reports, each club had the opportunity to read the 
written evidence to confirm the information was factually correct and no misrepresentation of 
participants or information had occurred. This was a key stage in the research, as the 
complexities of case research can manifest in a study that was conducted across different 
countries, particularly as the language barrier could have distorted the findings. To address this 
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issue, all the interviews with participants were conducted in English. In addition, the 
documentary evidence gathered in the cases was translated from Basque, Spanish and German 
into English with the use of new technologies, particularly the Google translate application. It 
is also important to point out the inclusion of different club conditions, social environments 
and supporter movements from different European football countries, outweighed any 
evidence lost in translation.    
3.13 Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis aims to identify, analyse and report patterns or themes in this primary study 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). This helps the researcher to familiarise themselves with the data and 
identify codes and themes from the primary data to establish a defining answer to the research 
questions. Thematic analysis also draws on the research questions and provides an 
interpretation of a complex phenomenon to develop and revise an understanding, instead of 
merely verifying conclusions of theories (Vaismoradi et al., 2006). This has been achieved in 
the research by adopting Braun and Clarke (2006) six step-by-step guide of the analytic process 
to provide validity and reliability of the study’s single reports, cross-case findings and 























Source: Braun and Clarke (2006). 
3.13.1 Familiarising with the Data  
Following on from the collection of data phase in the research, it was important to transcribe, 
read, take down ideas and write up direct observation from field visits, before the researcher 
could comprehend their meaning. The first stage of familiarisation with the case evidence was 
conducted after all three visits to the football clubs were conducted, which captured direct 
observations, key documentation and the interviews with the clubs associated participants. 
Lead by the two-research questions, the researcher used the data captured from clubs to 
understand, challenge, generate ideas and reflect on the evidence of the case. At this stage, the 
researcher undertook and naturally two-stage approach to familiarisation of the case evidence. 
Firstly, on a club by club bases when entering the field and visiting the club’s home cities of 
Liverpool, Bilbao and Gelsenkirchen, to become immersed in its supporter culture and local 
communities and understand how the club govern its business of football. Secondly, on the 
conclusion of the single club visits, the researcher started to reflect on the evidence across the 
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cases to draw common themes or ideas, as it allows text to become categories, which Gibbs 
(2007) calls a framework of thematic ideas.  
 
To identify ideas, draw out themes and analyse the case evidence towards the research’s 
findings and conclusion, two options are open to the researcher at this stage of the 
methodology. This is for the researcher to carry out the manually self-codification process, or 
to use computer-aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). CAQDAS allows users 
to organize and analyse unstructured or semi-structured data, such as interviews, field notes, 
audio-visual material and journal articles (Queen Marys, 2019). Although CAQDAS has been 
used in a number of other PhD research projects and academic journals, there are several 
weaknesses in adopting computer-based systems to this research. From the outset and during 
the familiarisation with the data, CAQDAS establishes the research’s key code from a data 
drop into a computer package (for example NVivo) to categorise key themes and analyse the 
data from a grounded perspective. Yet, by marginalising the researcher ability to actively 
evolve the themes at every stage of Braun and Clarke (2006) throughout six-step process, so 
instead of retrieving chunks of labelled data, it uses mapping methods where thematic or 
cognitive maps were made of linkages or constructions within the data (Ritchie & Lewis, 
2003). Furthermore, Basit (2003) claims the use of CAQDAS does not eliminate the need to 
think and deliberate, generate codes, and reject and replace them with others, therefore a more 
illuminating approach can explain the phenomenon in greater detail.  
 
Consequently, the researcher has chosen to discount CAQDAS and immerse the researcher in 
the data collection phase and throughout the thematic analyse of the case evidence. Manually, 
the research has adopted the role of the coder, but instead of purely concentrating on transcript 
data, they can draw on naturalistic actions and include interpretations of social life and potential 
rich analytical insights (Saldaña, 2015). These social and personal interpretations was certainly 
felt when conducting field visits in England, Spain and Germany, as the researcher had the 
opportunity to understand the spoken, written and documentary evidence (in the case of 
CAQDAS), yet with the thematic maps and cognitive linkages to comprehend, synthesis, 
theories and recontextualize the case evidence (Morse, 1994). The use of interview transcripts 
is one method of primary data, along with documentation and direct observations. The use of 
documentary evidence from the clubs, which consist on legal constitution, annual reports and 
minutes from meeting make it difficult for CAQDAS to comprehend the meaning of this 
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evidence, as only a knowledgeable researcher can synthesize and understand these real-world 
settings and human relationships within the context of the research question (Grey, 2013).  
3.13.2 Generating Initial Codes  
The research has used codes to analyse the evidence from primary interviews, documents and 
field observations to seek answers to the research questions, from a set of patterns, rules, causes 
and explanations (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2013). This has been achieved by “pulling 
together a lot of material from the first cycle coding into a more meaningful and parsimonious 
unit of analysis” (Miles, 2015, p. 86). After the case evidence was gathered on all three clubs, 
the researcher started to identify patterns in the transcripts, which highlighted a number of 
issues starting to arise throughout the data. To support these patterns, documentary evidence 
and direct observations during the field visits started to highlight several patterns, which the 
researcher was able to link together substantial portions of the data to generate the initial codes 
in the thematic analysis process (DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000).  A sample of how the codes have 
been generated as follows: 
 




• Assemblies are the way for the club to present the accounts to the societies, which 
count for the season to approve them as active members (Athletic Bilbao). 
 
• We’ve in the process of developing a governance framework for the club we have 





• Article of Association and the Companies Act 2006. These provide directors-




• Club Constitutions (Rules and Responsibilities). Documents who govern the daily 
operations within the club as part of a wider organisational structure (Schalke) 
 
Direct Observations:  
 
• The inclusion of supporter-members at a supervisory level at Schalke   
 
• The inclusive role for groups of supporter-members in decisions made at Athletic. 
 
Generating Code 1: Talks about how the clubs governs. 
 
This initial process was replicated to highlight the emerging patterns across the case evidence, 
which went onto generating codes driven by the research questions to later code against the 
data. The initial codes are as follows in table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. List of Initial Codes  
 
Research Question 1 Research Question 2 
Talks about how the club governs (Code 
1.1) 
Talks about the relationship between the 
club and its supporter groups (Code 2.1) 
Describes the influence that governance has 
in the club (Code 1.2) 
Describes the role of supporters in club 
decisions (Code 2.2) 
Identifies issues around how the club 
governs (Code 1.3) 
Identifies the influence of supporters at the 
club (Code 2.3) 
 
These initial codes started to organise our data in a meaningful and systematic way, as coding 
reduces lots of data into small chunks of meaning (Maguire, 2017). Due, to the inductive nature 
of the research approach, all the information from the interviews were transcribed, but the 
researcher did not code every transcript or piece of information. Instead, the researcher coded 
relevant segments of evidence to capture something interesting about the research questions 
(Appendix 1). Conversely, inductive approaches searched for patterns from the ‘facts’ or raw 
data, so that code and themes are identified concerning the research questions (Roberts, Dowell 
& Nie, 2019).  
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3.13.3 Searching for Themes  
As defined earlier, codes draw common themes or ideas to capture something significant or 
interesting into categories, which Gibbs (2007) calls a framework of thematic ideas. Braun & 
Clarke (2006) explain, there are no hard and fast rules about what makes a theme, as a theme 
is characterised by its significance. Consequently, the initial codes start to develop into broader 
themes, which start to say something specific about the research questions. The coding process 
was separated into two stages to capitalise on both research questions. Firstly, question one’s 
set of codes (Figure 3.6) was applied against the case data to categorise key themes, sub-themes 
and ideas, which are documented as follows (for more information, see appendix 2).  
 

























at Board Level 
Governing 
Decisions Making  
Constitutions, rules 
and responsibilities 
within the club 
THEMES 
Executive rights, the 
role of the board and 
individuals   






Talks about how 










around the how 







Secondary, the coding towards the second research question use taxonomy as a formal system 
to classify a multifaceted, complex phenomenon (Patton, 2002), which can entangle and 
enlighten the relationship between how club governs (question one) and its supporter groups. 
In conjunction with the codes established earlier, Mitchell et al stakeholder framework allows 
the researcher to understand and analyse, complex domains (Nickerson et al., 2009). It is 
important to note; the stakeholder typology has been used as a tool to categorise a group's 
salient position in how the club governs and to provide a theoretical background on the 
attributes of a legitimate stakeholder (power, legitimacy and urgency). However, this does not 
predetermine the attribute of supporter groups, but merely uses Mitchell’s classification 
taxonomy acts as little themed cages to entrap stories, more as a narrative to establish cohesive 
themes and explanations to the phenomena (Boje, 2001). This two-stage approach to coding 
allowed the researcher to understand the data on football governance in the cases, before 
applying the second set of codes towards the second research question. Consequently, this 
enriched the coding process as it allowed the researcher to build themes on the linkage between 
the club and supporter groups, using Mitchell's narrative to identify, explain and categories 
supporter relations. These coded themes against question two are documented in figure 3.7 (for 
more information, see appendix 3). 
 
















Groups in the 
Club 
Different Types 
and Influences of 
Supporter Groups  
The Power of 
Supporter Groups 





influence and power  
Supporter relations and 
urgent club action 
INITIAL 
CODES 
Talks about the 
relationship between 
the clubs and its 
supporter groups 
(Code 2.1) 
Describes the role 





supporters at the 





3.13.4 Reviewing Themes  
During the reviewing stage, the researcher reviewed, modified and developed the primary 
theme identified in step 3. To do this, the two sets of coded themes from both research questions 
have been brought together to address any duplication, to check the coded extracts make logical 
sense and if the themes are justifiable and trustworthy. The two sets of themes categorised 
together in figure 3.8.  
 















At this stage, a review of the data suggests five theme categories driven by the coding process, 
which relate to the research question. This themed process starts to merge and form an 
understanding of the influence that governance has on supporter relation. To define these 
themes future in the research from case to case, the researcher formed the case protocol around 
these six themes to explore the data further and define these themes. These themes have refined 
the case structure and the areas of the conceptual lens used in the observational pilot earlier 
explored in the chapter, to investigate and explain the key themes in greater detail. Therefore, 
these themes serve as protocol heading in the single case reports, so replication of the themes 






at Board Level 
Governing 
Decisions Making  
Role of 
Supporter 
Groups in the 
Club 
Different Types 
and Influences of 
Supporter Groups  
The Power of 
Supporter Groups 
CODED THEMES  
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This is so the generalizability of constructs and themes across the cases can be checked 
(Dooley, 2002). In categorising the case evidence with convergence from the single case 
reports point the data towards the research phenomena so that a cross-case analysis can be 
concluded in a final case report (Yin, 2011). Such case reports incorporate the “detailed 
description of the settings or individuals, followed by an analysis of the data for themes or 
issues” (Creswell, 2014 p. 196). Furthermore, the linkage between the codes and themes 
demonstrate the range of terms and concepts used by people when they talked and linkages 
between them and to show strength of feeling, confusions or hesitations (Appendix 5), which 
can manifest from within a complex football industry (Corden & Sainbury, 2006 p. 108). 
Consequently, the use of people’s comments, documentation and direct observations point the 
case evidence toward the research theme, case theory and phenomena, so that the evidence is 
accurate as spoken (Voss, Tsikriktsis & Frohlich, 2002). 
3.13.5 Defining and Naming Themes  
Following on the logical theme of literal replication, a cross-case analysis of all three cases, 
aims to “examine, categorize, tabulate, or otherwise recombine the evidence to address the 
initial proportions of the study” (Yin, 1994, p. 102). The use of cross-case analysis aims the 
conceptual lens on football governance, as an axis to classify the nature of a supporter 
relationship within each club. This goes way beyond the initial impression of supporter groups 
and starts to tabulate different supporter attributes from across the football cases. As a result, 
the use of multiple football clubs brings together both football governance and its relationship 
with supporter groups to analyse the “themes, issue phenomenon or functional relationship that 
strings together cases” (Stake, 2013, p. 58). 
These multiple cases are believed to draw on a theoretical framework to “delineate the 
combination of factors that may have contributed to the outcomes of the case, seek or construct 
an explanation” (Klenke, 2008, p. 72). In light of this, the analysis seeks to explain how football 
clubs construct their models of governance to provide new insight into the research issue.  
Taking this into consideration, the conceptual lens of power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchel, 
Agle & Wood, 1997) positions the stakeholder typology in the methodology of the case to 
identify different groups and their attributes within their clubs, before a cross-case analysis of 
the single case evidence.  
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The thematic conclusion from the single case reports has enabled the analysis to further define 
the themes, so the researcher can identify the essence of what each theme is about (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). To do this, this cross-case approach draws on the conclusions from these single 
cases to seek answers to the proposition of the research question, yet also offers the opportunity 
to refine the themes (Appendix 6). Therefore, figure 3.10 illustrates the linkage between the 
themes, the narrative of the case evidence and the single case conclusion in a final thematic 
map.   
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3.13.6 Writing of the Final Report  
A cross-case study reflects a systematic analysis of clubs and offers a meta-synthesis of 
evidence aimed at supporter groups (Timulak, 2009), so an analysis of the multiple findings 
can be formed from each case. This process of replication explores the evidence by applying a 
set protocol from case to case, as it “allows the investigator to address a broader range of 
historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues” (Yin, 1994, p. 98). Themes of similarities provide 
a logical framework on the way clubs are governed as a sports business, along with the 
subsequent relations that materialise with different groups of supporters. Exploring, five final 
themes identified in the analytic process provides a framework of thematic areas, which the 
cross-case report can address in detail to characterise its significance towards the research 
questions.  This deepens the study’s knowledge of how the three football clubs govern, as cross-
case analysis has the opportunity to broaden the conceptual lens as a new way of thinking 
(Bogard, Liu & Chiang, 2013), particularly in the context of supporter relations and football 
governance. Therefore, to understand the impact of the phenomena, the final case report uses 
convergence from the single the cases to “add strength to the findings as various strands of data 
are braided together to promote a greater understanding of the cases” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 
554).  
3.14 Validity and Reliability of Case Protocol 
The case protocol embodies and conceptualises trustworthiness, rigour and quality which are 
important in multiple cases, particularly when exploring a social phenomenon (Golafshani, 
2003).  Furthermore, the use of multiple football clubs has the “opportunity to refine and extend 
the theory” to “confirm emergent relationships and enhance the confidence in the validity of 
these relationships” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 542). As a consequence, the study has incorporated 
an impartial four-way test to examine the framework and examines the worthiness, credibility, 







Table 3.6. Four Tests of a Research Design  
 
Test Case Protocol  The phase of research and 
Tactic 
Construct Validity Use multiple sources of 
documentation, semi-structured 
interviews & direct observations 
 
Chain of events from case theory 
& proposition in the final cross-
case report 
 
Have key participants from clubs 










Internal Validity Thematic analysis & theme 
building  
Data Analysis 
External Validity Use replication logic in multiple-
case studies  
Research design  
Reliability Validity Use case study protocol develop 
case notes, database & 
appendices 
Research Design  
 
Source: Adapted from Yin (1994). 
3.14.1 Validity of the Research 
To build validity into the construction of the research approach maintains the reliability of both 
the internal and external conditions in the cases. This protects the case protocol and provides a 
robust framework to test the trustworthiness of the proposition against the research phenomena 
(Dalrymple, 2007).  Therefore, this framework provides a measure of convergence from 
supporters in their football clubs with the use of participants, documentation and observations 
to justify a coherent approach to the research theme (Creswell, 2013).  The conceptual lens 
built from Mitchell et al (1997) theoretical classification of stakeholders provides a framework 
to explore each supporter group. In this case, the social settings of football clubs provide a real-
life environment, which measures the different salient attributes of supporter groups from a 




In addition, the triangulated approach offers a protocol that cements certain filters into the 
collection of evidence, as this theoretical framework only draws cross convergence from the 
stipulated areas as stated in the research approach. Based on this design, the case protocol draws 
on the factual elements of how clubs are governed so that replication can naturally explore 
relations inside different sets of supporter groups, as this maintains validity case by case to 
protect the research findings (Yin, 2015). It is also important for the researcher to capture an 
accurate set of evidential records to present in a cross-case report, as it assumes that single 
cases have collected, analysed and reported case findings in line with the research protocol 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984).           
3.14.2 Reliability of the Research  
The rigorous nature built into the case design protects the reliability of the study’s protocol, 
particularly when applied from case to case across the football clubs. This maintains the same 
level of reliability in the collection and analysis of data between the cases from a strict protocol 
(Yin, 2015), which was replicated in each of the three cases. It is believed, the protocol instils 
a sense of reliability from information captured in the case report and file to form a chain of 
events on each club so “that an auditor could repeat the procedures and arrive at the same 
result” (Yin, 1994, p. 37) Besides, the protocol needs to reflect the reliability of case evidence, 
as the study’s emerging themes are covered in case reports. This is so the findings can reinforce 
the study’s conclusions. Therefore, by replicating the same headings in each report and case 
file captured on each football club, make the information presentable so that the reader can 
easily access the main themes and see how the case research was conducted and analysed 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
3.15 Ethical Considerations  
The actions of the researcher have considered the ethical issues from the start of the study, as 
these were reflected in the design of the research approach, particularly throughout the planning 
phase on how to conduct the case studies (Perry, 1998). The research of multiple football clubs 
and supporter groups, in conjunction with the humanistic relationships, which are complex in 
their nature and require a high level of ethical planning. Therefore, it is important to consider 
how to handle the information on people, their records and the sensitive nature of the case 
evidence. To prevent the complexities that arise throughout the football industry taking effect 
in the research, the approach considers how to maintain “deception (how can spontaneous 
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private behaviour be studied) and the protection against the violate of individual interests of 
privacy” (Sieber & Tolich, 2012, p. 1). 
In the highly competitive world of the football industry, the security of information was 
paramount to the ethical consideration in the case research to protect the sensitive handling of 
information taken from club documents, reports and meetings. In addition, the participant’s 
identity from interviews was anonymized from any transcripts, with the primary data kept 
confidential to the researcher. In this case, it was key for the researcher to pose several ethical 
questions to develop and test the robust nature of the framework’s ethical conditions, which 
went on to shape the design phase of the research approach (Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7. Constructing a Research Approach with Ethical Considerations  
 
Ethical Consideration Framework Question 
Methods Should I simply use methods or study them as well in terms 
of the effects they might have on the research process e.g. 
what they do when putting into practice? 
Sample How might my method of accessing a sample raise ethical 
concerns? 
Power Relationships and Needs What is the balance of personal and social power between 
those involved in the research 
Actions, Practices and 
Consequences 
How will those involved understand my actions and are these 
in balance with my judgements about my own practice? 
Communication and 
Community 
Who do I want to communicate my research to and which 
research communities and networks do I want to belong to 
share and disseminate my work? 
Source: Adapted from Miller et al., (2012,).
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CHAPTER FOUR - A CASE STUDY OF EVERTON FOOTBALL CLUB 
 
4.0 Overview of the Case Study  
The case study has researched Everton’s model of governance to investigate the relationship that 
various supporter groups have with the club.  This explores the different types of supporter 
relationships that arise from how Everton governs, with a conceptual lens of power, urgency and 
legitimacy taken from Mitchell et al (1997), which will classify the stakeholder attributes of 
various supporter groups. Therefore, the case study from the outset explores two theoretical 
questions: 1. What are the fundamental factors behind Everton’s model of football governance? 
2. What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of supporter groups 
have as stakeholders in Everton’s model of football governance? 
 
4.1 Case Protocol  
The case protocol has adopted a qualitative approach to explore Everton within its real-life settings 
as a football club. This study will conduct semi-structured interviews with members of Everton’s 
leadership team and its supporters. These interviews were used to provide a primary source of data 
to reflect the thoughts and feelings of knowledgeable respondents and provide an insight into the 
club’s key issues. An investigation into Everton’s statutes, official documentation and archived 
records has been used as evidence to understand the rationale behind how decisions are made 
within the club and the influence of different supporter groups. Additionally, the use of direct 
observations will analyse how Everton governs its business operations and the indirect effect these 
actions have on supporter groups. In order to understand the influence that governance has on 
supporter groups, the researcher will explore the case evidence within the field. This aims the lens 
on different groups of supporters to understand the nature of their relationship with the club.  These 
observations were made during field visits to the city of Liverpool, Goodison Park Stadium, the 





4.2 The History and Ownership at Everton FC  
The origins of Everton football club date back to 1878 when St Domingo FC was founded to 
occupy local children throughout the community during a break in the cricket season. In 1879, the 
original football club was renamed Everton; this was to reflect the local community that 
surrounded the club and to embrace the growing number of children who wished to play the game.  
A corner of Liverpool’s Stanley Park became Everton’s first home to play football matches, before 
a move over to Priory Road. The eviction of Everton from Priory Road saw the club move onto 
Anfield Road, before making the move over to Goodison Park in 1892. To this day, the club plays 
its home games at Goodison Park, which is the only ground in world football to have a church 
situated in the grounds of the stadium. St Luke’s Church is synonymous with the club’s history 
and Everton’s local community, which strongly resonates with its supporter groups. Evident when 
a club leader stated, “Everton was always a grassroots club with a real desire and the need for the 
local area and we hold them values true today, this is why we are fondly referred to as the people's 
club” (Personal Communication). 
From the early days of Everton’s ownership, the club has been owned by individuals with 
perceived personal wealth, or through the offer of land in which to play its home games. This was 
the case in 1882 when Mr J Cuitt of Coney Green donated land off Priory Road for the club to play 
its home games. However, a breakdown in the relationship between Mr Cuitt and the club led to 
the team’s eviction from the land, as a result of poor gate receipts, noise and unruly behaviour of 
the supporters. It was believed Everton’s new home on Anfield Road helped landowner; John 
Houlding capitalised on the growing popularity of football when he erected 8,000 new seats within 
an enclosed stadium to make a profit from supporters who wanted to watch home games. Not only 
did Houlding capitalise on the financial benefits of football, but he also funded Everton’s first 
professional players, namely Andrew Gibson and Sandy Dick. Yet, the true intention of Houlding 
became clear when he tried to obtain the surrounding land around the newly constructed stadium, 
then owned by a brewer named John Orrell. This was Holding’s attempt to float the club as a 
licensed shareholding company, which would have presented him with a vast personal profit. 
However, club members mainly George Mahon became suspicious of his financial motives and 
led to Houlding severing his ties with the club in 1892. As a result, Mr Mahon backed by the 
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wealth of Doctor James Baxter went on to acquire the ownership rights and to uphold Everton’s 
tradition with the community. 
In 1938, Mr Richard Edward "Dick" Searle founded the club’s first shareholders association, an 
important part of the club’s history, as it raised the collective concerns of minority shareholders. 
In recent years, the association claimed it was instrumental in the call for two extraordinary general 
meetings, which went on to challenge the reign of majority shareholders at the time, most notably 
Peter Johnson in 2004 and Bill Kenwright in 2013. At the last meeting, Mr Kenwright opposed the 
challenge to his chairmanship to reinforce his calls for further investment in the club from a new 
investor and claimed “I want every one of you to have your billionaire. It’s not me and I apologise 
it’s not me” (Everton deny BBC sale deal claims, Echo, 2013). Historically, Everton has called 
upon wealthy shareholders to raise capital investment for new players, even before the explosion 
of broadcasting revenue seen in today’s game. The call for a new billionaire to inject capital into 
the club is nothing new as this has been repeated at Everton throughout its history.  
Throughout the 1960s, which some supporters describe as the start of the Moore era, wealthy 
businessman John Moore became a club director and then went on to become Chairman. The 
Moore’s investment in Everton brought success to Everton both at home and across Europe, yet 
the relations with the supporters inevitably soured.  This demise of John Moore’s tenure saw Peter 
Johnson take over the majority control of the club and ended Moore’s role as the majority 
shareholder. However, the controversy continued, when Mr Johnson made use of a fact of share 
scheme to purchase, then split the club’s share stock from two to one, revaluing Everton at £100m 
in July 1994. As a result, Johnson’s power rose to 50% shareholding in the club’s company, this 
enabled Johnson to sell 17% of his shares and make a profit that was believed to be in the region 
of £30m. However, Johnson’s contentious reign as majority shareholder ended in 2000, when a 
consortium called True Blue Holding, headed up by the current Chairman Bill Kenwright went on 






Table 4.1. Everton’s Shareholders at the time of True-Blue Holding Takeover  
 
Directors of True 
Blue Holding 
Limited  
Shareholding Share % Shares nominally 
valued at £1 
Kenwright W 7,228,359 32.8% £7,025,482 
Abercromby 1,613,978 7.3% £1,568,679 
Woods, J 5,648,922 25.6% £5,490,375 
Gregg, P 3,331,891 15.1% £3,238,376 
Gregg, A 3,592,716 16.3% £3,491,880 
Other Shareholding     
Gregg, D 257,331 1.2% £250,109 
Others 358,154 1.6% £348,102 
Totals  22,031,351 £0.97 £21,413,002 
 
Source: Everton FC Shares Information, ToffeeWeb (2017). 
The takeover by True Blue Holding provided Bill Kenwright with the opportunity to become 
Everton’s chairman and represent the company’s shareholdings in the club. True Blue holding 
dissolved in 2004 on the request of Paul Gregg and other shareholders, due to concerns over 
Everton’s finances, which became apparent with the failed bid to build a new stadium on the Kings 
Waterfront. Following this, the Gregg family (Paul & Anita) sold their share to BCR Sports 
Limited in 2006, where Robert Earl became an Everton director to represent his now 23% 
shareholding in the club. Other majority shareholders also took up a position on the board to 
reinforce personal interests, namely Bill Kenwright (20% Ltd & 3% personal) and John Wood 
(22% personal) share capital. From 2006 until 2015, these two powerful shareholders had a 
prominent role on Everton’s board and started to influenced decisions with their number of shares 






Table 4.2. Directors on Everton Board from 2006 to 2015 
 
Directors Name* Re-elected  Resigned  Number of Shares per 
financial year in 
office  
W Kenwright  2006  8,754 (2006 to 2010) 
Increased to: 
9044 (2011 to 2015) 
J Wood  2006  6,622 (2006 to 2015)  
K Wyness 2006 2008 2 (2007) 
R Earl 2007  8,146 (2007 to 2015) 
P Carter  2008 Deceased 23rd April 
2015 
714 (2008 to 2015) 
*DIRECTORS - The Directors in office during the year and their beneficial interests in the share 
capital of the Company at the end of the financial year.  
(Source: Statement of Accounts of Everton Football Club from 2006 to 2015) 
In 2016, the billionaire that Bill Kenwright had so strongly coveted since November 2007 came to 
fruition in the form of Mr Farhad Moshiri, a British-Iranian who became the principal owner of 
Everton. This investment in Everton came after Moshiri sold his previous 15% share in Arsenal 
FC to longstanding business partner Mr Usmanov for a reported £250mn in February 2016. This 
enabled Mr Moshiri acquired 49.9% of Everton shares and paid a reported £87mn to become the 
club’s majority shareholder, via the Blue Heaven Holding Company, which was set up especially 

















Source:  List of Shareholders, Everton Football Club, as of July 2017. 
Furthermore, the accumulation of share capital by Blue Heaven also changed the dynamics of the 
club’s board of directors. The club has now moved from 4 directors based on shareholdings to 6 
roles, which now includes several non-executive positions that bring different and complementary 







 Name No. of 
Shares 
Owned  
% Owned  









 4,256   12.16% 
J V Woods  3,116  8.90% 
Other 
Shareholders 
 10,163  29.04% 




Table 4.4. Members of Everton’s Board of Directors 
 
Role Name Relationship to the Board 
Chairman (Principle 
Director) 
Bill Kenwright 12.16% Share Capital 
Deputy Chairman 
(Principle Director) 
Jon Woods 8.9% Share Capital 




Alexander Ryazantsev 49.9% Share Capital 
Operational 
(Alternate Director) 
Denise Barrett-Baxendale  Chief Executive 
Advisory (Alternate 
Director) 




Marcel Brands  Director of Football 
 
Kenwright, Wood and Ryazantsev hold a role on the board to undertake their legal responsibilities 
as directors, as they represent a company’s sizeable share capital in the club. Ultimately, the 
shareholding of Mr Moshiri makes him the recognised owner, certainly as the principal decision-
maker, as he decides how Everton conducts business both on and off the field. To assist Moshiri, 
three new executive director positions were created on the board to provide advice, particularly 
when it comes to operational aspects on how to implement certain board decisions.  A club leader 
provides an insight into the mixture of roles and responsibilities on the newly formed board and 
explains that “on the board, we have a chairman he has been an owner chairman, we also have an 
owner-director (Wood) in the group, we then have Mr Moshiri who has his advisor on the board, 
finally we have the CEO who is a massive football fan; who’s very positive about the way we 






4.3 The Principles of Everton FC Governance 
Everton football club was incorporated into a company on 14th June 1892, as a result of the clubs 
first articles of association were drawn. Today, the updated articles still provide a framework on 
how the club governs as a company and sets out the responsibilities of the principal shareholders 
and its directors. Along with these articles, Everton also needs to abide by the rules of the English 
Premier League (EPL), as founding members since 1992. As members of the Premier League, this 
also comes with a set of rules and regulations as these “serve as a contract between the League, 
the Member Clubs and one another, defining the structure and running of the competition” 
(Premier League Handbook 2016/17 Published: 9 August 2016). Superseding these league rules 
are the historic powers of the English Football Association (FA), who hold the responsibility for 
the game’s regulation and disciplinary codes of practice (The FA Handbook, 2016/2017).  
Both the FA and the EPL require Everton to comply with different sets of regulations that cover a 
wide range of areas, from tests on responsible owners and player transfers to the financial conduct 
of the club. In addition to this professional regulation, there is a growing realisation of political 
involvement in the English game, which may affect the way clubs are governed in the future.  It is 
believed this would stop the rising number of mismanagement and bankruptcy cases currently 
across English football. A club leader went on to explain the effect that external regulation may 
have on the way Everton governs its business in the future and states, “all these negative examples 
are opportunities for football to step back and with an inside look we need to take control of our 
game” (Interview, Liverpool, 2016).  
Further complexity is the pyramid of European football, which influences the way the board at 
Everton governs certain aspects of the club’s football business.  The role of the Union of European 
Football Associations (UEFA) also adds extra regulation onto English football, which requires 
Everton to comply with football regulations on a European level. As an example, Financial Fair 
Play Regulations of UEFA monitors the transfer spending across European football, in conjunction 
with a club’s annual revenue. Furthermore, the ultimate power to govern world football resides 
with Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), through member associations and 
confederations, which uphold standards of governance in the game. Additionally, Everton as a 
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business and any holding companies attached to the club need to comply with statutory legal 
requirements under the Companies Act 2006, a further challenge off the field.   
4.3.1 Constructing Governance at Everton FC  
Everton has chosen to list the club as a limited company and its Article of Association provides 
Directors with the necessary steps needed to comply with the Companies Act 2006. Working to 
comply with the Act, the articles at Everton outline how the club proposes to govern as a company, 
from share capital and voting rights to board proceedings. On the 29th April 2014, Everton Football 
Company Limited updated 32 articles (plus sub-sections) with a special resolution that outlined 
the club’s constitutions and sets out how the company is to be governed.  These articles provide 
information on the purpose of the company, which clearly defines and documents the duties and 
responsibilities of its directors. Furthermore, the articles explain shareholders of Everton as “the 
holder, which are “members whose name is entered in the register of members as the holder of 
shares” (Articles of Association of Everton FC, Special Resolution, April 2014). 
As a result of the share register, Everton’s principal directors have been appointed to the board, 
due to their legal rights as shareholders in the company. For example, Everton’s three main 
shareholders form the majority of the company with 70.96% of the shares. These directors are 
responsible for the company’s annual report, which includes the club’s financial accounts outlined 
in article 15.1. The directors have the authority to exercise the powers that come with company 
ownership, as the principal director holds the share rights to create a new role on Everton’s board. 
As a consequence, the owner also holds the discretionary power to enforce decisions through these 
appointed representatives. Importantly, the legal framework that forms the board of directors was 
evident in an interview with a prominent leader, who went on to explain, “as a club we always had 
a government framework to comply with company law and legislation” (Personal 
Communication).  However, the manager went on to point out Everton’s current governance 
framework limits the board’s ability to consult and disseminate information effectively, 
particularly on a wider set of issues other than those that are statutory. Going on to claim, the 
current governance model “doesn’t have much rigour in terms of subcommittees and reporting 
styles, or even the opportunity to share minutes” (Personal Communication).  
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As a result of the recent share acquisition by Mr Moshiri’s Blue Heaven Company, the board’s 
configuration has significantly changed. This has seen the introduction of new directors onto the 
board to uphold the statutory requirement of the principal shareholder with the appointment of Mr 
Ryazantsev. In addition, further non-shareholder roles were created on the board to assist with club 
operations. In May 2016, Robert Elstone became the club’s Chief Executive Officer and appointed 
onto the board. Then in September 2016, the club appointed Denise Barrett-Baxendale as Deputy 
Chief Executive Officer, which enabled her to join the board. It is believed the inclusion of non-
executive directors at the highest senior level at Everton go onto influence operational decisions 
and other holding companies affiliated to Everton Ltd (Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1. Everton Football Club Ltd Corporate Structure  
 






The club’s three limited companies and the charity are under the subsidiary control of Everton 
Football Club Company Ltd. Goodison Park, Everton Investment Ltd and the Ladies football club 
govern slightly different from that of Everton Ltd, as the main shareholding is jointly held by 
Kenwright and Wood. A noticeable absence from these parent companies is the representation of 
Blue Heaven Ltd, in particular Mr Moshiri. In 2002, Goodison Park Ltd was established for the 
management and ownership of the stadium, away from the football club (Everton investment Ltd, 
Annual Report 2016). Simultaneously, Everton Investment Ltd was created as a financial vehicle 
within Everton’s corporate structure purely to loan £30m from Goodison Park Ltd, which went on 
to purchase and split the ownership rights in the stadium into a separate entity (Everton Investment, 
Annual Report 2016). It is important to point out that all of these companies are wholly owned 
subsidiary undertaken by Everton Football Club Company Limited, who report the group accounts 
annually. 
In addition to the limited companies, Everton in the Community, formed in 1998 is the football 
club’s official charity and offers, “60 programmes covering a range of social issues including 
health, employability, anti-social behaviour, crime, education, dementia, poverty, youth 
engagement, youth justice and disability” (Our History, Everton in the Community, 2017). 
Currently, Denise Barrett-Baxendale is the club's Chief Executive Officer and Richard Kenyon is the 
new Chief Executive of the Club’s official charity, but without a position on Everton’s main board 
of directors. This executive role under the club’s CEO, a trustee in the charity shows Everton’s 
intention to be recognised as the people’s club, evident with the charity’s current outreach 
programme. Everton’s charity consists of a Free School (2015) Peoples Hub (2016) and St Francis 
Disability Centre (2017), this portrays the importance of the local community to the club.  A club 
manager went on to reiterate the importance of the charity, in terms of Everton’s strategic 
intentions to incorporate the community into the club, going on to claim, “we use a motto in the 
terms, nothing but the best is good enough both on the pitch, off the pitch and also in the delivery 





The board of directors at Everton Football Club are fundamental to the corporate structure and 
form the organisation’s hierarchy within the club. Recently, the club has created an executive team 
with a number of senior management positions to support the board of directors, under the 
leadership of the chief executive officer (Figure 4.2).  These executive roles in Everton’s 
organisational structure are accountable to the board and incorporate both the club’s football, 
commercial and community operations. Further down the organisational structure, the department 
heads hold the responsibility to manage their stipulated areas of expertise. Everton’s strategic 
alignment from board to commercial services within the club was evident when a manager went 
on to explain Everton’s four strategic pillars. These pillars draw on the experience of supporters at 
home games, as one manager explains the club’s mission to “know every single thing that we can 
about our fans to make sure that we can get as close as possible to them, easy to buy from, being 
a club and that's exactly where the community programme sits, all creating a memorable match 
day” (Personal Communication).   
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3.4.2 The Influence of Governance at Everton FC 
The influence of principal shareholders on the board of directors, as prominent individuals hold 
the share capital to control Everton’s strategic direction, commercial activity, levels of investment 
and debt. Ultimately, the 49.9% share capital held by Blue Heaven Holding Company makes Mr 
Moshiri the owner and Mr Ryazantsev his representative to casts his majority vote at board 
meetings. This power results from Everton’s articles, which stipulate that decisions made at board 
level work on the principle of one share, one vote (Articles of Association, art 12:1, 2014). On 
paper, the 49.9% of Everton’s shares held by Blue Heaven does not offer Mr Moshiri a majority, 
especially to pass a resolution single handily. Yet in reality, the 29.04% made up of other 
shareholders offer no resistance against the principal owner.  
It is believed, a large proportion of minority shares held in the club are unknown, as the holders 
became untraceable after the war. Several attempts over the years to locate absent individuals and 
missing shares have proven futile, failing to fill the gaps in Everton’s list of active shareholders on 
the club’s register. This means, Mr Moshiri’s newly acquired share capital has made him the 
principal owner, welcomed overall by the vast majority of Everton supporters. This feeling towards 
the new owner was evident throughout the interviews with various groups, as one supporter claims, 
“we know that Mr Moshiri wasn’t happy at Arsenal and probably needed a new challenge, as he 
didn’t have the voice his investment would probably demand - I think his investment triggers 
something maybe even bigger at Everton than what is happening at the moment” (Personal 
Communication).  
Currently, the owner is relatively new in his role as principal shareholder, as Mr Ryazantsev only 
attended his first board meeting in March 2016. This appointment of Ryazantsev and not Moshiri 
on the board was met with an air of caution from Everton supporters, felt during the interviews, as 
one explains, “the new owners don't communicate with the supporters that much but I don't worry 
about that because at the end of the day it is a business, so I don't expect that he'll go bankrupt for 





Along with the 49.9% share capital, it has been reported that Mr Moshiri has given Everton an 
£80m interest-free loan to consolidate club debts that arose in the 2015/2016 set of accounts. 
Ultimately, the level of investment made by Mr Moshiri has made him the owner of Everton. 
Majority ownership right dictates Everton’s future and inevitably seeks to protect his investment. 
As a result, some concerns remain throughout the club on the pitfalls of one powerful owner, as 
one Evertonian points out, “football in England has changed and the owners now own clubs on 
commercial grounds to protect their investment and their revenue streams, yes these are risks, but 
there's always going to be a price to be paid for success” (Personal Communication).   
Recently, the effects of the new owner have started to influence Everton’s strategic direction at 
board level with several new financial partnerships (the naming of Finch Farm), infrastructure 
projects (docklands stadium project), along with an increase in the players transfer budget (a record 
£139mn in the 2017 summer transfer window). Although the club’s board has sanctioned these 
deals, the indirect influence of Mr Moshiri as a principal decision-maker in these business deals 
has been notable. For example, the naming rights of Finch Farm for a reported £75m over five 
years by USM Holdings (USM), was as a result of the close personal and business association 
between company founders, Alisher Usmanov and Mr Moshiri. This close bond between Usmanov 
and Moshiri was apparent during their joint venture into Arsenal, which came about because of 
their joint love affair of English football (Everton General Meeting, Liverpool Echo, January 
2017).  
While at face value, the investment of another wealthy individual helps to secure extra investment 
in the club, it can also be viewed as another example of Mr Moshiri’s strategic plan for Everton’s 
future direction. Mr Morshiri’s arrival at Everton and his business acumen are taking effect at 
board level and infiltrating the rest of the club. Evident at the AGM when Chairman, Mr Kenwright 
who has resided on the board since 1989, claimed: “I felt instantly this was a man who could get 
us out of the problem times we were having" (Stadium issue tops agenda at Everton AGM. 




As part of the corporate structure, the executive team is responsible to execute, monitor and control 
the actions taken by Everton’s board of directors.  These roles on the executive board are critical 
to club operations and provide a direct link that governs Everton from the board down to its 
departments. As the executive plays a key role in the club, particularly on how Everton govern 
more towards a sports business, as one manager was quick to point out “we don't want to be shown 
that we are a high-powered PLC, but we will be bringing a stronger governance framework over 
the next 12 months” (Personal Communication).  These executive changes have failed to supersede 
the company’s article of association, which outlines the statutory powers, roles and responsibilities 
of club directors. Therefore, changes to Everton’s governance cannot influence the practices at 
board level and are more likely to influence operations lower down at an executive level, not the 
actions of shareholder directors.  
The changes at board level are highly unlikely as Mr Moshiri would effectively be giving up his 
shares and the control of his multimillion-pound investment in the club. Supporter groups do 
recognise the power of share capital and accept the owner has invested heavily in the club, as one 
supporter points out, “I think there's a limit to the responsibility that fans should have, I think it's 
more about a role of listening, rather than a roll of negotiating - I would say it’s active listening 
from the fans and you have to leave the club to the people in charge of running the club” (Personal 
Communication).  
3.4.3 Future Challenges to the Governance Model at Everton  
Fundamental to Everton’s governance model is the articles of association, which were last updated 
in 2014. Since the update, the club has undertaken a change of ownership and consequently, this 
has changed the board’s dynamics.  Additionally, the responsibility of the three holding 
companies, extra financial commitments and share capital remains a challenge for Everton FC Ltd. 
It is also evident, Everton needed to invest in the club’s dilapidated stadium, which is set to 
increase the number of third-party investors with new liabilities to fund this large infrastructure 
project. One of these key financial partnerships struck by Everton was with Liverpool City 
Council, required to meet the financial commitment needed to build a new stadium at the Bramley 
Moor dock. However, the lack of transparency during the failed stadium bid at Kirby and the failed 
sponsorship deals with Cheng Beer and Kitbag has left Everton supporters sceptical as to their 
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merits. In an interview, one supporter provides a knowledgeable insight into Everton’s previous 
investors and casts a shadow over third party involvement within the club to claim, “some say one 
of the shadow companies was a front for Sir Philip Green and we didn't really get to find out and 
we still don't know the full extent or the details on it - but if you're asking should we pick 
investment or not then that's a really difficult decision and I don't think fans could ever make that 
decision” (Personal Communication).  
Besides, the use of holding companies continue to challenge the way Everton governs the club, as 
a result of Mr Moshiri’s 49.9% share capital. There is an acceptance that Blue Heaven is Mr 
Morshiri and represented by Mr Ryazantsen, yet the holding company owns the share capital in 
Everton. Yet, the absence of Mr Moshiri from the board of directors as a registered director in 
Everton Football Company Ltd fails to make him accountable when legal or financial matters arise 
in the future. A club manager acknowledges the fear felt amongst supporters and claims “the new 
owner has a financial investment in the club, but how perverse would it be if he would try to 
disengage the fans - that would be ridiculous he wouldn't do that and we (the board) certainly 
wouldn't do that” (Interview, Liverpool 2017).  
Similarly, questions continue to be asked whether Everton can sustain the current levels of debt 
amassed with the loans underwritten by Blue Heaven, which is perceived to be above and beyond 
the club’s current levels of financial revenue. This debt has serviced extra transfer budgets and 
used to secure the land at the new stadium. For example, in 2014/15 Everton FC Ltd recorded a 
loss of £24.3m in their annual accounts, yet the club’s turnover was £120m turnover and many 
believe the loss was down to the way the accounts of the holding companies are reported (Everton 
Annual Reports & Accounts, 2015/16).  The lack of transparency between the companies and the 
role of powerful individuals within the club has raised concerns amongst supporters, as one points 
out “if you take the likes of Bill Kenwright (12.16% share) who hasn't got the money in terms of 
Mr Moshiri (49.9% share) - but we don't want them (the board) making the wrong types of 




The creation of subsidiary companies is common practice throughout English football; seen as a 
way to offset financial liabilities away from the main football business and stimulate capital 
investment without an exchange of shares in Everton Ltd.  Although the accounts for the 
companies are reported to the club’s main board of directors, the legal responsibilities lie with their 
registered directors. In addition to the complexities between the holding companies and the club, 
a joint Special Purpose Vehicle agreement has been struck with Liverpool City Council. This forms 
an agreement with the council to act as guarantors for Everton’s £300m loan investment required 
to build the new stadium at Bramley Dock. However, these new vast financial partnerships may 
prove problematic in the future, particularly on how these relationships and liabilities are governed. 
As Liverpool City Council now become creditors with the legal right to recoup any monies lost, if 
Everton cannot service their loan repayments.   
Additionally, the rental of the Finch Farm Training complex from the council heightens the 
speculation around the lack of transparency in the partnership. In the past, the content of deals has 
remained secretive between the council and the clubs, hidden behind the Land Registry Act 2002, 
which prevents the disclosure of information on the rental agreement made on the training ground 
(Environmental Information Request 461698 to Liverpool City Council, June 2016). This lack of 
information from previous deals between the club and the council was evident from previous joint 
partnership deals. However, a manager reiterated a plan was in place to change the transparent 
nature of future deals and states, “new owner is really clear on transparency, as in let’s tell people 
what we are talking about and let’s talk about the biggest issues, yet we cannot consult on every 
decision, as we are the executive and we had to manage the business” (Personal Communication).  
The newly created non-executive appointment on Everton’s board of Denise Barret-Baxendale 
(CEO) was seen as a prominent step towards how the club governs its operations. Yet, the power 
to make decisions remain with key shareholders and executive roles are seen to implement and 
control the club operationally. Furthermore, the role of CEO on the board at an executive level 
joins together ownership with the control of operations at Everton, seemingly without any 
mechanisms to challenge the hierarchical power of club directors. This reflects how Everton 
governs with the use of director-executives who act as the owner’s principal agents, with the ability 
to influence every operational aspect of the club. However, there have been a number of cases 
when the executives continue to mistake control for power and make decisions that have a negative 
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impact on the club. For example, the failed stadium at Kirby, problematic sponsorship deal and 
the change of the club crest. More importantly, the club recognise these areas of weakness, as a 
manager accepts that “one of the biggest examples, when we got it wrong, was the new club crest 
and we did do it wrong but repaired it - a preview of the crest was released but they (the supporters) 
didn't like it, but we had all the kits already made, along with the merchandise, which was in 
production from China” (Personal Communication).   
In reaction to the negative feeling felt amongst the supporters, the club went on to revise the crest 
with further consultation with various supporter groups. Furthermore, the failed bid for a new 
stadium still resonates in the club and left many supporters to call into question the ability of the 
current executive board to replace or upgrade Goodison Park. The failed move to Kirby only 
heightens the fear amongst supporters on why and how future commercial partnerships and deals 
are signed at Everton and the impact these decisions may have on supporters in the future. It is 
believed the previous lack of consultation in the proposed move to Kirby and the change of the 
club crest, along with the lack of transparency in land and sponsorship deals, highlights a weakness 
in how the club communicate business decisions to supporters. These feelings were reiterated by 
one supporter, who points out “I'm not too sure of details of the commercial deals, especially with 
kit bag, what did we get from that, this is what worries me - fans couldn't even get complete kits 
so it is these things that make me raise questions on some kinds of commercial partnerships” 
(Personal Communication). 
4.5 The Role of Supporter Groups and Associations at Everton FC   
The supporter association is seen as the most prominent group of supporters, in terms of how 
Everton govern under a corporate share structure. This minority group of shareholders (who hold 
a stake in the club’s shareholding) are said to “act as a form of watchdog over important matters 
concerning the club and with the responsibility for supervision of share dealings in Everton FC” 
(Everton Shareholders’ Association History, 2017). It is believed the association holds the right to 
access information on club matters, which otherwise would only remain private to key 
shareholder-directors within the club. Legally, minority shareholders do have the right to question 
the actions of majority owners and this is usually at annual general meetings. In recent years, the 
club has acknowledged that this group of supporters hold the right to access information and to 
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attend annual meetings, which in the past has not always been the case. One manager went onto 
explain the way the club has previously neglected the rights of minority shareholder supporters 
and explains, “these haven't always been the most sensitive of meetings, but there are meetings 
and they are shareholder meetings with shareholders - they are entitled to ask questions on how 
the club is being run and rightly so” (Personal Communication).  
Registered shareholders are also seen as supporters and continue to hold the most prominent role 
in the club, in terms of Everton’s main articles of association. Historically, these supporters have 
come together in an association to again a greater influence as a significant group of minority 
shareholders in the club. Over the new period on ownership, this group has strived for a closer 
working relationship with the club’s board, as seen when previous members of the association 
went on to become directors on Everton’s main board of directors. During the 1990s, a breakdown 
in relations with the board made the association more independent and Evident when the minority 
shareholders were instrumental in calling for another extraordinary general meeting, mainly to 
seek answers on the club’s poor financial results and team performance.  
In September 2008, this group of shareholders was successful when calling for an extraordinary 
meeting to challenge the current actions of Chairman Mr Kenwright.  Supporter groups demanded 
answers to a range of questions, mainly around the club’s future direction. The tension between 
the association and the board at Everton continued at a general meeting held by the club in 
February 2016. At this meeting, the association’s chairman John Blain went on to describe the lack 
of communication between the club and this minority group of shareholders. He said, “the club, 
through the chief executive have basically said to us that they are not going to answer any more 
questions from the AGM and are not going to have any more meetings with us (Liverpool Echo, 
February 2016).   Recent attempts from the new principal shareholder (Moshiri) has been to foster 
a new open relationship with this group of minority shareholders (Meeting with Farhad Moshiri, 
Everton Supporter Association, 2016). This approach has seen the club’s position on the 
association somewhat softened, particular that of Mr Kenwright (Chairman) and this was reiterated 
by one manager who claims, “the club is trying to work towards the most open communication 
channels; whether that is with the shareholders association or the fans forums” (Personal 
Communication).   
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The limited number of shares available to buy on the open market reduce the opportunity for 
supporters to become a member of the association. As a consequence, the number of official club 
members has increased at Everton, along with season ticket sales. Everton’s membership scheme 
offers the supporters a range of commercial benefits and even access to match day tickets. 
However, it is also felt these supporters have the opportunity to become part of the club’s official 
fans’ forum. This forum elects several supporters to represent official members on a range of issues 
and provides open consultation within the club. However, the forum topics up for discussion at the 
meeting continue to reflect the club’s commercial activity, in areas such as stadium branding, the 
matchday programmes, match day events and community events (Everton Fans Forum, 2017). 
There is a belief amongst supporters that the forum, only serves to gauge the feelings of supporters 
as part of their matchday experience, in line with the club’s strategic targets. As one manager 
explains, “it really is about really taking advantage of all of those touchpoints with our fans and 
helping them build a stronger sense of loyalty outside of a match day” (Personal Communication).       
The election of fans onto an active forum is seen to provide a direct link between forum liaison 
officers and supporters, who meet monthly to discuss club issues. In previous seasons, supporters 
on the forum were consulted on issues, such as ticket prices, shirt design and match day 
experiences. One manager went on to further explain the role of the forum at Everton and claims, 
“we include our fans (in the club) with the fans’ forums, as it is an opportunity for them to air their 
opinions” (Personal Communication).  As a result, fan representatives on the forum take a lead in 
a number of Everton related projects that reflect the club’s strategic vision, largely to improve the 
matchday experience of supporters. It is believed the forum strikes the right balance between the 
commercial activities at Everton and the feeling amongst supporters. As one supporter explains its 
“about getting the balance right between commercial and the supporters, which is always a difficult 






Everton also has several unofficial groups that form outside the club, used as an avenue for 
unaffiliated supporters to voice their concerns. A number of supporters believe their role is from 
afar to oversee the custodianship of Everton’s owner and to hold those in power accountable for 
their actions. One supporter voiced their concern for Everton in the future, as a result of the over-
investment by other owners and clubs and claims “if you take Leeds, it wasn't a strong investments 
it was borrowed money on the clubs debt, it was a gamble and the price of supporters then paid 
was to see the club fall and now they're watching the team in the championship and that shouldn't 
happen again” (Personal Communication).  Another popular group at Everton is the Supporter 
Trust (Est1878) who continue to fight against the following issues they believe are important to 
supporters across English football:  
• Affordable Ticket Prices  
• Safe Standing 
• Investing in Grass Roots Football 
• Campaign for a democratically elected representative from the Supporters Trust to sit on 
the Board of Directors at Everton Football Club to represent and promote the interests and 
views of all Evertonians 
• Campaign for Supporter Ownership of Everton Football Club 
There has been a steady rise in popularity amongst supporters joining unofficial groups, evident 
with the number of splinter groups currently affiliated to Everton (Table 4.5). One supporter 
reinforced the growth of these groups, but with a sense of realism on the role, they play and 
explains “these are pressure groups in terms of Everton forums and various websites run by 
supporters, for example, ToffeeWeb, but I doubt the supporters have any influence on some of the 











Grand Old Team to Support  https://www.grandoldteam.com/  
Toffee Web www.toffeeweb.com  
When Skies Are Grey  www.whenskiesaregrey.co.uk  
Nil Satis Nisi Optimum  www.NSNO.co.uk  
Toffee Talk (for the thinking Evertonian) www.toffeetalk.com  
Blue Kipper (Call y’self an Evertonian)  www.bluekipper.com  
 
Unofficial supporter groups affiliated to Everton have grown in previous years due to the perceived 
lack of investment in players, which has contributed to a downturn in the team’s success. 
Meanwhile, in light of the new owner, the evidence suggests this group of supporters play an 
important role in questioning the inevitable change planned at Everton. One manager claims that 
supporter groups that act outside of the club also have an important role to play and explains “I 
think in some ways the fans have more power being away from the board, acting like a pressure 
group” (Personal Communication).  There is a growing acceptance at Everton, a closer working 
relationship with supporters can only benefit the club due to the influence, these groups have 
towards servicing the current levels of debt at Everton. Along with the rise in player wages, a 
proposed new £300m stadium development and the recently signed 40-year lease at Bramley 
Dock. One supporter went on to voice their concerns of being bankrolled by a billionaire owner 
and points out “you wonder sometimes what happens sometimes if these high-profile owners, for 
example at Chelsea, get bored and withdraw their investment but what if they sell to somebody 
else who hasn't got as much money, will we start to decline” (Personal Communication). 
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The influence of Everton supporters on the club’s financial performance was evident when 
attendance revenue at home games dropped from £17.9mn to £17.6mn in 2015/2016. A 1.6% 
downturn in gate revenue, even though the club reached two domestic cup semi-finals in that 
season (Table 4.6). Due to this impact, Everton’s executive team have made the supporter 
experience at match days a fundamental element of the club’s commercial strategy. A manager 
points out the commercial importance of Everton supporters on match days has to be paramount, 
as “we are an entertainment industry, which offers football- so we had done a lot of work over the 
last four years” (Personal Communication).  Yet, there is still a growing body of supporters who 
question why Everton have fallen so far behind similar-sized clubs in recent seasons, as 
“unfortunately from the success, we had in the ’70s and early 80’s what saddens me is how we fall 
so far behind the rest, even with the influx of the broadcasting money, we fell quite quickly” 
(Personal Communication).    
Table 4.6. An Overview of Everton FC Profit and Loss Accounts 2014 to 2016 
 
Source: The Swiss Ramble Blog (2017).  
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4.5.1 The Relationship of Supporter Groups with Everton FC Model of Governance  
The relationship between the club and shareholder supporters, mainly within the association has 
been fraught with conflict and action, particularly in the way Mr Kenwright has previously 
marginalised the rights of minority shareholders. Two votes of no confidence against Mr 
Kenwright as Chairman, also have fuelled the tension between both parties. Over time, the 
association has offered to meet the board to re-build relations and have failed in their attempt to 
re-establish communication. In their defence, owner directors within the club do not have any legal 
obligations to include supporters in any decisions taken at a board level. As Everton’s articles 
determine control on one share, one vote basis. This shared control empowers directors to govern 
the club from their legal recourse as majority shareholders, without any responsibility to explain a 
course of action to supporters. As a consequence, the relationship between the board and the club’s 
supporters has been as a result of goodwill from the principal shareholder, evident with the 
exclusion of the association under Mr Kenwright’s ownership and the opening of dialogue at the 
start of Mr Moshiri’s reign.     
Currently, the rhetoric from Mr Moshiri is to build an ongoing relationship with representatives of 
the association, as Evident in his early meeting with the minority group of shareholders. Yet, the 
company articles that influence how Everton acts towards minority shareholders remain 
unchanged and this suggests that any future relations will be on the owner’s terms. Based on his 
goodwill, not from a rightful position within the club. Evident when one manager went on to point 
out a weakness in how the club records and disseminates information from club meetings and 
claims “we have always had a government framework to comply with company law legislation, 
however, we haven't had as much rigour in terms of subcommittees and reporting styles, or the 






As a consequence, it is believed the difficulty for Everton’s executive team is to build a governance 
framework that addresses the concerns of minority shareholders, which reflect their statutory rights 
from within the club’s formal channels. This is difficult due to the missing information from the 
share register, as the lack of personal details and unregistered shares makes it hard to understand 
the true number of minority shareholders. Currently, Everton’s minority shareholders are recorded 
at 29.4%. This missing information is believed to result from several official certificates being 
displaced, as a result of World War 2. Many believe that Mr Moshiri in the future will convert his 
principal shareholdings into a majority, with the purchase of Kenwright (12.16%) and Wood 
(8.9%) shares. If this agreement materialises, this would effectively eliminate the other prominent 
owner-directors and make the minority (represented by the association) the only other group of 
shareholders.  
A positive step by the club has been to build a link between supporters with the official fans’ 
forum. As a result, these forum meetings offer both parties the platform to raise issues on mutually 
beneficial areas, namely club initiatives and to address any matchday issues. However, there is 
realism amongst supporters that the forum only acts as a ready-made consumer group to court the 
option of supporters on commercial issues and through fan surveys. One manager explains the role 
of the forum and how it can build relations between supporters, pointing out that Everton “would 
really like to enhance the power of the fan base, why wouldn't you like to hear what your fans have 
to say” (Personal Communication).   
Many supporters believe the forum is merely an opportunity to pose questions to club 
administrators and while welcomed by some supporters, it does not offer them any additional 
power to influence club decisions at a board level. There is a belief, the forum’s agenda continues 
to air on the side of commerciality and replicates Everton’s customer charter in the following areas: 
• Promoting Diversity 
• Disabled Supporters 
• Everton In the Community 
• Charities 





• Loyalty and Memberships 
• Hospitality 
• Stadium Tours 
• Club Media Channels 
• Partnerships 
• Fan Experience 
In recent years, the unofficial supporter groups have taken up the mantle to question the reasoning 
behind failed commercial decisions and the rationale behind striking these deals. A criticism 
labelled at Everton’s board of directors has been the lack of transparency on business deals and 
their reluctance to share information on why commercial partnerships are signed. As one supporter 
explains, “transparency is the key with commercial deals and after the event, there should always 
be limits in terms of how you engage fans before you make a decision” (Personal Communication).  
Many believe, the official fan serves as a ready-made consumer group and other unofficial 
supporter groups continue to really pressurize and scrutinize board decisions from outside the club. 
A manager went on to explain how these groups can truly influence the club and claims   “I think 
in some ways the fans have more power being away from the board acting as a pressure group; I 
think they have a lot of power as a pressure group in terms of ticket pricing for example, with the 
away fan initiative they have done a tremendous job even with the accessible Stadium, they've 
done a tremendous job by being able to be on the opposite side so to speak” (Personal 
Communication).  This approach seems to encourage conflict, rather than consult with Everton 
supporters, which may have a negative impact on future success both on and off the field. Evident 
when Everton supporters joined rival Liverpool supporters to protest on likeminded issues, mainly 
on ticket prices. In light of this approach, Everton continues to encourage supporter groups to act, 
only if protests remain peaceful “because we (the club) have match day operations to conduct” 
(Personal Communication).    
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4.5.2 The Power and Influence of Supporter Groups 
Minority shareholders hold the right to challenge how Everton conduct certain aspects of the 
business. These rights are superior to any other group of supporters and through the association 
have the opportunity to question the future actions of Mr Moshiri’s reign as principal owner. Under 
the Companies Act 2006 statute, minority shareholders have the right to call on the following 
action: 
• With 5% of the shareholding, shareholders have a right to call a general meeting and to 
require the circulation of a written statement in this respect. 
• With a 10% holding shareholders have the right to have the company’s annual accounts 
audited, at the company’s expense. 
• Over 25% means that a shareholder can block a special resolution.  Such resolutions are 
required. For example, to amend a company’s articles of association. 
Source: Minority Shareholder Rights, Cripps LLP (2015). 
However, despite Everton’s minority on paper is 29.04%, in reality, there are only 94 members in 
the shareholder association. This minority in Everton Football Club Company Ltd does cover the 
5% share required to raise a petition or to reinstate annual meetings after a 5-year absence. A block 
on these meetings by directors led to heightened tension between the supporters and the board, 
which further deepened after the club’s failed attempt to move the stadium over to Kirby, mainly 
against the wishes of the majority of Everton supporters.    One supporter points out the breakdown 
in relations still lingers today, as “I remember when he (Kenwright) was in discussions on the 
ground in Kirkby well there's no way myself or a lot of the supporters wanted to go to Kirkby” 
(Personal Communication). After the breakdown of the Kirby move, Everton’s board of directors 
withheld key information on the project from 2008 until 2013, with many facts still unknown 
today. Uncertainty during this period, was evident when MP Chris Matheson announced the 
involvement of Sir Phillip Green as a shadow director in Everton, in a football governance 
committee held as part of Parliament. A fall out from these comments, saw Everton’s chief 
executive withdraw an offer in February 2017 to stage a shareholder meeting, which Mr Matheson 
was due to address.         
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Although Mr Moshiri is seen to encourage a stronger relationship with minority shareholders, there 
is a limit to how much this group of supporters can influence the board in the future. It has been 
reported that Mr Moshiri has an option to acquire the shares of Kenwright and Wood, along with 
any other shares that come onto the open market. In the notion, Blue Heaven share capital grows 
over time, there is a real possibility the holding company will gain sole control on the board at 
Everton. However, questions remain on how much information the club will trust with the 
association, as previously the club has kept this private between directors, as evidenced by the 
secrecy around the identity of prospective owners. A club manager defended their right to keep 
information from supporters and claims “we had the protection of the sale involved and that means 
the protection of the people who are looking to invest in the club, these people who are interested 
could also be looking at buying another 2 to 3 clubs at the same time” (Personal Communication).    
This view is averse from the role of the official fan’s forum, which promotes the sharing of 
information between the club and supporters. Forum meetings held in-house at Everton continue 
to address commercial issues, yet critical information on new owners and the new stadium at Kirby 
remain off the table for discussion.  While the club insists the topics up for discussion are not 
censored, there is a feeling amongst supporters the forum has little power to influence the 
mainboard.  Instead, forum meetings are staged to seek consumer feelings on match days, or new 
product development as part of commercial areas within Everton’s customer charter. The feeling 
amongst a wider set of supporters is contentious issues remain unanswered and the forum does not 
offer any direct access to the owner. As one manager points out “supporters with shares don’t have 
the opportunity to motion at annual general meetings, as we don’t have fan representation on the 
board” (Personal Communication).     
Overall, the majority of Everton supporters have no affiliation to the shareholders association, or 
the club’s official fans forum. Therefore, it is believed, these supporters are deemed unofficial as 
they form outside the club, with no influence at a forum level. There is a belief in the club this 
group of supporters only have a commercial relationship due to their attendance on match days. 
One supporter highlights these feelings amongst Evertonians and claims “I would say that we are 
more than a customer, different to other businesses where you are a customer and you should get 
the right treatment - you do have a lot of emotion to that club, a different kind of customer 
relationship but you still need responsibility from the club” (Personal Communication).  It has 
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become evident, Everton uses these types of supporter relationships as touching points within the 
club’s strategic pillars, with relations that reflect a customer experience as part of the club’s 
charter.  
The club state all supporters have the opportunity to ask questions as part of the official fan’s 
forum. Scepticism remains on meeting topics and the subsequent lack of consultation on larger 
decisions within the club. Yet, there is a sense, or maybe optimism that the new owner at Everton 
will take the club into uncharted levels of success. Nevertheless, the ungoverned use of unofficial 
supporter groups as protest groups will encourage action against the owners during unsuccessful 
periods and remains a risk to the club’s future success. As further commercial pressure and stadium 
relocation in the future offer these non-affiliated groups with the opportunity to vote with their 
feet, as one supporter points out, “sometimes you just can't afford this (following Everton) whether 
you're emotionally tied to the club or not, actually as an Evertonian it is probably actually cheaper 
now just to get a Sky box and watch it on the TV and in fact, now I can watch any game alone at 
any time on a Saturday and Sunday” (Personal Communication).     
4.6 Impact and Conclusion of the Case Study  
The case study protocol from the outset was to research two questions based on a theoretical 
framework of stakeholder theory. This framework explores how Everton governs their football 
business and the subsequent power, urgency and legitimacy of different supporter groups in the 
way a club governs (Mitchel et al, 1997). Therefore, this conceptual lens on Everton’s governance 
model provides a framework to identify the distinctive relationships between the club and various 
groups of supporters.  
4.6.1 What are the fundamental factors behind Everton’s model of football governance?  
Everton’s model of governance originates from share capital, which provides shareholder directors 
with a place on the club’s board. In the case of Everton, share capital has been registered in various 
holding companies, seen previously with True Blue Holdings (Kenwright & others) and now with 
Blue Heaven Holding (Morshiri). This sees 49.9% of the current shares owned by Blue Heaven 
Ltd. This makes Mr Moshiri the principal owner and therefore, Mr Ryazantsev (his board 
representative) the key decision-maker on the board. More significantly, the articles of association 
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in Everton FC Ltd set out the responsibilities of the board and the rules on how directors must act 
when dealing with the club’s corporate affairs (in conjunction with the Companies Act 2006).   
In reality, Mr Moshiri’s majority share capital and subsequent voting rights (1 share + 1 vote) offer 
him the sole control to run the club as he sees fit. Other members on the board are directors due to 
their share capital, or by appointment to non-executive roles at Everton. However, under Everton’s 
current articles of association, neither Kenwright (12.16%) nor Wood (8.9%) has the voting rights 
to overrule the actions of Blue Heaven. Even, if the rest of the shareholders (50.1%) came together 
to block the actions of Mr Moshiri, this would still not outvote his 49.9% majority, due to Everton’s 
large number of missing minority shareholders. 
At the moment, Mr Moshiri’s tenure as the owner has been warmly greeted by other shareholders, 
along with the majority of Everton supporters. This is mainly due to the amount of investment in 
new players, new commercial partnerships and the mooted move to a new stadium at the desirable 
Bramley Dock area. While at the moment, the influence of the new owner has been welcomed, 
along with his £80m loan, the financial backing for the new stadium (Special Purpose Vehicle in 
conjunction with Liverpool council) and the £60m three-year credit facility with the Bank of 
China, all reinforce his position as Everton’s owner. Under Everton’s current governance 
framework, it is impossible for directors to overrule or reject the wishes of Mr Moshiri’s majority. 
There seems a lack of transparency from board meetings and this makes it difficult for minority 
shareholders to question the rationale behind the owner’s strategy. Even without a formal role 
within the club, Mr Moshiri’s influence as the principal decision-maker on the board is 
unquestionable. This position of power resides from share capital and the vast sums of personal 
and commercial investment linked to the new owner.  
4.6.2 What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in Everton’s model of football governance? 
The conceptual lens in the case uses power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997) to 
classify the salient influence of various supporter groups at Everton, as a result of the club’s model 
of governance (Table 4.7). Four groups of supporters were identified as part of the case study and 
are as follows: 
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Table 4.7. Classification of Everton Supporters as Stakeholders 
 
Types of Everton 
Supporter Groups 
Power Legitimacy Urgency Stakeholder 
Types 
Shareholder Supporter 
Group (Association)  
No Yes Yes Dependent 
Groups of Official 
Affiliated Supporter  
No Yes No Discretionary 
Groups of Unofficial 
Supporters 
Yes No Yes Dangerous 
Groups of Unattached 
Supporters  
(no official or unofficial 
relationship with the 
club or supporter 
groups)  
No No No Non-Stakeholders 
Firstly, shareholder supporters who form the association hold a prominent role in the club. This is 
due to their rights in the articles of association, in accordance with the Companies Act 2006. Share 
rights held by supporters offer this group a legitimate position to challenge the action of other 
shareholders, via extraordinary meetings and on how the board of directors govern the club. The 
rising number of supporters affiliated to the association has strengthened the group’s legitimacy to 
scrutinise board decisions, as a group of minority shareholders. In recent seasons, the association 
has enforced its right to call into question the actions of the current chairman with a vote of no-
confidence. This call of no-confidence against Everton’s chairman highlights their legitimate 
rights as shareholders to voice their disapproval at club decisions, which make directors act 






While this group can bring legitimate motions and challenges, they have no power to affect change 
at a board level, due to the allocation of votes per share. These non-powers were evident from 
2008 to 2013, when the association failed in their attempt to gain access to information from 
general meetings and currently have no way to obtain the minutes from board meetings. While 
supporters with shares are offered an opportunity to challenge decisions after these are made, they 
do not have the power to influence decisions beforehand, or even during the board decision making 
processes. Therefore, this limits the influence of the group and makes them dependent on other 
stakeholders, mainly the principal owner and how he chooses to govern Everton as a company.  
Secondly, members of the official supporter groups, particularly those who represent season ticket 
holders and club members as part of the fan’s forum. This group continues to discuss issues with 
Everton representatives that affect their experience on match days. Regular meetings offer this 
group the opportunity to raise issues through a legitimate platform with employees from the club. 
However, these meetings revolve around issues that affect their consumer experience and offer 
supporters no real powers to influence how the club makes larger, more important decisions. It is 
seen more like a working group for supporters and administrators to discuss the club’s commercial 
activity, as the topics mirror Everton’s customer charter, which aims to improve the matchday 
experience for all supporters. Therefore, this group’s relationship is at the discretion of the club 
and offers no additional power to consult on urgent issues and with no legitimacy to influence how 
the board makes decisions.   
Thirdly, unofficial supporter groups have no direct access or relationship with Everton’s board and 
form of groups outside the club.  This means they have no legitimacy in terms of access to the 
club, or its forum administrators to that of official groups. Yet, as a default, these groups hold the 
power to protest with unofficial action against the club. Evidence throughout the study suggests 
unofficial action has the opportunity and power to disrupt the commercial aspects of the club. As 
a consequence, unscheduled protests from this group requires urgent steps to counteract the threat 
from unofficial action against the club. Therefore, the unpredictability of this group from outside 




Finally, there is a group of supporters that have no relationship with either Everton as a club or 
any supporter groups. This group of supporters have been disconnected from the club for various 
reasons and support Everton from afar. They cannot influence the club as a consumer, nor do they 
have the power to protest against the club with singular action as they have no aspirations to join 
any supporter groups. In return, the club has no power to influence this set of supporters and view 

















CHAPTER FIVE - A CASE STUDY OF ATHLETIC BILBAO FOOTBALL CLUB 
 
5.0 Overview of the Case Study 
The case study has researched Athletic’s model of governance to investigate the relationship that 
various supporter groups have with the club.  This explores the different types of supporter 
relationships that arise from how Athletic Bilbao governs, with a conceptual lens of power, 
urgency and legitimacy taken from Mitchell et al (1997), which will classify the stakeholder 
attributes of various supporter groups. Therefore, the case study from the outset explores two 
theoretical questions: 1. What are the fundamental factors behind Athletic’s model of football 
governance? 2. What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in Athletic’s model of football governance? 
 
5.1 Case Protocol  
The case protocol has adopted a qualitative approach to explore Athletic Bilbao within its real-life 
settings as a football club. This study will conduct semi-structured interviews with members of 
Athletic’s leadership team and its supporters. These interviews were used to provide a primary 
source of data to reflect the thoughts and feelings of knowledgeable respondents and provide an 
insight into the club’s key issues. An investigation into Athletic’s statutes, official documentation 
and archived records has been used as evidence to understand the rationale behind how decisions 
are made within the club and the influence of different supporter groups. Additionally, the use of 
direct observations will analyse how Athletic governs its business operations and the indirect effect 
these actions have on supporter groups. In order to understand the influence that governance has 
on supporter groups, the researcher will explore the case evidence within the field. This aims the 
lens on different groups of supporters to understand the nature of their relationship with the club.  
These observations were made during field visits to the city of Bilbao, San Mamés Stadium, 





5.2 The History and Ownership at Athletic Bilbao FC 
Athletic Club Bilbao, since its formation in 1898 was a founder club in Spain’s Primera Division.  
Athletic is situated in the Biscay province and the San Mamés stadium sits on the Ría de Bilbao 
(the estuary) in the industrial city of Bilbao. Since the early 19th century, the port has been used 
as an industrial hub to connect the city across the world and plays an important part in the history 
of Basque football. Opening Bilbao’s port up to new markets in iron and steel extracts through the 
city’s mines and quarries, also attracted workers from across Europe. Industrialisation was born in 
Bilbao and the influx of de los ingleses (the English sailors) who brought football along with them, 
started to kick a ball it along the docks during their lunch breaks. As a result, football was born in 
Bilbao, a love affair that supporters still hold today (Vaczi, 2015).  The club was formally known 
as Bizcaya, a local team from Bilbao until the club changed its name to Athletic Bilbao in 1903 
and become one of the founder members of the Primera División in 1929. To this day, Athletic 
supporters still pride themselves on being only one of three clubs, not relegated from Spain’s top 
football division (Gómez-Bantel, 2016).   
The election of Luis Marquez in 1900 as the club’s first President, went on the lay the foundation 
for Athletic’s historic model of governance. This included members within a club structure, which 
used philosophies of a sports club, later replicated throughout Spanish football. To this day, 
Athletic still use a membership model to govern the club and along with Real Madrid and FC 
Barcelona remain the only clubs not relegated from La Liga in its 90-year history. It is believed 
the democratic ethos incorporated into Athletic promotes a sense of togetherness, which spreads 
joint responsibility and liabilities amongst its members. However, the financial crisis in 1990 
threatened the majority of member-run clubs throughout Spanish football, due to mounting debt 
and unpaid Government taxes. In a deal struck with the Spanish Government, the debt-ridden clubs 
were bailed out. This changed sport member clubs into public limited companies, with higher 






As a consequence, the Spanish Government introduced legislation to reinforce the legal 
responsibility of a club, with regulation known as sociedad anónima deportiva (SAD). This 
legislation effectively removed the influence of members overnight and transferred their power 
over to a majority owner.  Athletic Bilbao was one of only four clubs, along with Real Madrid, FC 
Barcelona and Osasuna to keep their status as a member’s club, as a result of their profitable 
balance sheets at the time of the audit. Along with their status as a member’s club, the Spanish 
Government continues to offer Athletic a preferential tax rate as a non-commercial sports 
association, highly criticised by other clubs.  Yet, the ethos at Athletic as a sports organisation is 
evident throughout the club, as “Athletic Club is a private non-profit association with its own legal 
personality that, being ascribed to the Federación Vizcaína de Fútbol (Basque Football 
Federation), has as its social purpose the promotion and implementation of all types of sports 
activities and soccer, in particular, governed by State Sports Law 10/1990 on the 15 October 
through Basque Country Sports Law 14/1998 (Athletics Institutional Information: September 
2016).  
It is believed that registration as a non-commercial sports business promotes an active role for 
members and shares the responsibility to make decisions along with the liabilities of the club. 
There is a sense of supporter buy-in due to a shared ethos, which comes with being part of a sports 
club. Even today, Athletic continue to battle to keep their protected membership status against 
several challenges, mainly against the SAD status and future EU competition regulation. These 
external factors in the football club are seen to draw on the siege mentality instilled throughout the 
Basque region, after years of political intervention from the central Spanish Government. It is 
believed the club represents the regional past throughout its supporter community, which 
reverberates around Old Street of Casa Vieja (central old town in Bilbao) the location for the club's 
historic peña's (supporter groups), some of the oldest throughout Spain. Athletics’ historic regional 
philosophies continue to reaffirm the club’s relationship with its supporter groups, which goes 
further than their right to elect the next president. This commitment, born from Athletics' historic 
connection to the community has placed members at the heart of their club to protect their cultural 
heritage. This sense of community between the club and its members was evident throughout the 
interviews as a manager points out, “we really feel we understand football and not just only 
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football, but life and more importantly we are able to explain how we understand football to our 
members” (Personal Communication). 
The vast majority of Athletic members are from the Basque region and their affiliation originates 
from generational family ties with the club, as one supporter explains, “we don’t get to pick our 
football team, we are born into the club; it is passed down from our fathers” (Personal 
Communication). This deep-rooted connection with the local community and Bilbao’s football 
team is believed to originate from the Basque region’s fight for independence against Franco’s 
communist regime. Many claim the historic fight for independence has inevitably crossed over 
onto the football field. There is a belief amongst many Athletic supporters, the anti-establishment 
sentiment still holds strong today. A supporter used the phrase, “matador against the bull”, while 
another claims “the Basque culture has been under threat since the origins of the Spanish civil war, 
but when we are attacked, we rise and come together” (Personal Communication). There had been 
several occasions on the field when the Basque culture has carried the team to success against 
adversity. Most notably, the victory against Franco’s star-studded Real Madrid team in the 1958 
cup final with 2-0 win in favour of Athletic.  At the final whistle, the upset even captured the 
attention of Franco, as the dictator claimed the spirit of Athletic players in victory, came from their 
desire, togetherness and camaraderie.  
5.3 The Principles of Athletic Bilbao FC Governance  
Athletic cantera philosophy is unique throughout world football and has operated in the club since 
1912.  The cantera policy state only players from the Basque regions of Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, Araba, 
Nafarroa, Lapurdi, Zuberoa and Nafarroa Behera may be signed to play for the club. This policy 
is written into the club’s constitution and has been upheld throughout generations of club 
presidents. Jose Urrtuia, the current president reiterates the club’s policy to sign only regional 
players in the club’s annual report and claims “Athletic Clubs foundations will work tirelessly so 
that the values and philosophy that unite us can remain constant in time and are kept a source of 
shared pride” (Txosten Ofiziala; p7, 2015) As a result of the club’s commitment to the policy, 
members feel a real sense of affiliation to Athletic’s regional players. This sense of pride is evident 
throughout the Basque community, as a supporter claims “we feel so close to the players as they 
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share the same principles to that of the supporters – its feel like every member of the club knows 
either a player or the family of a player” (Personal Communication). 
Along with Athletics community spirit, comes the close-knitted relationship between those 
affiliated to the club, from supporters to players.  There is a real sense of tradition through the way 
the club is governed, particularly on the levels of commercial activity at the club. It is believed 
Athletic cantera policy make the club’s position within European football unique, at a time when 
transfer and sponsorship deals have reached unprecedented levels. While, the direct influence of 
its members, uphold the club’s rich traditions against private ownership and privatisation. 
Athletics’ historic traditions are felt throughout its supporter groups, also resonating amongst the 
club’s executive board, as a club manager points out, “along with its supporters, Athletic are 
characterized by their desire to defend values which are becoming increasingly uncommon in 
football and sports overall in the 21st Century” (Athletic Club, Club Information, September 
2016). 
It is also important to point out, there is a small minority of supporters who disagree with the way 
Athletic govern its old philosophies (with only signing Basque players), but these remain subdued 
with the team’s relative success in recent seasons. Besides, the steady production line of 
international level players from Athletic’s academy (Spanish and French) continues to keep the 
team competitive at the top of La Liga. This previous success has led to a Spanish league and cup 
double in 1981/1982 and more recently the 5-1 Super Cup victory in 2014/2015 over FC 
Barcelona. Success has also been witnessed on a European stage when Athletic reached the Europa 
League final in 2011/12 but went on to lose 3-0 to Atlético Madrid. Recent success instils a sense 
of confidence amongst members that the president and his senior management team are making 
the correct decisions in line with Athletics’ historic policy, which is embodied by the club's famous 
motto, which states “con cantera y afición, no hace falta importación”, this translated means, “with 
youth talent and home support – we do not miss imports” (Unzueta, 2011) These feelings were 
reiterated throughout interviews, as one club manager proudly points out, “we had never been 
relegated from the top division and we believe our club ethos embodies both the players and its 




The club’s philosophy to defend Athletic traditions, both on and off the field protects the rights of 
their members. The greatest challenge to Athletic's Basque only policy came in the seasons of 
2005/06 and 2006/07 when the club was nearly relegated from La Liga for the first time in the 
club’s history. Understandably, modern-day football continues to challenge the traditional way the 
club is governed, particularly amongst the younger members who want to see the best players in 
the world wear an Athletic shirt, not only based on birthright but talent.  A younger supporter went 
on to claim, “we have struggled to sign the best Basque players in recent years - just look at 
Griezman (who qualifies under the cantera policy) if other clubs get to buy our own players, why 
shouldn’t we get to buy theirs!” (Personal Communication). For example, Griezman qualifies to 
play for Athletic under the cantera policy, now unrealistic due to his wages and transfer fee, but it 
raises an important issue around Basque qualification. Previously, Athletic have also signed 
players based on their youth registration at other local La Liga clubs, such as Real Sociedad and 
Aleves. For example, in the Griezmann case (one for the world’s hottest prospects), he could 
qualify to play for Athletic, due to his formative years at Real Sociedad. Another criticism of the 
Basque only policy is that it only covers the playing side of the club, not the football coach or their 
staff. Evident from the previous appointment of foreign managers, Howard Kendall (English: 1987 
to 1990) and Marcelo Alberto Bielsa Caldera (Argentinian: 2011 to 2013). 
An increase in private ownership and foreign investment throughout the Spanish league continues 
to add pressure on Athletics' unique cantera policy. In addition, the upsurge in foreign players at 
other La Liga clubs, only intensifies the competition to remain within Spain’s top division. Both, 
Barcelona and Real Madrid adopt the same model of membership within their club, but also 
capitalise on unlimited corporate investment from global companies. This enables them to compete 
across European football and sign the most high-profile players that command the highest wages 
and transfer fees. Unbeknown to many, historically Athletic has signed players from outside of the 
Basque area. As between 1902 and 1912, the club incorporated several international players, which 
in turn lead to success on the field. For example, with British Nationals Fred Pentland, Walter 
Evans and William Dyer to name a few (Athletic Club, History, September 2016).  
This mix of home and international players went on to win several championship leagues and Copa 
del Ray finals, in one of the clubs most successful periods. There had been calls from some quarters 
at Athletic, mainly by younger members to buy foreign players with a change in club policy.  
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However, the feelings on display throughout the interviews were that the cantera policy was held 
in high regard, even with the threat of relegation - setting Athletic apart from other clubs across 
European football. Evident in one interview when a manager points out “Real Sociedad was the 
same as us (only home-based players) but changed to recruiting foreign players and then got 
relegated to the 2nd division – so we believe our management of the club is correct until proven 
otherwise” (Personal Communication). 
5.3.1 Constructing Governance at Athletic Bilbao FC  
The club’s articles of association along with the statutes document how the club should be 
governed and the role of its members. These rules explain the procedures behind the election of a 
president and directors onto the Board of Directors during a four-year term of office. Any 
individual up for election must come from a nomination of a candidate, in a maximum pool of 21 
nominees who hold club registration. As part of the election process, the president, along with the 
board formally resigns from their position to trigger a change of office. From the board’s 
resignation through to the election of the new president, an interim election committee oversees 
club operations until the board of directors has been inaugurated into position (Athletic Board of 
Directors Meeting; February 2015). A further example of how Athletic’s tradition continues to 
influence the election process is the historic method of drawing lots, to select five designated 









The electoral board validates the conditions that qualify a candidate for the presidency, along 
with the board of directors and the stipulations are as follows:  
a)  To have reached the age of majority. 
b)  To be in full exercise of civil rights. 
c)  To not be subject to any sanction that disqualifies them from holding executive office. 
d)  To not hold an executive position at another football club, nor be active as a player, 
referee, coach/manager or member of the technical staff of another club at the time of 
standing as a candidate. 
e)  To have been a member of the club for an uninterrupted period of one year. 
Members also need to meet the following conditions to qualify for a vote in the club, 
under the electoral regime: (Athletic Club Statutes: art 66) 
a)  To have reached the age of majority. 
b)  To be in full exercise of civil rights. 
c)  To not have suspended your membership when the elections are called. 
d)  To have been a member of the club for an uninterrupted period of one year. 
e)  To be on the Electoral Roll. 
Governance at Athletic forms a framework to uphold the articles of association that outline the 
powers of the president, as part of the board of directors. Empowering these leaders with the 
responsibility to govern the club falls to the members.  It is believed, these elections offer members 
the opportunity to appoint a new president, which occurs every four years and provides a mandate 
of power to lead the club (Athletic Club Statutes: art 68). Additionally, these elections endorse the 
president’s manifesto and it is the responsibility of the board of directors to deliver this vision 
during their term of office. A mandate offers the president the power to make decisions on behalf 
of its members, particularly in terms of club operations as one manager explains “the club 
management team has to make lots of urgent decisions and it is impossible to consult all the 
members with every decision – and more importantly they have appointed a president to make the 




Without a doubt, the role of the president is pivotal to how Athletic govern, as his position at the 
head of the board of directors leads a senior management team (Candidacy Presentations: June 
2006). During presidential elections, Athletic members vote in eleven vocal directors, along with 
a vice president who take-up a position on the club’s board. The director’s role on the board is to 
assist the president in his daily duties and consist of a secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer and the 
club’s accountant (Figure 5.1).  It is felt the directors on the board represent the view of its 
members, who remain confident that decision-makers still have a similar view on the club’s 
direction to that of a supporter. As a result, members believe that directors continue to manage as 
a mirror image of themselves and in the best interest of the club. As a supporter points out “we 
trust the president to act in the traditions of the club and to represent its members with the pride of 
the Basque people” (Personal Communication).   









In the board’s structure, the president resides over seventeen directors and he is currently in a four-
year term of office (Athletic Club Statutes: art 73). The case evidence suggests the presidential 
candidates build a team from people with similar philosophies, mainly in agreement with the 
proposed manifesto, similar to a political party. This was clear when a member points out that 
“ultimately I vote for presidents and trust he has selected the best team to represent its members - 
sometimes I would like a cross selection amongst the electoral groups, but I can only vote for one 
group” (Personal Communication). There is a view that individual candidates naturally side with 
one of the presidential groups, as a result of previous regional, personal or business relationships. 
However, these previous relationships and political affiliation help to elect a group of directors 
based on a manifesto, but this removes the opportunity for members to elect candidates based on 
their personal ability, skills and professional experience.  
This situation can also arise when only one candidate runs for president at Athletic, either for 
political or practical reasons. In this situation, a president may be appointed without the need for 
a formal voting process (Athletic Electoral Board Meeting: March 2015). This limits the ability 
for members to influence the next president, even the appointment of directors, as it removes the 
opportunity for groups to vote in a formal process.  Dissatisfaction against a presidential 
appointment was evident when members voiced their disapproval at Fernando Lamikiz failed term 
of office from 2004 to 2006. This dissatisfaction grew against the president from a “generalized 
dissatisfaction that persists after this difficult past season and thereby submits his resignation so 
that he is not a burden to the club” (Athletics Ordinary General Meeting: September 2006).  
5.3.2 The Influence of Governance at Athletic Bilbao FC  
Ultimately, the president is accountable for how the club conducts its business with the added 
responsibility for the directors at Athletic to maintain the right mix of skills on the board. These 
skills must cover several areas, from financial budgets to the negotiation of player and commercial 
contracts, which all fall under the board’s powers to enact decisions on behalf of the members. All 
seventeen directors have a right to vote in club decisions as a majority rule is required before a 
board can approve a motion. Although each of the seven directors receives a vote, which promotes 
parity amongst board members, it can reduce the power of the president to carry forward the wishes 
of its members. One manager went on to explain the mechanisms of the board and claims “the 
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president does not have any extra powers on the club board, he chairs the meeting and then we 
vote on the issues raised in the agenda, so the board has no need for a casting vote” (Personal 
Communication). Although the board does hold the power to increase the number of directors on 
the board in the event of a skills shortage, this requires the endorsement of members to ratify the 
appointment in a secret vote (Carlos Lasa joins the Board of Directors: June 2010). 
At the moment, the board is made up of seventeen director positions, so decisions form naturally 
from an odd number of decision-makers able to cast a vote. While this spreads the influence 
equally amongst various decision-makers, which includes the president, it also has the opportunity 
to change the dynamics on the board. These additional director positions in the future add an extra 
level of responsibility onto the president who holds a casting vote, possibly when a deadlock occurs 
in board meetings. In return, the board also have the opportunity to reinforce the power of the 
president, when rebel directors take on the president, either in meetings or with leadership 
challenges.  A manager explains the dynamics on the board and power of the president at board 
level and point out “all the people on the board represent different working backgrounds and when 
project come up or we need advice we had experience which we can call upon, if not we 
recommend somebody to join us – I can’t remember a vote by the members against our 
recommendations” (Personal Communication).  
An alternative avenue for members to influence decisions at Athletic is their right to invoke a 
formal request to add a new item onto the agenda at general assembly’s, as this provides the 
opportunity to vote on a new club motion (Athletic Club Statutes: art 19). These rights incorporate 
members into the club’s governance structures through formal proposals, motions and declarations 
that challenge the actions of the board.  Athletic leaders welcome the use of motions by members 
as an opportunity to consult with its supporters on key decisions, as one points out “the challenge 
is explaining the motion, then getting the right validation to include as an item on the assembly 
agenda, we are almost certain the vote will be passed by the members” (Personal Communication). 
However, the feelings felt amongst members during the interviews suggest there is confusion on 
their level of power and influence at board level when decisions require approval from the club’s 
members.   As one member claims, “yes it is true, we had the right to vote on a decision, but it 
seems to me on less important decisions – we had just renamed the San Mamés press room, but to 
name the next manager or a player…..never!” (Personal Communication).     
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The president’s power originates from a mandate issued from the members as an electorate, 
described by some as a custodianship. This comes from a belief, Athletic’s board governs the 
business in the interest of its supporters and not just purely to make a financial profit.  An increase 
in commercial revenue throughout the football industry has started to place extra pressure on the 
president to compete on and off the field, without jeopardising Athletic’s rich heritage as a 
community sports club.  However, the balance between tradition and investment at Athletic, to 
remain competitive in La Liga has become increasingly difficult to govern with the persistent drive 
for team success.  Evident from 2001 to 2007 when members voiced their displeasure at a rise of 
commercial activity, along with the team's poor results, which culminated in five different 
presidents in seven years. Changes to the entire board of directors every four years continue to 
raise an important question on where the ultimate responsibility lies for poor performance, either 
between the elected (president) or the electorate (members).  
These uncertainties may arise with the transfer of accountability from the electorate through to the 
president after elections are concluded, as the board take-on the full responsibility for the club 
performance on and off the field. A member claims, “we elect a president to make the club 
decisions on behalf of the members- if things go wrong and the team doesn’t perform, then it lies 
with the president, not the members” (Personal Communication). However, the club offers a 
difference of opinion, when it comes to the balance of power and claim members also have an 
important role to play within Athletic’s constitution. As one manager explains, “yes, of course, the 
members elect us, but each and every member has the responsibility to support the team on and 
off the field. Members vote on important decisions affecting the club, so we all have joint 
accountability if things don’t go to plan” (Personal Communication). Furthermore, this joint 
accountability is reinforced within the club’s articles, which offer members the opportunity to 






While the president has the power to enact daily decisions on behalf of the electorate under a 
mandate, it raises an important issue around how members re-exert their influence on poor 
performance. An indication of this influence was evident when a group of members filed a motion 
of no confidence against Fernando García Macua’s (Athletic president from 2007 to 2011) style 
of leadership. However, a criticism of the members comes when individuals choose to opt-in and 
out of decisions throughout a yearly cycle, without any deterrent in the club rules for non-
participation. For example, in an election, only 50% of members are required to make the 
appointment of the next president binding. Thereafter, the total drops to 40% in the second round 
and further decreases to 10% in a final round of votes, which still constitutes a majority when 
agenda items and motions are approved. (Extraordinary General Assembly: April 2014).  
Undeniably, club articles provide a framework that encourages the inclusion of members on some 
of the larger decisions made at Athletic. Yet, the small turnout rates at the extraordinary meetings 
highlight the lack of commitment from some members to uphold and challenge the club’s actions 
and emotions. Recently, these motions mainly consist of annual reports, proposed budgets, even 
the development of San Mamés and Lezama training complex.  Members with rights represent a 
wider spectrum of supporter views at Athletic and also provide the opportunity to raise any 
objections to any unsolicited commercial action or unwanted partnerships made by the board. 
Otherwise, without the involvement of members on club matters, the membership scheme reflects 
many others across football and becomes a ready-made consumer database without power any to 
influence Athletic decisions (Discounts for “Mamma Mia” Musical: July 2016). It is believed, the 
relationship between a president and the directors form prior to the election process. These 
relations are aided by regional supporter groups who play an integral role in presidential 
campaigns, with many going on to form Athletic’s board as part of the successful presidential 
team. This close connection was recognised by a member who claims, “the president selects his 
team before a vote had been cast, but there is always a feeling there are relationships, or maybe 
business dealings between members of the president’s group - it’s all seems above board because 





This close connection on the newly formed board of directors highlights the historic relationships 
between individuals on the senior management team, as many have questioned the close 
connection between a president and his directors. Although Athletic is seen to govern the club with 
an air of transparency, the personal ties between directors from previous business interests and 
political alignment are unclear before the election process. Whilst, members elect a president based 
on their vision for the next four years, the appointment of directors is based on a regional or 
political alliance, rather than on individual merit, skills or experience. Naturally, the nature of an 
election process draws out the political dimension, even in a sports context. As a club manager 
points out, “the directors are mainly professional people and they would not feel they are 
representing the interest of the club they love unless they challenge decisions, they do not feel are 
right”!  (Personal Communication). 
5.3.3. Future Challenges to the Governance Model at Athletic Bilbao  
There are several political, social and economic factors that continue to challenge Athletic as a 
members’ club and may even affect how the board governs the club in the future. Primarily, the 
president's team is fundamental to the club’s day-to-day operations, but they also make decisions 
on business-related activities, such as sponsorship deals, business partnerships and any new 
adventures (Sponsorship agreements with Kirolbet: September 2015). It is the board’s 
responsibility to conduct business in line with Athletic’s philosophies, but also to keep the club 
economically viable, both on and off the field. However, it has become more difficult to strike a 
balance between the riches on offer throughout the football industry and the club's historic stance 
against the over-commercialisation of Athletic members. 
The steady rise of foreign investors in similar-sized clubs across La Liga continues to impact the 
president’s reign of office, mainly on the level of commercialisation acceptable to members and 
strike a balance between profit and tradition (Presidents Press Conference: February 2015).  
Currently, the president has been in office since 2011 (7+ years) that provides the club members 
with a sense of stability and coincides with a successful period for the football team. At the same 
time, the current president has also overseen the construction of the new San Manes stadium.  
Members feel comfortable leaving the day to day running of the club with the current management 
team, as one manager points out, “the president understands the club in a particular way and runs 
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it with his heart, but if this was to change, maybe we could see an alternative approach – a more 
business-focused approach” (Personal Communication). 
The current influx of new owners and foreign investors into other Spanish clubs reopen the debate 
around Athletic’s unique policies. Supporters view their philosophies in Spanish football as 
paramount to Athletic’s future success to retain La Liga status over other teams, which is said to 
be one of the club’s greatest achievements. Throughout the interviews, Athletic’s historic status in 
La Liga, as an ever-present since its formation, continues to be felt with a sense of pride amongst 
supporters and held up as one of Athletic’s greatest achievements.  This was reiterated throughout 
the visits to Bilbao, even ridiculing Athletic’s closest rival, Real Sociedad with a popular joke 
amongst supporters, which asks “what does Sociedad have that Athletic do not?....... A second 
division championship!” More importantly, the threat to Athletic’s status in La Liga is real, due to 
the growing nature of private investors who have taken over similar-sized clubs and invested 
heavily in players due to their financial resources. This is the case at Valencia, owned by Peter 
Lim (Singaporean) at Getafe, which is owned by the Royal Emirates Group (Dubai) and at Malaga, 
which is owned by Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Al Thani (Qatari). All of these clubs have 
increased spending powers from the riches a private investment, largely due to the introduction of 
the SAD regulation.   
In reality, a concern throughout the interviews is that Athletic are only one season away from 
relegation, especially with the growth in competition within La Liga in recent seasons. This 
increase in spending in La Liga clubs was evident in the summer 2017 transfer window. Whilst, 
the rest of La Liga spent an estimate €617m to signed home and international players, Athletic 
paid out €3m for Ander Capp, a local player from neighbours, Eibar. This highlighted the disparity 
in transfer budgets between other clubs and Athletic, which was further compounded by the uneven 
financial distribution of the new three-year domestic TV deal signed by La Liga in 2016. It is 
believed the highest earner in terms of broadcast rights is Barcelona FC, which receive in the 
region of €150m per year, closely followed by Real Madrid who receives €148m (2016-2017 
session).  These clubs continue to take full advantage of their prestige in world football, which 
capitalises on the image rights of the world's best players, but under the banner a sports member 
club (Spanish La Liga New 3 Year TV Deal Worth €2.65 billion- 2016-19: February 2016). 
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Another challenge to Bilbao's local philosophies was the recent rise of Deportivo Alavés 
(promoted back to La Liga in 2015/16) and Eilbar (promoted back to La Liga in 2014/2015), who 
are both situated in the Basque catchment area, under the cantera policy.  Alavés have capitalised 
on private commercial investment permitted under their SAD status, which provides direct 
competition for a La Liga spot. Not only are Alavés and Eibar seen as competition on the field, 
but it also challenges Athletic’s recruitment of the region’s brightest youth talent. Unfortunately, 
the rise of Basque local clubs in Spanish football continues to heighten the fears amongst its 
members, as these pressures may see Athletic fall behind smaller clubs within the region. To 
reinforce Athletic’s youth policy, which houses some of Spain’s brightest young players, the club 
has invested heavily in the Lezama master plan (Athletics Training Facility) to increase the quality 
of its youth players and help nurture their progression into the first team (Club Referendum to all 
members concerning Lezama: December 2009).  The club plans to invest €12m over 2-3 years to 
upgrade its central training facility, with an extra €21.5m to helps toward the running costs for the 
2014/15 season (Txosten Ofiziala; p146. 2015). As a supporter claims “it feels we had no other 
option, but to invest extra into the youth system because that is all we know, and all our 
philosophies allow” (Personal Communication).   
Inevitably, further challenges lie ahead for Athletic as the European Union Commission continues 
to investigate the use of tax breaks to sport clubs across Spanish football. In a commission ruling, 
it was deemed professional football clubs must be run and therefore treated like any other 
commercial business, in accordance with all other economic industries that fall within the 
European Union. Margrethe Vestager, the EU commissioner, who led the investigation into 
football went on to claim, clubs continue to breach competition law, by "using taxpayers' money 
to finance professional football clubs can create unfair competition. Professional football is a 
commercial activity with significant money involved and public money must comply with fair 
competition rules. The subsidies we investigated in these cases did not” (European Commission: 
State Aid & Spanish Football: 2016, p. 1) As a consequence of the EU verdict, the Spanish 
Government, along with the Spanish football authorities continue to review the tax breaks on offer 
to Spain’s four member-governed clubs, as it is claimed that non-SAD clubs continue to use 
“public money” offered with preferential tax rates, and this verdict threatens to eradicate the 
historic membership model from Spanish football.  
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5.4 The Role of Supporter Groups and Associations at Athletic Bilbao FC  
Athletic supporter groups are called peñas and represent many of the micro afición (communities), 
who meet in local bars and restaurants throughout the city on match days. There are approximately 
450 supporter groups currently affiliated to the club, which represent both official members with 
different rights, along with other local supporter groups who support the club but are not registered 
as members.  Originally, the number of official club members was set at 35,000 and this group 
held the right to vote in elections and to attend games at the old San Mamés stadium (1913 to 
2013). In 2013, the re-construction of the San Mamés released a further 10,000 memberships 
within the club and raised the total number of members to 45,000. As re-construction of the 
stadium triggered a 10,000 additional membership within the club, this has also led many to 
criticise the way memberships were offered to supporters. Aa a supporter went on to explain, “due 
to the number of members against the stadium attendance there is a small number of tickets left 
for each game and the waiting lists for new memberships are long” (Personal Communication). 
Athletic’s 45,117 members have a direct relationship with other regional supporter groups that are 
affiliated to the club. The majority of these supporter groups are registered with the club and are 
situated within the Basque region, throughout Spain and now even on an international scale. After 
the revamp of the San Mamés, the extra 10,000 new memberships added to the 35,117 existing 
members were housed in a new stadium capacity of 53,000 with an addition of 13,000 seats (Press 
Conference and Assessment of the Draw: August 2014). It was believed when the club created 
these new memberships, the funding was instrumental in the early stages of the new San Mamés 
development to provide the capital investment needed to lobby the regional Government for 
planning permission and land acquisition to build the stadium. A manager points out the reason 
behind why Athletic used new members as capital investment to fund the early stages of the project 
and claims, “we included and needed help from new prospective members, so we asked new 
members to register and asked them to pay 30 euros each to lobby for funding of the new stadium 





As a result, 10,000 investors became new members in the club and these are referred to as barria 
members (neighbourhood members), which entitles them to a seat to watch the games, but as a 
consequence only limited rights in the club's formal meetings (Barria members be allowed to vote 
in the upcoming elections: October 2014). This group of newly acquired members held different 
rights to existing members, as new members did not have the right to vote in their first election 
after the opening of the stadium, but they did have the opportunity to watch Athletics games for 
their annual fee. Throughout the interviews, it was suggested, while new members feel part of the 
club on match days and affiliated to the philosophies. It seems Athletic’s newest set of members 
feel powerless, as other members get to elect the next president. This view was expressed by a 
Barria member from the last elections, who explains, “if you ask me the difference between being 
a member of Sociedad and Athletic, I see no difference – I pay to watch my team and other people 
are making my decisions in the club” (Personal Communication). The exclusion of Barria 
members from Athletic’s voting process was believed to create tension and division amongst both 
sets of members. This is evident on match days when members are housed in different areas of the 
stadium based on the seniority of their membership status. A manager claims the different levels 
of membership has started to affect the atmosphere throughout the stadium going on to claim, “we 
had to work with the fans to improve the relationship as it’s not easy to explain, but we had to talk 
to the groups to improve the things……the atmosphere” (Personal Communication). 
Historically, member-based clubs hold the full right to vote in elections have the opportunity to 
influence how the club governs. Aided by Athletic’s member's constitution, the inclusion of 
members can contribute towards club decisions, who act as guardians to protect Athletic 
philosophies. To do this, Athletic uses the club's annual assembly as a reporting mechanism to 
offer the members the opportunity to review the previous operational decisions and to question the 
subsequent actions of the directors. These actions are presented in the form on a Txosten Ofiziala 
(official report) at the assembly and additionally, its directors provide a verbal report on why 
certain decisions were made. Whilst on the other side, it also acts as an endorsement, or as a method 
to challenge the president's style of leadership and the club's level of performance. An annual 
assembly also provides members with the opportunity to discuss different aspects of the club, as 
one manager points out, “the assembly is a good opportunity not only for the members to check 
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the records, but as the board, it provides us with confidence that we are getting things right off the 
field” (Personal Communication).  
This transparent nature of the general assembly instils key governance principles, which check and 
balance the financial conduct of the board in accordance with club articles. As a result, this 
approach holds club directors accountable and promotes a sense of confidence amongst members 
that the board continues to make the correct type of decisions. To protect Athletic’s future success 
and sustainability, the members hold the responsibility to cast their vote an important process to 
protect the club or to ratify new commercial partnerships (New item on General Assembly Agenda: 
October 2014). This positions members at the heart of the club and is believed to protect the 
Basque’s footballing heritage, which acts as a critical eye over the president’s custodianship. As a 
member claims, “it would be a brave president that changed the club’s policies – many of the old 
members (senior) have been involved for years and long before most of the board. It will never 
happen in my lifetime!” (Personal Communication).      
The introduction of members into formal mechanisms that report and approve club actions increase 
the accountability of supporters with governance processes that reflect their traditions. These views 
are seen as a method to monitor the individual action of a director with an air of accountability, 
particularly when the board makes critical decisions on behalf of the club and its members. 
Although Athletic make decisions from only a few individuals on the main board of directors, this 
offers a degree of flexibility when the club needs to make quick decisions. For example, the signing 
of a player, health and safety issues in the San Mamés or sponsorship deals. It is believed too much 
influence on the side of members may reduce the power of the president and limit his ability to 
make decisions or capitalise on any future opportunities, all to the detriment of the club. A 
supporter went on to explain the particular role of members in the club's daily operations and 
claims “we get to vote on some decisions, but we take these with great responsibility because if 





Athletic’s official regional supporter groups serve as a mini-election ground to put forward 
nominees for the club’s main elections. These regional groups consist of “eight zones or regions, 
each one of these regions has delegates or representatives that constitute Coordinators who guard 
the interests of the supporter’s clubs and their members” (Federacion Internacional de peñas Del 
Athletic Club: January 2017) Candidate's progress from a position on a regional supporter group 
through to the club’s board, as this draws a sense of political alignment with its members and the 
new president. The evidence observed throughout the field visits to Bilbao suggest that prominent 
member groups continue to hold a strong political and social relationships with a president, before 
and after club elections has taken place. These relationships build a stronger line of communication 
between the board and members, which pull similar groups together with a similar localised 
political outlook. Such relationships form regional support from regional groups who nominate 
directors and presidential candidates for elections, as regional voters are ready to back their home-
town election campaign (VII Congress of the Southern Athletic Club Supporters: November 2015).  
Backing your association’s candidate at the time of club elections was evident when one member 
went on to explain, “normally each area has a president of a supporter group and these are the 
individuals that progress into the club elections – I always vote for the southern section because 
this is my community” (Personal Communication).   
5.4.1 The Relationship of Supporter Groups with Athletic Bilbao FC Model of 
Governance  
Club elections provide members with a direct link to those in charge of making decisions at board 
level, which is further reinforced from the rules written into the club’s articles.  Elections select 
members from regional groups to represent a body of supporters, but before nominations are 
ratified, the nominee's civil rights must be in accordance with the Basque regional government 
(Athletic Club Statutes: art 66). This offers access to the club for local people and the whole 
community’s due to the open and transparent regional approach throughout Athletic. This 
approach reflects the bond between the members and how the club governs under the cantera 
policy which has become unique throughout European football. This policy mirrors the way 
Athletic governs and its relationship with the supporters and their role within the club. A club 
manager points out how the board governs the club on a daily basis and states “we try to make all 
the club’s information available to members, some we had to keep confidential – we don’t hide 
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everything and try to show this to the members with not only open access to information but the 
San Mamés and to open training sessions with the team” (Personal Communication). 
An air of transparency resonates throughout Athletic in the way the club governs, this was further 
evident in the level of detail released by the club. The continued release of information is extensive 
throughout the club and is believed to help supporters understand why decisions and actions were 
taken by the board. This was felt throughout the interviews with club officials and supporter 
groups, as one affiliated member points out, “the club is ultimately run by its members and this 
makes us really feel part of the club – in particular, and most importantly it is the players and the 
team that makes us feel proud” (Personal Communication). However, the excessive sharing of 
information into the public domain can also have a negative impact on Athletic’s corporate affairs, 
the security of its people, assets and data. This open access to Athletic’s sensitive information can 
damage the future position of the club, particularly during contract negotiations, legal cases and 
can even impact on the team’s personal security (Laporte Contract Renewal: June 2016). 
Furthermore, this open approach to the club’s private information can leave Athletic open to future 
investigation, particularly on how a sports business can continue to sign highly lucrative 
sponsorship and land commercial deals (EU Commission Verdict, 2016).    
An added complexity surrounding the sports business was the creation of the Mames Barria LM 
(lease rights) and SM (site & user rights) private limited companies created to construct and 
manage the new San Mamés stadium. These companies were approved by an Assembly of 
Associate Members at a meeting held on 23rd March 2007 (General Assembly, 2009). Both 
companies were created to build and operate the new stadium as a vehicle to raise capital 
investment from external shareholders (Company Overview of San Mamés Barria: Bloomberg, 
2016). However, the use of private companies (construction & venue management business) to 
run the stadium, calls into question the nature of a sports club and starts to introduce shareholders 






In a way, many believe the creation of both companies compromise the democratic right of 
members, as directors of the holding board are appointed and not elected, which leaves members 
without the opportunity to contribute to their decisions. It is important to point out that members 
do have the right to review the accounts through the club’s annual report, but with limited access 
to influence these companies. This is evident with 10% of the company’s shareholding being held 
by external parties of the Basque Country General Administration (Incorporation of Basque 
Government, May 2010) and Kutxabank (Audit Report: San Mamés Barria SL, 2007-2014), which 
introduce external partners with a legal position into the club. A limited knowledge on the newly 
formed companies was evident when one member claimed, “we can see the profit and loss figures 
in the memoria oficial (annual report) and know that the club finance is good for this year and the 
next, but sometimes we don’t know how we are going to get there, or what the plan is” (Personal 
Communication). 
These limited companies have the power to increase commercial activities (sponsorship, 
merchandise and corporate matchday packages) as a corporate entity without the need to challenge 
Athletic philosophies or to change the articles that state the purpose of Athletic as a sports club. 
Athletic's general meetings do have the opportunity to review company accounts through the club’s 
reporting channels (annual report/proposed budget for assembly approval), but the creation of the 
holding companies reduces a member stake from a 100% entity to 90%. In an interview, a manager 
explains the process that monitors these companies from within the clubs and claims, “the 
members have the opportunity to review and approve all of the club decisions, in fact, they voted 
on the creation of the company at an extraordinary meeting” (Personal Communication). However, 
a 10% shareholding in club assets (for example the stadium) offers external partners the proxy 
right to influence how these are managed as a private limited company (Ley de Sociedades de 
Capital: art 25. 2011). Furthermore, the use of share capital provides a shareholder with access to 
financial accounts and budgetary information, which becomes detrimental to Athletic’s 





Athletic’s operational decisions are made at board level, (business and football-related), while 
more strategic decisions are taken through the assembly (ordinary, general and extraordinary) and 
this mixed level of decision-making highlights the disparity in the rights of its members at certain 
points in the club’s constitution (New item of the General Assembly, October 2014). As one 
member goes on to explain how supporters vote at the assembly “vote on each individual agenda 
item which has been raised on the day, not taken by the board, this is on a yes or no basis and in 
line with our rich history” (Personal Communication). Furthermore, this confusion is felt when a 
president and the entire board of directors are required to resign to trigger the formal election 
process, with a period where nobody is operationally responsible for the club (Resignation of 
Board of Directors and Assignment of the Management Committee: February 2015). An election 
committee is assembled to oversee the club’s constitution, but it raises questions on the process of 
making urgent decisions, which limits Athletic both operationally and strategically during this 
period. Besides, the implantation of an entire board makes it difficult to implement any consistent 
approach to decisions, as the newly elected directors form their strategic plan when in position 
(Athletic Club Statutes: art 19, 23 & 54).   
5.4.2 The Power and Influence of Supporter Groups  
The election of a president and the directors provide the board with a mandate to conduct 
operations, along with the power to enact Athletic’s decisions. Athletic members hand-over the 
club leadership responsibilities to the board, but this group of members continue to have an active 
role to ratify the annual report and to approve or reject the budgets for the new season. Such powers 
provide members with a position to govern under the articles and to monitor Athletic’s financial 
accounts. As a result, the direct influence of members draws together a consensus on the club’s 
direction, with an understanding of mutual respect between both parties. Athletic use governance 
as a tool to interact with members on key issues, which promotes a relationship based on open 
communication and engagement, along with the opportunity and challenge the action of those in 
power. This openness was reflected throughout the interviews as one manager went on to explain, 
“we have to listen to our membership that we represent and if they want to raise an issue we had 




The inauguration of Athletic’s president acts as a figurehead to the club’s board, who makes 
decisions within the confines of the club’s article and rules. These articles present members with 
a multi-functional role within the club’s governance, from the ceremonial passing of Athletic’s 
mandate of power to the board, similar to the monitoring of the club’s annual financial performance 
(Financial Records at Members Disposal: October 2012).  A weakness with an inclusive approach 
to governance highlights the ambiguity in the accountability between both the board and its 
members and where the ultimate responsibility lies for failing strategies on and off the field. 
President Urrutia points out, “it has been difficult to maintain a balanced approach with the 
members, without being detrimental to future club success”, Yet “we had a completed season, full 
of achievement and good news, but I do not want perspective work to affect our strategic plans, as 
members are the pillars of the club’s future entity” (Txosten Ofiziala; p9. 2015).  
However, Athletic members remain confused as to what types of decisions are taken at different 
levels within the club. While many decisions on the club’s operations are taken at board level 
under the mandate of power, it questions how Athletic decide what constitutes a motion, or if 
formal constitutions are required at all to make certain club decisions (Evident with the motion for 
a seat change process: March 2015). This uncertainty resonates amongst Athletic members and 
was evident when a member went on to state, “sometimes it is unclear on the influence we hold 
over the club’s decisions, it’s good we get a vote on the boards, but also sometimes it seems like 
decision are already made and we are just ratifying previous judgements” (Personal 
Communication). This was felt when members were asked to vote on the naming of the pressroom 
at Lezama, yet do not have the ability to propose a new director outside the election period. There 
is a wider belief that members are only asked to vote to approve low-level decisions, after the event 
to reinforce board decisions.  For example, the decision to use new members as a capital investment 
in the new stadium, which was made by the president, backed by the board and without any input 
from existing members (General Assembly: the pre-decision statement on the construction of the 





The creation of companies with limited liability (San Mamés Barria) in conjunction with the 
Basque Government and Kutxabank incorporate both public and private shareholders into the club. 
There was criticism, mainly from the EU commission that the Spanish Government continue to 
supplement football with preferential tax rates as a sports club. Athletic’s ambition for the two Ltd 
companies is to make the new stadium as profitable as possible for the benefit of citizens, private 
investment and the Basque government (First official meeting of the Basque government and 
Athletic Club: September 2009). This admission has a worrying consequence for the members at 
Athletic, as the sole purpose of the Barria companies is to service the stadium, where 45,117 
members act as a key revenue stream at each home game. Nevertheless, members continue to have 
trust in the president and his balanced approach to Athletic’s philosophies and commercial 
revenue.  One supporter went on to state, “I personally trust the current president to run our club 
– we supported him on the field as a player and now we have to support each other off the field 
for the club's best interests, we see him as one of us!” (Personal Communication). 
Even in the face of commercialisation, Athletic members still feel empowered at the club, as their 
vote elects the next president with similar football and business philosophies to govern the club. 
This close relationship between the members and its president can originate from regional 
supporter groups, or even carry over from a playing career. This is evident with the current 
president, whose members feel continues to make rightful and trustworthy decisions on their 
behalf. For the previous 8 years, this has been Josu Urrutia. However, the members are due to elect 
a new president in the belief a new board of directors will uphold the same traditions at Athletic 
Bilbao, as one supporter states “If we see the president doing a good job, or at least trying to do 
things rights like he said he would, then I and the member would vote for him again – better to 







5.5 Impact and Conclusion of the Case Study  
The case study protocol from the outset was to research two questions based on a theoretical 
framework of stakeholder theory. This framework explores how Athletic Bilbao govern their 
football business and the subsequent power, urgency and legitimacy of different supporter groups 
in the way a club governs (Mitchel et al, 1997). Therefore, this conceptual lens on Athletic’s 
governance model provides a framework to identify the distinctive relationships between the club 
and various groups of supporters.  
5.5.1 What are the fundamental factors behind Athletic’s model of football governance?  
The model of governance at Athletic Bilbao and the role of its members are not unique within 
Spanish football. However, what separates the club from the rest is the cantera policy, which is 
written into the club’s article of association. This policy is seen to protect Athletic’s geographical 
position in the Basque region to only sign and develop local players as part of a sports member 
club. The election of a president and the directors onto the board offers key individuals the power 
under the mandate to govern Athletic’s football business. Besides, the articles set out the roles and 
responsibilities of the directors and the role of members, who monitor annual reports and approve 
proposed budgets. However, the position of members within a sports club has been threatened with 
the creation of two private limited companies, which has handed over a 10% shareholding to the 
Basque Government and Kutxabank in return for financial and land investment. As a result, this 
creates the release of share capital to private and public partners, all in the drive to increase revenue 
within the stadium, yet it seems to the detriment of members at Athletic. 
The way Athletic governs the business includes members at the heart of the club, with an air of 
openness and willingness to share information freely across internal and external environments. 
These beliefs provide members with an air of confidence that the president, along with his directors 
continue to make decisions in line with Athletic’s unique traditions and philosophies. Such 
principles resonate throughout the club with the members issued with detailed information on why 
decisions were made and who voted “for” or “against” a proposal. The transparency and openness 
throughout the club even stretch to the daily access for supporters to the San Mamés Stadium and 
Lezama Training Complex. Although, Athletic should be commended on the nature of their 
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transparent release of information towards supporter groups, too much information sharing to those 
outside Athletic may be counterproductive and harmful to the business, personnel play and 
performance. For example, the publications of a player buy-out fee (Kepa buyout clause of €80mn 
triggered in 2018; Laporte buyout clause of €65mn triggered in 2016) has seen Europe’s richest 
clubs sign Athletic players for a knockdown transfer fee, which was announced up to five-years 
ago to world football and fails to capitalise on the transfer growth across European football.  
5.5.2 What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in Athletic’s model of football governance? 
The conceptual lens in the case uses power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997) to 
classify the salient influence of various supporter groups at Athletic, as a result of the club’s model 
of governance (Table 5.1). Four groups of supporters were identified as part of the case study and 
are as follows: 
Table 5.1. Classification of Athletic Bilbao Supporters as Stakeholders  
 
Athletic Supporters 
Types with Attributes 
Power Legitimacy Urgency Stakeholder 
Types 
Member with senior 
rights 
Yes Yes Yes Definitive Stakeholders 
Members with junior 
rights (Mainly Barria) 
No Yes Yes Dependent Stakeholders 
Supporter Affiliated to 
peñas but not Members 
No Yes No Discretionary Stakeholders 
No association to the 
Club membership or 
peñas Group 





Firstly, the typology identifies supporters who hold an active membership with the club and have 
full rights to vote in the presidential and director elections. Such rights instil this group with a 
sense of power to elect the next president to lead the board of directors, raise motions and approve 
financial reports and budgets. More importantly, Athletic’s constitution provides a foundation to 
build a relationship between the club and these members, which legitimises the president’s power 
to enact decisions on their behalf. Membership powers resonate throughout the club when their 
influence is needed in key decisions. For example, when issuing the president with the powers to 
enact decisions, approving or rejecting a financial set of accounts, or even setting the club’s future 
budget. Evident, when this group of members is required to approve annual reports, which make 
this relationship urgent as it is stipulated within club articles and subsequent governance processes. 
Therefore, this group of members with full rights is deemed as definitive stakeholders, due to their 
position in the club’s main articles and their ability to offer a mandate to Athletic’s principal leader, 
the president.    
Secondly, the typology identifies new members who have limited rights still have a role to play in 
terms of Athletic’s articles and subsequently how the club is governed. These members do not 
have a vote in elections and have no power to elect the club’s next president. This reduces the 
influence of this group to elect the next president, or to select individuals to sit on the board of 
directors. As a result, this group does not influence to endorse a president or to ratify the president’s 
mandate of power to enact decisions on behalf of the club. In addition, Barria members were 
introduced into the club to fund the new stadium but offered these members limited rights in 
Athletic’s decision-making processes. Therefore, new members with limited rights are deemed as 
dependent stakeholders, due to their active position in the club’s constitution and their limited 







Thirdly, the typology identifies supporters who fall outside the club’s articles and who are not 
formal members of Athletic but yet remain in an active regional supporter club (peñas).   While 
this group has no position or power to influence club decisions, they remain legitimate supporters 
due to the relationships with their regional co-operators (high-profile members with senior rights). 
This secondary access to powerful individuals offers regional supporters the opportunity to vote 
in regional level elections, which can have an indirect influence on the selection of a presidential 
nominee.  Therefore, supporters with peñas relationship are classified as discretionary 
stakeholders, due to the group’s non-urgent position to influence club decisions.  
Finally, the typology identifies a group of supporters who have the attributes of non-stakeholders, 
as they are deemed to have no affiliation to either the club or any regional or local supporter group. 
As a consequence, this group does not influence the club and is not influenced by how Athletic 
govern.  However, the opportunity to join or participate in a regional peñas with access to local 
president offers this group a proposed link to the club. Therefore, although this group has been 
classed as non-stakeholders, they do have the pathway to build a discretionary relationship with 
the club with access to local supporter groups, as these are deemed to hold a legitimate stakeholder 













CHAPTER SIX - A CASE STUDY OF FC SCHALKE 04 FOOTBALL CLUB 
 
6.0 Overview of the Case Study  
The case study has researched Schalke’s model of governance to investigate the relationship that 
various supporter groups have with the club.  This explores the different types of supporter 
relationships that arise from how Schalke governs, with a conceptual lens of power, urgency and 
legitimacy taken from Mitchell et al (1997), which will classify the stakeholder attributes of 
various supporter groups. Therefore, the case study from the outset explores two theoretical 
questions: 1. What are the fundamental factors behind Schalke’s model of football governance? 2. 
What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of supporter groups 
have as stakeholders in Schalke’s model of football governance? 
 
6.1 Case Protocol  
The case protocol has adopted a qualitative approach to explore Schalke within its real-life settings 
as a football club. This study will conduct semi-structured interviews with members of Schalke’s 
leadership team and its supporters. These interviews were used to provide a primary source of data 
to reflect the thoughts and feelings of knowledgeable respondents and provide an insight into the 
club’s key issues. An investigation into Schalke’s statutes, official documentation and archived 
records has been used as evidence to understand the rationale behind how decisions are made 
within the club and the influence of different supporter groups. Additionally, the use of direct 
observations will analyse how Schalke governs its business operations and the indirect effect these 
actions have on supporter groups. In order to understand the influence that governance has on 
supporter groups, the researcher will explore the case evidence within the field. This aims the lens 
on different groups of supporters to understand the nature of their relationship with the club. These 
observations were made during field visits to the city of Gelsenkirchen, Veltins arena stadium and 





6.2 The History and Ownership at Schalke FC  
The region of Gelsenkirchen has been home to football since FC Schalke was formed as a club in 
1904. Situated in the North Rhine-Westphalia state of Germany, football was introduced as a past 
time for workers from the local coal mining industry. The influx of workers to the city named a 
thousand fires, who housed some of Europe’s largest collieries, which increased the population of 
the region from 6,000 inhabitants to an estimated 138,000 by 1900 (Discover World, 2017). This 
led to the merger of two cities, Buer and Horst, which turned the Ruhr Valley into an industrial 
belt and these new mining communities went on to supply many of the players and supporters at 
Schalke. Today, Schalke still maintain these traditions, as the club is nicknamed the miners (die 
knappen) with the steigerlied (the miner’s song) still proudly sung before home games, which pays 
tribute to the bravery of local miners that were about to descend into the coalface. Schalke’s 
historic spirit still resides in the Schalke’s motto, “wir leben dich” (we live you), which was born 
out of respect and traditions of the local community. This sense of tradition was evident when a 
supporter explains, “we hold our mining traditions close to our heart and we hope that our team 
show the same passion and commitment as our forefathers”  
Formally, the club was established by a group of schoolboys, named as Westfalia Schalke. Due to 
the age of the team, they failed in their first attempt to register for the main German football league. 
To address this, the football club merged with the gymnastic club of Schalker Turnverein 1877 but 
separated in 1915 to become SV Westfalia Schalke.  Later, these two clubs re-joined in 1919 to 
become urn-und Sportverein Schalke 1877. In 1924, the club reclaimed its independence and was 
renamed as FC Schalke 04, going on to change the club colours from red and yellow to royal blue. 
During this period, the club was led by prominent figures such as Wilhelm Gies and Heinrich 
Hilgert-Wiegemeiste.  Although the club had no official stadium or infrastructure, one thing was 
evident, the community at Schalke just wanted to play football. A club manager describes the 
importance of the club’s traditional roots, which still resonates in the football club and points out 
that “Schalke are very proud of the history of the club from its mining background and the region, 
which is important to the people and which is still important to our working-class background as 
they identify with the club” (Personal Communication). 
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In 1926, Schalke was registered in Germany’s highest regional football league, the Gauliga Ruh 
and the team achieved some early footballing success. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the club went 
on to win league and cup championships, going on to build their own unique style of play described 
by many as the Schalker Kreisel (the spinning top) (Milestones, Schalke, 2017). However, in June 
1930 the success was short-lived when Schalke was banned from German football, due to the 
illegal payments, gifts and loans given to amateur players. Following on from this, in January 1933 
a political movement named the National Socialists (known now as the Nazi party) became the 
leading political party in Germany. This had an adverse effect on Schalke as a football club, as the 
club’s working-class background was seen as an outlet to spread Nazi ideology. The club’s Jewish 
members were forcibly removed from their businesses and their role within the club.  Most notably, 
Sally Meyer and Julie Lictman both textile manufacturers from the region were displaced by pro-
Nazi sympathisers (Wachter et al, 2009).  
At the end of the war, the club moved into the new Glückauf Kampfbahn stadium and joined the 
first German professional football league, as Schalke slowly started to recover after World War 2. 
Schalke went on to become one of the league’s stronger teams and capture the German 
Championship in 1958. As a result of this success, Schalke was offered a place in Germany’s 
newly formed national Bundesliga in 1963. In the early 1960s and early 1970s, Schalke supporters 
witnessed both promotion and relegation between Germany’s football leagues. The team’s 
inconsistent performance was also reflected off the field with several mismanagement issues, 
which left the club’s finances in turmoil. As a result, Schalke had to sell their Glückauf Kampfbahn 
stadium to the local council of Gelsenkirchen to retain the club’s Bundesliga status. Financial 
irregularities were further compounded with a bribery scandal that hit the club in 1971, which saw 
players bribed by opponents Arminia Bielefeld to throw a game to stave off their threat of 
relegation. Surrounded by controversy, 13 Schalke players were banned from football, while at the 
same time Schalke was labelled, FC Meineid (FC Purjury) as it was proven several players lied 





From the 1970s, until the mid-1990s several key individuals have held a powerful position as the 
club’s president and influenced the direction of Schalke’s business and financial affairs. During 
this period, the club built a new stadium in 1973, the Parkstadion to host games for the 1974 World 
Cup in Germany. Yet, this investment still failed to bring Schalke any notable success both on, or 
off the field. As a result, Gunter Eichberg (the sun king) was appointed the club’s president on 16th 
January 1980 with promises of increased investment and team success. This started his 
controversial reign at the helm of the club. At the end of Eichberg’s term of office, which many 
called a dubious era of leadership, his actions left Schalke with a 500,000 Deutschmark fine for 
several violations to the club’s license agreements (Traditions & Experience, Schalke FC, 2017).  
A supporter explains the sun king’s reign at Schalke and claims, “at first we thought he would 
bring us success and maybe a league championship, but in the end, he did more bad than good” 
(Personal Communication).  
Even during his short period as president in 1994, Bernd Tonnies (who died after only one month 
in position) he went on to make a lasting effect on how Schalke was to be governed in the future.  
It is believed, Clemen Tonnies went on and implemented his late brother’s vision on how the club 
should be governed, which was influential when Schalke voted to change the club’s constitution. 
At the time, there was a sense amongst supporters that the president was too innovative, as a role 
for supporters on a supervisory board was an unsustainable way to govern the club.  One manager 
went onto explain the influence that members now hold within Schalke’s current model of 
governance and points out “we say that the most important day in the year is the general assembly; 
they can elect the boards, the supervisory board and they still have the power to decide on decisions 








In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, Schalke’s fortune has changed for the better, both on and off 
the field. On the field, the club has witnessed success in the German cup (2001, 2002 and 2011), 
runners-up in the Bundesliga (2001, 2005, 2007 and 2000), a UFEA cup win (1997) and 
qualification for the UEFA Champions League (2005, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2017). 
Off the field, in 2001 Schalke moved into a newly constructed stadium, the Veltins Arena that 
accommodates 61,973 seated and standing supporters on match days. This success was reflected 
in the club’s financial performance, when Schalke was named the 13th in a European economic 
league table, as a result of their revenue in 2014/2015 (Top of the Table, Deloitte, 2016). At the 
club's Annual General Meeting in 2016, Peter Peters, Chief Financial Officer announced that “in 
the 2015 fiscal year alone we made 22.5 million Euros profit, with a 264.5 million Euro turnover. 
That's a new record by a long way” (Peter Peters: Reliability pays out in hard cash, Schalke 2016)  
6.3 The Principles of Schalke FC Governance  
FC Schalke 04, like other football clubs in the Bundesliga is required to comply with German 
Commercial Law (HGB). Legally, Schalke must comply with the HGB rules and regulations 
similar to other corporations, as football clubs are permitted to submit an audited set of financial 
statements to the German Football Association (DFB). These statements report on the financial 
year at Schalke, which commences on 1st January to 31st December. Schalke also presents an 
annual report at a general meeting held in May each year. Historically, Schalke has been regarded 
as a members’ club, which incorporates other sports such as Basketball, Handball, Athletics and 
Table Tennis within its association. This inclusive nature of Schalke’s association also 
incorporates many areas of the business, from arena management and right exploitation 
(immediate) to catering and merchandise (indirect). As a consequence, Schalke sports business 
activities and interests continue to work “within the meaning of the German law on clubs, societies 






At the heart of Schalke’s model of governance is a set of constitutions, which outline the legal 
procedures and rules of the club, which comply with the district statute and set-out the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals, boards and committees. Schalke’s supreme decision-making body 
as an association is the club’s annual general meeting held in June each year (AGM). All members 
are invited to attend the AGM and vote on decisions in the following areas as set out in the club’s 
constitution (Schalke’s Constitution, art 6:1).  
a)  Receiving the reports of the association organs, 
b)  Discharge of the Executive Board and Supervisory Board,  
c)  Election of the members of the Supervisory Board,  
d)  Election of the members of the Honorary Council,  
e)  Election of the members of the Election Committee,  
f)  Appointment and dismissal of honorary members,  
g)  Determination of membership fees and any special contributions of the members,  
h)  Decision on the submitted applications,  
i)  Decision on any change of the statutes,  
j)  Decision on the dissolution of the association.      
Schalke continues to uphold the tradition of an association, under the principles of the 50+1 rule, 
which still resonates firmly throughout the club and its membership. This means the constitution 
of the club disallows any single person (or company) from having more than 49% of the voting 
rights in the professional football club. Therefore, 51% of Schalke’s voting rights remain with its 
members as natural persons as part of a legally binding association of supporters, which must abide 
legally and procedurally as part of the association (Schalke’s Constitution, art 5, 2018). This 
society of members makes the supporters associations within Schalke into a Verein (V.e) with 






Therefore, members of the club are legally bound under the club’s constitution (article 5) and 
committed to the virtue and statutes of the DFB (in particularly the 50+1 rule), which makes the 
club membership as the majority group of owners within Schalke (supporters and association). 
Evident when one supporter claims, “it’s important for the players to show the members, as the 
owners that they can fight on the pitch, we like it when we have good players to watch who can 
play quick and fast, but we also need some important players that replicate the supporters” 
(Personal Communication). 
6.3.1 Constructing Governance at Schalke FC 
The club bears the name, Football Club Gelsenkirchen-Schalke 04 eV, abbreviated to FC Schalke 
04 eV (registered association or incorporated association). Schalke 04 is situated in Gelsenkirchen-
Buer and entered the register of association for the district court in Gelsenkirchen-Buer (Schalke’s 
Constitution, art 1, 2018). Although the club’s legal registration is as an association (e.v), the group 
also incorporates several registered companies (gGmbh) and partnerships (Co.KG) with liabilities 
(KG) and limited liabilities (Co.KG) as documented in Schalke’s following group structure. 
Figure 6.1. The Group Structure at Schalke 04 
 




FC Schalke 04, as a group of societies and corporations, is responsible for the executive board that 
governs the daily operations within the club as part of a wider organisational structure. This board 
consists of three members, who all have the responsibility for their areas of the business. For 
example, Schalke had three main areas, which are sport and communication, finance and 
organisation and marketing. These three areas of the association consist of 11 departments with 
accompanying managers who report to the executive board. The organisational structure governed 
by Schalke’s executive boards is as follows. 
Figure 6.2. The Organisational Structure at Schalke 04    
 





The executive board at Schalke holds the power to make operational decisions in line with the 
associated statutory obligations, along with the club’s constitution. Executive duties include the 
independent action to take decisions on sport and economic matters, insofar as these powers do 
not supersede legal statues or contravene Schalke’s constitution (Schalke’s constitution, art 8.5, 
2018). The executive board can make decisions on behalf of the club, its power as an association 
was explained by one member who claims, “we signed with Viagogo the online ticket platform, 
the illegal black-market selling tickets and the members said that it wasn't possible to have a 
relationship with such a sponsoring company. So, then the club cancelled the contract, which 
proves that the members still have the power to influence decisions” (Personal Communication).  
The executive board is the catalyst for Schalke’s operations, procedures and financial plans and 
culpable for any damage to the club’s reputation or liabilities. More importantly, the supervisory 
board at Schalke makes the appointment to executive positions, as a member explains, “the 
executive board represents the members, not the other way around” (Personal Communication). 
Schalke members have the responsibility to elect members to the supervisory board, who in turn 
appoint the executive board and monitor their performance, both individually and collectively. 
Annually, the supervisory board can review the club’s procedures, financial plans and annual 
reports from the executive board, even holding the power to recommend their executive powers 
are discharged. A club manager describes the role of the supervisory board at the club and went 
on to explain, “the three managers (executive) need everything that exceeds €500,000 has to be 
agreed by the supervisory board, who also need to view the financial plan to see what they think 
and what the three managers are going to do over the next year; so I think it does work good, if it 








Under the club’s constitution, members hold the right to appoint supervisory board members on a 
3-year rolling basis. Besides, the supervisory board also holds the right to self-appoint board 
members on behalf of the club. The construction of the supervisory board and its 11 members are 
as follows (Schalke’s Constitution, art 7.1, 2018). 
The Election Route of Schalke’s Supervisory Board  
• 6 members of the board are appointed by the club’s Annual General Assembly 
• 1 member of the board is appointed by the club’s Sports Advisory Council  
• 1 member of the board is appointed by the fan’s club as an umbrella organisation  
• In addition: 3 members may be appointed internally by the Supervisory board itself. 
It is also the responsibility of the members at the general assembly to appoint the honorary council, 
which acts on its own merit, independent and free from any of the association groups or boards. 
This council consists of 5 members all over the age of 30 who have been registered club members 
for 5 years, with at least two members being qualified as a judge. This legal experience amongst 
council members’ help to adjudicate “disputes arising from the exclusion of members and the 
imposition of sanctions on members by the Executive Board, as well as disputes with which the 
Honorary Council deals on request or on its own initiative” (Schalke’s Constitutions, art 5:1). A 
manager goes onto explain the role of the council within the club is to offer a “solution to a regular 
court to deal with it (disputes between members); if members are also dismissed for racist 
behaviour then we ask for an honour report for a solution or can we find another way, but they are 







In addition to club boards, Schalke’s electoral committee conduct its affairs under their own set of 
rules and consist of eight elected members. However, the committee must act in accordance with 
the club’s constitution (Rule of Procedure of the Election Committee, rule 1). The eight committee 
members are duly appointed by the general assembly for a term of four years, as each member 
must have been registered to the association for at least one year. Furthermore, these members 
must have interrupted service and an expression of interest needs to be submitted to the executive 
committee. The club’s committee rules outline the responsibilities of the members and outline the 
selection procedure for election to Schalke’s mainboards. More importantly, the committee 
governs the procedural aspects of club elections, which select, nominate and appoint various 
members in line with the constitution. A club manager illustrates the role that the committee hold 
inside Schalke’s association and points out, “the election committee decides which people can be 
elected by the general assembly, there’s a discussion that it may be too powerful, however, they 
(the members of the committee) are elected by the general assembly in a democratic process” 
(Personal Communication). 
6.3.2 The Influence of Governance at Schalke FC 
Additionally, the club’s organisational structure further influences how the club governs, in line 
with Schalke’s constitution and general assembly. This assembly is the supreme decision-making 
body of the association and has the responsibility for: 
a. receiving the reports of the association bodies 
b. discharging the members of the supervisory board  
c. electing the members of the supervisory board  
d. electing members of the honorary council  
e. electing the members of the election committee  
f. appointing and dismissing Honorary Members and Honorary Presidents  
g. fixing the membership fees and any special contributions of the members  
h. deciding on the submitted motions 
i. deciding on any amendment of the statutes  
j. deciding on the dissolution of the association 
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The assembly provides members with the platform to influence Schalke as an association and has 
the power to discharge, elect and monitor the club’s executive board, honorary council and election 
committee. Besides, the assembly offer members the opportunity to influence any change to the 
club’s constitution. This was the case in 2017, when the members rejected a proposed change to 
the articles within Schalke’s constitution, particularly around the role of the electoral committee 
and the subsequent rights of members. A member went on to explain the importance of member 
rights in the club’s constitution and claims “this change would drastically change and reduce our 
powers and include unnecessary dependencies within the club, for example, the representative of 
the supervisory board should objectively and independently decide on possible candidates and not 
under the influence of the executive” (Personal Communication). These feelings were also 
replicated from within the club, as Peter Peters claims "the co-determination of the members is an 
important asset in the registered association. Therefore, we are happy to comply with the wish of 
our members not to reform the Electoral Committee and to vote for the vote as good as it is” (No 
interest in amendments to the election committee, Schalke, 2017)  
Undoubtedly, the influence of the supervisory board at Schalke, headed up by its chairman has the 
power to appoint members, supervise board decisions, approve of land and rights acquisitions and 
even sanction legal transactions over €500,000 (Schalke’s constitution, art 7:5). Yet, the club’s 
daily operational decisions, both on and off the pitch are from appointed positions and not from 
elected boards, committees or departments. Most notably, these decisions are by the executive 
board, from within departmental assemblies as part of the club’s organisational structure. 
Operationally, the executive boards within 11 departments all have their own board structure as 
follows;  
• Departmental Head 
• Deputy Head of Department  
• Sports Attendant  





On first impressions, the responsibility to approve executive decisions on sport and business lies 
with the supervisory board, which many believe promotes good governance practices. Upon closer 
inspection, the roles of departmental boards replicate many areas of the supervisory board, which 
limits the club’s ability to capitalise on presentable business opportunities in a fluent and complex 
football environment. For example, the executive board must endorse departmental decisions and 
subsequent transactions over €500,000 and after that, the supervisory board must offer approval 
or even reject the proposed business deal. Previous head coaches, in particular Felix Magath (head 
coach from 2009 to 2011) have expressed their frustration at the different layers of approval 
required just to sign a player or to renew a current contract. A manager explains the reason behind 
the structure at Schalke and claims “we had the Sporting department who have one seat (on the 
supervisory board) and I believe it's a nice mixture, so that the members’ the fans, the Sporting 
departments and also the sponsors have a say on how to run the club” (Personal Communication). 
Over the previous two seasons, several high-profile international players have left Schalke after 
their contract had expired under the Bosman rule and left the club on a free transfer. For example, 
Max Meyer free transfer to Crystal Palace in 2018, Leon Goretzka free transfer to Bayern Munich 
in 2018, Sead Kolasinac to Arsenal in 2016 and Joel Matip to Liverpool in 2016, losing the club 
millions of pounds in transfer fees. This led Liverpool’s German head coach, Jurgen Klopp to 
claim the transfer of Matip went on to save Liverpool millions of pounds in the transfer market 
(Liverpool’s signing of Joel Matip from Schalke, The Telegraph, 2016). A member went on to 
express their frustration at not keeping, or even financially to capitalise on Schalke’s best players 
and states “we want the best players at our club, but even if these players want to leave we need 
the money to invest in other players to strengthen the team; I think we are behind some other clubs 
in the way we authorise our transfers policy” (Personal Communication).   
While, Schalke’s constitution provides the mechanisms as an association to monitor and approve 
outgoing financial investment (acquisitions, legal transactions, financial outgoings and the signing 
of major sponsorship deals and capital investment), these decisions remain the sole responsibility 
of the executive board. Although, the multi-million-euro sponsorship and investment are not 
unique to Schalke, as the level of influence that comes with this investment is evident at Schalke. 
A club manager explains this power of investment at the club and their influence on the supervisory 
board and points out “we had an issue when Gazprom became sponsors, which is also over 10 
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years ago; a few members said you can't have gas for a  sponsor anymore, but most of them said 
they give us good money, lots of money for this, so they have one seat on the supervisory board 
but they have no influence taking part in the meetings, so that's a good position for us the club” 
(Personal Communication).   
Currently, these three appointed sponsor positions on the club’s supervisory board are made-up 
from representatives of Gazprom (contracted club sponsors until 2022), a Russian Energy 
Company, Stadtwerke a German energy provider and a political/media consultant. A member went 
on to express concerns about the role of Gazprom inside the club’s supervisory board and stated, 
“Veltins our sponsor for over 20 years do not have a role of the club boards to us (the members) it 
seems they do it out of love for their local club and this is mutual, but as for Gazprom there are 
many supporters who are saying they want to take over the club” (Personal Communication).  
6.3.3 Future Challenges to the Governance Model at Schalke 
An influx of private owners and corporations has infiltrated several Bundesliga clubs as majority 
owners, mainly RB Leipzig, Wolfsburg and Bayer 04 Leverkusen, which has raised the uncertainty 
of member rights throughout Germany. In the case of Bayern Munich CEO Karl-Heinz 
Rummenigge claims “personally, I am in favour of leaving it to every club to decide whether they 
open the door on outside capital” (Bundesliga's 50+1 rule must end for clubs to compete – 
Rummenigge, ESPN, Sep 2017) A growing number of clubs, with Dietmar Hopp at Hoffenheim 
at the centre of the argument, continue to threaten and prepare legal action against the ownership 
rule to disband the 50+1 involvement of club members. A club manager explains the impact a rule 
change may have at Schalke and claims “if they will go to the court for sure there will be more 
problems than say having a rule in the Bundesliga, perhaps Hoffenheim will become the first club 






As the air of capitalisation continues to wash over German football, members in these clubs have 
started to voice their disapproval on how these clubs govern without their members. These groups 
have started to hold hostile protests and actions to protect their rights. This action was witnessed 
in a day of supporter action against the German Football Association (DFB) on 20th August 2017; 
this was fuelled by the rise of commercialisation, club takeovers and even the inclusion of China’s 
under 20s squad within the fourth tier of German football. These concerns were raised 
throughout the interviews with Schalke members angry at the way the DFB has allowed certain 
clubs to capitalise on corporate wealth to the detriment of its own supporters. One member went 
on to claim, “at Schalke the club is owned by the members and we do the right things, but the 
majority of other clubs are now run by companies and the rich” (Personal Communication). It is 
believed that if the 50+1 door is firmly closed to accommodate private ownership, it would 
ultimately remove the power of Schalke’s members overnight. As a consequence, a change in the 
regulation would forcibly remove Schalke’s historic constitutions and leave the club open to a 
power struggle between the main sponsors to the detriment of its supporters.    
Over the past decade, German football has wrestled to restore a balance between commercial value 
and the club’s statute as associations. Certain clubs in the Bundesliga have opted to be governed 
under the interest of private owners, while others continue to comply with the 50+1 rule as an 
association. However, a wider threat to the association statue at Schalke and across other clubs is 
the 20+1 rule. This means that under German law, it enables long-term sponsors of over 20 years 
with the right to acquire a legal stake in the club’s ownership.   This has already been witnessed in 
other clubs, most notably at Bayer Leverkusen who are under the ownership of the global 
pharmaceutical company Bayer. A manager points out the impact that internal power struggles at 
other clubs have had on its members, as currently “at Hoffenheim there's a fight inside the Club 
between supporters and members and the board he (Hopp) is now 20 years sponsor of the club and 
when you have been a sponsor for 20 years you have a decision you can buy parts of the club; for 





At the moment, the rise of private ownership is currently the expectation and not the norm 
throughout German football. However, as more Bundesliga clubs go on to trigger the 20 years 
sponsorship threshold, it pits the 50+1 (membership rule) against the 20+1 (sponsor ownership 
rule) and further threatens the role of associations across German football. In the context of 
Schalke, the club has two prominent partners who sponsor the club - Veltins, local beer 
manufacture and Gazprom, a Russian a state-owned energy company. On the other hand, Veltins 
have sponsored the club for over 20 years, but have chosen not to enforce the right to increase their 
role to owners. A manager further explains the relationship between this local sponsor and the 
club, “Veltins is 20-year sponsors and have been sponsors of our club, but Veltins is very popular 
here and perhaps it's like Adidas in Munich, so for them (members) it wouldn't be a problem if 
they bought part of the club” (Personal Communication). However, the goodwill from a local 
company not to enforce the 20+1 right to ownership, may not always protect Schalke members’ 
association in the future. This may come from the partnership with Gazprom, which started in 
2007 and their current contract is set to expire in 2022. Therefore, in 2027, five years after the 
current contract expires, Gazprom will have the opportunity to challenge the ownership model at 
Schalke, like Red Bull Leipzing, Wolfsburg and Bayer.  
Currently, the governance structure at Schalke consists of three boards (Honorary, Executive and 
Supervisory) with a subsequent election committee and various spin-off committees. In addition, 
there are various sub-committees attached to the supervisory board, such as the Economic 
Committee, Express Committee for Sporting Decisions and the Participation Committee of the 
Companies. Along with the boards, the organisational structure has 11 departments, each with its 
own director and assembly. However, the number of boards and structure layers has raised 
concerns on each board’s term of reference and the remit of each committee. As a result, Clemens 
Tönnies, the chairman of the supervisory board claims, “I thought we had all understood each other 
but we are far too concerned with ourselves and some are drawn to the questions of the 
constitutions and rules of the organisation; Unfortunately, attempts to achieve more togetherness 
and better co-operation have not been successful so far” (Achieving the best for our club, Schalke, 




Besides, previous disputes between members who mainly reside on the same board at Schalke’s 
continue to highlight the need for professional roles and responsibilities to remove any tension 
from personal judgements. For example, the recent dispute between Clemens Tönnies and Dr 
Ing Andreas Horn was based on how the latter person persuaded the chairman of the supervisory 
board with unsportsmanlike and dishonourable behaviour. As a consequence, Dr Horn’s 
suspension by the honorary board was upheld by the Higher Regional Court Hamm (i.e. the 
Schalke Ehrenrat determines against which rules of the club, the club members have violated in 
order to be sanctioned). Both representatives on the supervisory board hold the opportunity to 
represent different political agendas, siding with different stakeholder groups (supporters clubs 
and sponsors). This places the emphasis on individuals and not professional roles inside the board, 
which can further increase the risk of further personal disputes, as a member points out, “a few of 
the members on the supervisory board have spoken in the press like it’s their own club, but it’s not 
it’s the members’ club, they are there to protect the club’s interests, not to profit individually from 
their role in the club” (Personal Communication). 
6.4 The Role of Supporter Groups and Associations at Schalke FC 
Historically, supporters at Schalke are members of the association, were under the 50+1 rule they 
continue to hold the majority voting rights at the club’s general meetings. Currently, Schalke has 
150,000 members who are also affiliated to an association, all with their own status as an 
eingetragener verein (V.e). One of the largest groups of members is the Schalke Fan Club 
Association (SFCV) originally formed on 12th August 1978 to represent 10 supporter clubs across 
the Gelsenkirchen area, which has now grown to represent over 90,000 members in 1,000 






As an organisation, the SFCV is a legal association in their own right, with legal responsibilities 
to comply with the court of Gelsenkirchen-Buer under the same status as FC Schalke 04. As a 
result, SFCV has its organisational structure that governs the association as follows: 
• Executive committee 
• Supervisory board/ advisory council 
• District secretaries/districts 
SFCV objective as the main supporter association is to represent their members at board level at 
general assemblies and in the public domain. The SFCV has historically held the position as 
Schalke’s umbrella supporter organisation and in conjunction with the club’s constitution offers 
its members greater powers. One of the main advantages to membership of the SFCV is their 
power to elect their own member internally to sit on FC Schalke 04 supervisory board. Written 
into the club’s constitution, the umbrella organisation (SFCV) has an ever-present position on the 
board with protected status to represent the association. As a result, their position provides the 
opportunity to build a relationship with other individual members on the board and acts as a 
continuous flow of information on the background behind club decisions.  A member of the SFCV 
went onto to explain the historic connection with the club and claims that “the umbrella 
organisation for the supporters was decided way in the past because we were the first organisation 
(supporters’ group) to do work as supporter liaison officer for the club” (Personal 
Communication). 
Similar to FC Schalke 04, the supervisory board at SFCV governs, controls and supports the main 
board to maintain a link between the members and the association’s executive. This board consists 
of six members who represent local districts (four elected from members and two seeded leaders). 
A member explains the role of the supervisory board in SFCV organisational structure and states 
“we protect the history of the club and any changes need to get our approval as this is our club and 
any change without us would lead to massive protest” (Personal Communication). A common goal 
that resonates throughout 22 districts of the SFCV is a togetherness as part of a larger supporter 




Additionally, the use of district leaders provides the direct link between supporter clubs and the 
SFCV board. This network of leaders develops a platform to gather the thoughts and feelings felt 
amongst members, which contribute directly to Schalke’s core values, key decisions and long-term 
strategies, via the supervisory board. As a result, members of SFCV have a direct link to Schalke’s 
mainboard and with that comes the ability to represent the interests of the individual supporter 
groups and their members (The Blue Thread, SFCV, 2017). A manager at Schalke, went on to 
explain the important role that the SFCV plays inside the club and points out “these supporters 
have the opportunity to influence decisions not only at the assembly but during the week, or during 
the year as they just to talk with members of the board (SFCV board) and also members of the 
supervisory board; so they have very good connections with the supporters and it's a close 
connection” (Personal Communication). 
Consequently, the SFCV is the main supporter group and deemed the umbrella organisation in 
Schalke’s constitution, which provides 95,000 affiliated members with extra power and influence. 
However, this is not the only association to house large groups of members at Schalke. Three of 
the larger groups of members are Schalke Fan Initiative, Ultras Gelsenkirchen and FC Schalke 
Supporters’ Club. However, these associations do not hold the right to send one of their members 
straight to the club’s supervisory board, as they reside outside Schalke’s umbrella organisation. 
One member went on to describe their relationship with the club, outside of the SFCV and claims 
“the main group (SFCV) hold more power in terms of board in the club, but we have more power 
in other ways and we know all our members personally if they are not committed to our Schalke 
family, they get asked to leave in the first year” (Personal Communication). 
It is believed, there are many reasons behind the formation of different supporter groups at Schalke. 
For example, Schalke Fan Initiative was formed to tackle racism, Schalke fans-project group was 
formed to improve youth work and Ultras Gelsenkirchen was formed to represent the diverse fan 
culture at Schalke. Although these supporter groups were formed for many different reasons, all 
these associations continue to support Schalke’s constitution. A club manager went on to explain 
how these unofficial groups can hold an influence outside of the club and claims, “we did have 
some major idea to change the constitution this time, but it didn't go through because we couldn't 
convince (the club require a ¾ majority to pass a motion), the ultras and the others about our idea” 
(Personal Communication).  
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Currently, the number of supporter groups have increased in popularity and continue to influence 
their members from outside the club’s umbrella organisation (SFCV) and started to play a 
prominent role in the club. Supporter groups with a notable number of members, influence and 
power outside the SFCV are as follows: 
• Schalke Fan Initiative Ev (Schalke Fan Initiative eV) 
• FC Schalke 04 Supporters Club Ev (FC Schalke 04 Supporters Club eV) 
• Ultras Gelesenkirchen (Ultras Gelsenkirchen) 
• Schalke Markt (http://www.schalkermarkt.de) 
• Schalke Fan project (Schalke fan project) 
While the majority of Schalke’s members are affiliated to various supporter groups as previously 
discussed, there are also a number of supporters around Gelsenkirchen that do not affiliate 
themselves to any supporter association but remain members with the club. The reason for this 
was explained by one member who claims, “although I love the club and have been a member as 
long as I can remember, my local supporter club joined with the main supporter group (SFCV) and 
I just lost touch due to the politics between the different groups” (Personal Communication).  
For example, Schalke registered its 150,000th member into the club during one of the field visits 
in December 2017. While the new member had always supported Schalke as a non-member, he 
went on to claim, “I've been a Schalke fan for 45 years now, my son already asked me why I'm not 
a member. Then I thought spontaneously today when I saw the recruitment, now I do it” (Schalke 
04 has 150,000 club members, Schalke, 2017) The increase in member numbers over the previous 
seasons was believed down to the rise in Schalke popularity from the club’s international base of 
supporters.  Evident when one supporter who was interviewed as part of the field visit travelled 
from England to watch regular games at the Veltins-Arena and claims “I just don’t get the 
atmosphere at my local club back in England that I do in Germany, plus what it costs me to travel, 
the cost of the ticket, food and drink, it’s cheaper than watching a premier league game in England” 
(Personal Communication).  
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6.4.1 The Relationship of Supporter Groups with Schalke FC Model of Governance  
It is clear from all the evidence gathered during the field visit to Gelsenkirchen, the SFCV who is 
named as the umbrella organisation within Schalke’s constitution currently holds the closest 
relationships with the club of all its supporter groups. Firstly, the SFCV represents 90,000 of 
Schalke’s 150,000 members and permits the group to a 60% share of club votes. This group of 
supporters are a principal decision-maker in the club, particularly when a vote is required. One 
manager explains how the club views the importance of the ongoing relationship between the 
SFCV and the club and points out “we don't always get the two-thirds majority needed to make 
the change because we're having such a good constitution that works so well for the club it helps 
the club so that's why we need to have a discussion with them (supporter groups) beforehand” 
(Personal Communication). 
Secondly and again written into the club’s constitution, the SFCV is the only supporter group with 
the right to internally elect their own member onto Schalke’s supervisory board (mainly their 
chairman at the time). This offers the SFCV an ever-present place at board level, which in turn 
increases their influence in how the club is governed. Furthermore, this permanent position on the 
board means the SFCV representative has the opportunity to build a lasting relationship with all 
six of the club’s representatives. Evident with the close natured relationship between the current 
chairman of the supervisory board, Mr Tonnies and the SFCV during his 23-year tenure (appointed 
to the board in 1994). A supporter of the club explains this close-knitted relationship between Mr 
Tonnies and SFCV and points out “he (Tonnies) controls the board that's their job, the chairman 
wasn't so popular for the active supporters because he's very powerful he has lots of money and 
also present in the media always talking he's the manager of the club, but he isn't the three guys on 
the executive board are paid by the club, so he's not so popular with the fan-clubs” (Personal 
Communication). 
Finally, the club’s close relationship with the umbrella organisation is evident on a daily basis at 
Schalke with the level of responsibility entrusted upon the SFCV. A club manager explains the 
role that the SFCV plays in Schalke’s operations, “the big issue for all supporters groups is the 
tickets for the games both Home and Away as the umbrella organisation they get 1/3 of all the 
home tickets and all the away tickets, therefore they are in charge of distribution to the supporters 
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for that allocation of tickets” (Personal Communication). However, the disparity of power between 
the supporter groups and the preferential treatment of SFCV members has become a contentious 
issue amongst members outside the umbrella organisation. One member went on to criticise the 
different level of responsibility between different supporter groups and claims “we were part of 
the club but decided to come out as we didn’t feel the SFCV stood up for the real supporters as 
Schalke, now we are on our own and have younger members, I feel we have more power now than 
then” (Personal Communication). The inequality that is felt from supporter groups outside the 
umbrella organisation was evident with the rise of Schalke’s ultra-group, as historically the ultras 
have held a number of different relationships, inside and outside the club’s constitution. 
Renowned throughout German football, each club has a group of ultra-supporters throughout the 
Bundesliga, which have become synonymous with the hooligan element within football. Yet, while 
on the surface this is also the case at Schalke, on closer inspection the ultras relationship with the 
club is more historic and in-depth than many others. Over the past decade, the main Ultra GE had 
changed their position and culture within its supporter group and become more organised than 
many other groups that are affiliated with the club’s umbrella organisation. As one manager from 
the club goes on to explain, “I think in the last 10 years it has changed and some other groups have 
come to the front. For example, the ultras, who I think maybe better organised and have other 




Figure 6.3. Schalke’s First Team Squad and Management with an Ultra GE Banner  
 
Source: Ultra GE (2018).  
Previously, the ultras fell under the banner of the umbrella organisation at Schalke, but in 2013 the 
group left the SFCV as in their opinion it no longer served the interest of the majority of Schalke’s 
supporters. As a consequence, the breakdown in relations within the SFCV led to the resignation 
of Supporter Club and Schalke Fan-Initiative from the umbrella organisation. One supporter went 
on to explain why the ultras left the umbrella organisation and claims “it was a surprise to me that 
the ultras joined us at the time, but after the treatment in the stadium of the ultras by the police of 
Gelsenkirchen, along with other issues, it was a step too far for some senior members in its group” 
(Personal Communication). At the time, it was believed the SFCV became too aligned to the club 
and key individuals somewhat institutionalised and without the inclination to challenge how the 
club was being governed.  
Currently, the relationship between the ultras and the club is much improved and some believe 
their influence is in the ascendancy to that of other supporter groups, even the SFCV. As one 
manager claims, “it could be that there will be a change (to the constitution) in two maybe three 
years and the supporters say ok the umbrella organisation is not powerful anymore, as seen with 
the ultra-group as they were part of the 100 supporter groups, but they came out of the umbrella 
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organisation, so it will be an issue for us” (Personal Communication). Although the ultras continue 
to work outside the SFCV, there is a growing acceptance within the club to introduce the group 
back in line with the club’s constitution. Yet, the difficulty the club has is the powerful position of 
the SFCV, who are deemed the umbrella organisation in the club. However, this also limits the 
opportunity for the club to capitalise on the influence of other external groups (namely the ultras) 
at the club’s general assembly. 
In light of these constitutional constraints, the club continues to build ongoing relations with 
supporters via several member initiatives, which have been organised by Schalke’s executive 
board. Firstly, the Schalke Fans Project (SFP) provides an independent point of contact between 
the Schalke fans department and its members. As one member of the fans department explains, 
“the fans project is a team of social workers who are not employed by the club (funded by the 
Gelsenkirchen City Council) so they can work a little bit more independently and is another way 
of communicating to supporters” (Personal Communication). In addition, Schalke Help acts as the 
club’s outreach programme to engage the local community and build relations with club members, 
but those locally who have an affiliation with the club. A supporter explains the importance of an 
ongoing relationship between the club and the local community that Schalke represents and points 
out, “this is our club, the communities, just take a look around the training pitches and the stadium; 
it all belongs to the club and there's no other parties, so it’s important to work together as a family 
(Schalke members) for the benefit of the local area” (Personal Communication). 
6.4.2 The Power and Influence of Supporter Groups  
Ultimately, the power at Schalke lies with the supervisory board and it has become apparent that 
members affiliated with the SFCV hold more power and influence than other groups through their 
unique position as Schalke’s umbrella organisation. Although not officially named in Schalke’s 
constitution, the SFCV is recognised as the club’s umbrella organisation.  As one member points 
out “we had been together as a group of members since 1978, we had supported the club through 
the bad times, we had the most members, so I believe it’s our right to have more powers than other 
groups and send one of our members to the club’s board (supervisory)” (Personal 
Communication). However, the rise of other well-organised groups with a younger base of ultra-
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members and the fact the SFCV is not named in the club’s constitution as the umbrella organisation 
continues to challenge their ever-present position on the supervisory board. 
Furthermore, SFCV’s constitution does very little to protect its status as an umbrella organisation 
and even threatens their future role in the club. In this case, when the members vote in an SFCV 
representative onto the club’s supervisory board for a set period of four years in line with Schalke’s 
constitution. However, the SFCV constitution fails to monitor or even challenge the position of its 
representative during their four-year reign on the supervisory board. While the weak performance 
from an SFCV member at a board level cannot lead to board de-selection, it has the possibility to 
threaten their future role to represent the members as the club’s umbrella organisation. Particularly, 
with the influence of other groups into the club, as their vote (3/4 majority) is also required to 
make a significant change in the club’s constitution.  
For example, in 2017 the influence of minority groups outside the SFCV was evident when the 
club in conjunction with the umbrella organisation proposed several changes to the club’s 
constitution. However, these constitutional changes were rejected due to the ultras and other 
groups voting together to defeat the motion. As one manager explains, “the ultras do still have a 
say in the general assembly because they have 1,000 people and it makes it hard for us if we want 
to change our constitution, they don't have a majority at the AGM. If we (the club) don't have a 
two third’s majority no changes can be made, so we still have to talk to them” (Personal 
Communication). 
Furthermore, the increased power of the SFCV members as part of the umbrella organisation is 
evident during general assemblies, when members vote to elect the other six supervisory members 
onto the board. Firstly, SFCV members vote for their representative onto the supervisory board, 
then secondly vote along with the rest of the members at the assembly on the remaining six places. 
As one member outside of the SFCV points out “it’s true they (SFCV) do get to select their own 
people onto the supervisory board, but with their numbers they also get to influence the other 
members on the board each year, just look at their historic relationship with the current chairman 
of the supervisory board” (Personal Communication).  
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At the moment, the members are the club majority owners, notwithstanding their allegiance to 
alternative supporter groups, see themselves as an integral part of the club. Association status as 
an E.v with rights under German law and the protection of the 50+1 rule continues to reinforce 
their power and influence right at the heart of the club. One manager gives their opinion on the 
current role of members at Schalke, particularly in the wider context of German football and state, 
“there are other clubs, for example, Nuremberg right now in the process of outsourcing their 
professional team without the fans say, but the fans of Nuremberg say well we don't need to do 
this because look at Schalke and how successfully they run their club” (Personal Communication). 
However, on closer inspection, there is still a strong sense that individual members within the 
Schalke’s supervisory board continue to influence how the club is governed. For example, the 
power of the supervisory board chairman and the position of Mr Kupriyanov from Gazprom, even 
the power of the founding Rojek family within the SFCV, who all continue to make local 
supporters nervous on their future intentions. As one member describes, “there have always been 
dark channels at Schalke and special budgets at the clubs” (Personal Communication). Although 
it can be argued members have a vote on budgets and decisions at the assembly and that members 
also hold a place on the supervisory board, in reality, there remains an imbalance of board members 
as supporters and those perceived as club representatives. Therefore, it remains to be seen if 
Schalke’s association status and the role of members become threatened in the future, but as a 
manager rightly points out “I think the 20 years sponsorship rule will be important but at the 
moment I don't think it's a problem here and perhaps Hoffenheim will become the first cup to go 
to the court to challenge the 50 plus one rule, but if the State says it is not possible anymore because 
you are making 300 million Euros each year, it is not a sports club then they may change it by law, 






6.5 Impact and Conclusion of the Case Study  
The case study protocol from the outset was to research two questions based on a theoretical 
framework of stakeholder theory. This framework explores how Schalke governs their football 
business and the subsequent power, urgency and legitimacy of different supporter groups in the 
way a club governs (Mitchel et al, 1997). Therefore, this conceptual lens on Schalke’s governance 
model provides a framework to identify the distinctive relationships between the club and various 
groups of supporters.  
6.5.1 What are the fundamental factors behind Schalke’s model of football governance?  
Schalke’s model of governance provides a framework for the club to maintain its status as an 
association. Schalke’s registration as an association Verein (E.v) in conjunction with the DFB 
50+1 rule, upholds the legal rights of supporters within the club and prevents the club from being 
owned by one individual or company. Besides, Schalke’s constitution stipulates the statute, article 
and procedural rules, which set out the rights and duties of the members as owners in an 
association. Structurally, the four main boards at Schalke (one appointed and three elected) hold 
different powers to enact decisions as set out in the club’s constitution. This means the association 
members are elected or appointed to these boards via several different routes. For example, 
supervisory board members are elected at the general assembly and appointed based on their 
expertise, a representative for a sponsor or a club executive. An added complication behind the 
supervisory board members has been the appointment of a Gazprom representative, who is 
believed to oversee club decisions. However, Veltins (local beer company) a club sponsor for over 
20 years has no recognised position on the board. In 2027, Gazprom will reach the sponsor's 
threshold at Schalke (over 20 years) and unless the club takes steps to protect the association, the 
20+1 sponsorship threshold may alter the way the club is governed in the future.   
Schalke’s general assembly is the supreme decision-making body responsible for the election of 
board members to approve budgets and set membership fees, but also to propose constitutional 
changes. The supporters at the club have a representative on the supervisory board to represent 
Schalke’s 150,000 members. At the assembly members also have the platform to approve or reject 
how the executive has run the club in the previous year. As a result, members hold the right to 
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influence decisions at board level, which protects the interest of Schalke and upholds club 
traditions as an association. Besides, the SFCV has been deemed Schalke’s umbrella organisation 
and as a consequence acquire extra responsibility within the constitution to represent all members 
at a board level. However, the rising influence of the ultras and other groups outside of the SFCV 
continue to challenge their umbrella status, as they have the power to block future constitutional 
changes, mainly on political and not practical motives. 
6.5.2 What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in Schalke’s model of football governance?  
The conceptual lens in the case uses power, legitimacy and urgency (Mitchell et al, 1997) to 
classify the salient influence of various supporter groups at Schalke, as a result of the club’s model 
of governance (Table 6.1). Four groups of supporters were identified as part of the case study and 
are as follows: 
Table 6.1. Classification of Schalke Supporters as Stakeholders 
 
Types of Schalke 
Supporter Groups 
Power Legitimacy Urgency Stakeholder 
Types 
Supporters who are 
members of the club 
and the SFCV (the 
umbrella organisation) 
Yes Yes Yes Definitive Stakeholders  
Supporters who are 
members of the club 
and alternative 
supporter groups 
(outside the umbrella 
organisation) 
 
Yes No Yes Dangerous Stakeholders  
Supporter who are 
members with the club, 
but no affiliation to any 
supporter group 
 
Yes No No Discretionary Stakeholders   
Non-members of the 
club or supporter 
groups.  
 




Firstly, the typology identifies a group of supporters who are members with the club and also 
affiliated to Schalke’s nominated umbrella club, the SFCV. Dual membership offers this group of 
supporters a definitive role within the structure of the club, as part of the umbrella organisation. 
More importantly, these powers offer SFCV members the opportunity to appoint their own 
representative directly onto the supervisory board. SFCV group of members vote in general 
assembly’s on club issues, elect board members and sanction club actions. SFCV's position as the 
umbrella organisation also legitimises this group of members through the club’s constitution, 
which instils their right to influence decisions at a board level. Additionally, the umbrella 
organisation has 90,000 affiliated members across 1,000 district supporter groups, which makes 
these supporter groups an urgent avenue of consultation before any changes to the constitution. 
Therefore, these supporters are deemed as a definitive group of stakeholders due to their umbrella 
position in the club’s constitution, their representative and power on the supervisory board and 
their majority held in general assemblies. 
Secondly, similar to the previous groups of supporters, these groups of members are affiliated to 
the club and also to a supporter’s group. However, this group of supporters are members of a group 
that works independently and outside the club’s umbrella organisation. Therefore, this group is 
still active members within the club and hold the power to vote in board members and influence 
decisions made at Schalke’s general assembly. Yet, the group’s role outside the umbrella 
organisation reduces their legitimacy in the club’s constitution, particularly when electing a 
member representative onto the supervisory board. Furthermore, the rise of the ultras and other 
groups require the club’s urgent attention, particularly before any constitutional changes are 
proposed or accepted in the club. Nevertheless, this group of supporters are deemed as dangerous 
stakeholders due to their ungoverned role outside the club’s umbrella organisation and the 
influence they hold at the assembly.  
Thirdly, there is a growing number of supporters at Schalke, both nationally and internationally 
that are members of the club but have no affiliation to any supporter groups. These members are 
still entitled to attend and vote in the general assembly to influence decisions, but individually and 
not collectively as part of a group. In the main, these supporters attend home games and hold an 
impact on environmental factors at Schalke (stadium atmosphere and ticket prices) but without the 
legitimate role in the vast network of supporter groups. While these supporters still acquire similar 
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rights to other supporters as a club member, the nature of their intermittent relationship makes this 
group non-urgent to the way the club is governed. Therefore, the influence of this group of 
members who continue to be diluted within the membership of 150,000 and therefore deemed as 
discretionary stakeholders.  
Finally, there is a group of supporters at Schalke who are not members of the club and therefore 
have no influence as a member. This group of supporters has no legitimate power to vote in club 
elections, or toward any decisions made at the general assembly under Schalke’s constitution. 
Therefore, this makes their relationship non-urgent in the way Schalke is governed and their 
relationship has no influence on the club’s future. Schalke’s popularity both nationally and 
internationally has led to a growth in this type of supporter, who either attend home games or 
support the club from afar. Therefore, this group of members has been deemed non-stakeholders, 
as they neither hold any influence over the club nor are influenced by the way the club is governed. 
However, it is important to point out that this group of non-stakeholders still have a pathway within 
Schalke’s model of governance to transform their power, legitimacy and urgency into definitive 














CHAPTER SEVEN - A CROSS-CASE FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
 
7.0 Chapter Introduction 
The chapter aims to draw together the evidence from the single case studies on Everton FC, 
Athletic Bilbao and FC Schalke 04 to explain the findings and results. From the outset, the six-
step thematic analysis process has drawn on codes and themes to define different groups of 
supporters and their relationship with each of the club’s model of governance. Additionally, the 
themes generated from the cross-case studies have provided the foundation to analyse similarities 
and differences and how they affect the findings. This approach draws on constructs and 
relationships from a distinct set of supporter groups (in single case studies) and advances theories 
by comparing similarities and differences among football cases (in multiple case studies) (Ridder, 
2017). Therefore, these findings and results chapter draws together the themes explored by the 
single cases and the multiple analysis ascertain patterns, replication, or contradictions of findings 
(Starkey, 2010).  
7.1 The Thematic Writing-up Process 
As discussed in the previous methodology chapter, the final report chapter draws together the two 
separate single case studies conducted at Everton, Athletic Bilbao and Schalke to transit the 
thematic knowledge from the single cases to prepare and present results that define the research 
questions.  To do this, the findings explore five defined themes, sub-themes and codes, as these 
categories are explicitly linked to the raw case evidence. This research design explores the 
concepts of supporter relations, the thematic issues concerning data and the emerging governance 
issues in the clubs.   Therefore, the next section interprets the five final themes to characterise and 
identify differences in the data, generate stakeholder typologies and map supporter connections, 





7.2 Theme One – Lack of Constitutional Clarity Leads to Weak Governance 
The relationship that different sets of football supporters hold within Everton, Athletic Bilbao and 
Schalke, it was important to identify the distinctive elements of governance construction within 
each of the clubs (Table 7.1). From the outset, the single case studies explore the contrast between 
the governance models, from a set protocol built on a theoretical framework to explore the 
fundamental factors behind each model of football governance. To understand how each football 
case governs their responsibilities as a club, the single reports take into consideration the impact 
of different regulative and legal frameworks within three European countries. Everton FC falls 
under English Company Law, similar to any other business or corporation. Under the Act, a 
company is owned by share capital and in Everton’s case, the principal shareholder is seen as the 
owner. A further complication highlighted at Everton is the club’s main shareholding can be held 
by a holding company (Blue Heaven) and for all intent and purpose, the owner (Moshiri) fails to 
hold a position within the club’s corporate structure and therefore holds no personal legal 
liabilities.  
Table 7.1. Defining Theme One  
 
 
Theme Definition  
 
 
Lack of Constitutional clarity leads to Weak Governance  
 
 
Theme Description  
 
 
Limited and ill-defined legal consultations are the catalyst for weak 





Talks about how the club governs 
 
Key Issues arising from the Evidence  
 
• Too reliant on the statutory framework of governance  
 
• Feelings of unlimited power for individuals   
 
• Ill-defined responsibilities in club operations 
 





Athletic are currently one of three clubs in La Liga with protected status under Spanish law as a 
member’s club and receive the benefits on offer to that of smaller sports organisations across Spain.  
However, the club continues to diversify the corporate side of the business, which was evident 
when Athletic started work to construct the new San Manes stadium. This resulted in the creation 
of two holding companies, named Barria (LM - lease rights and SM - site and user rights) that 
started to separate the club’s management and hospitality in the new stadium away from its sports 
business. This suggests Athletic continue to benefit from two legal entities, namely as a member’s 
club and a company owned by shares, yet still governed under the banner of a sports organisation.  
While in Germany, Schalke holds an association status (V.e) which also abide by the 50+1 rule of 
the DFB as the club continues to govern with its members by the way of the majority. It was 
evident from the case study that Schalke still adhere to the philosophies of an association and its 
members are entwined in the club’s organisational structure and constitution. Similar, to other 
modern-day football clubs, Schalke has a number of registered companies attached to their 
corporate structure. Yet, more importantly, these companies are governed by the club under their 
association statute, as Schalke owns all its assets without any third-party involvement.  
 
While from the outside, it may seem that both Athletic and Schalke are both governed in the 
interests of their members, particularly with the Basque only policy and the right to vote in their 
own president. The newly constructed San Mamés, has diversified Athletic’s business and diluted 
the power of their members with the decision to create holding companies to build and service the 
new stadium. It may be argued the holding companies are governed by the club, but on closer 
inspection, a 10% offer of shares to influential partners, namely the Basque Government and 
Kutxabank reduces the financial assets of the members in return for financial and land investment 
to build the new stadium. Consequently, this agreement also offers partners at Athletic a position 
to influence the future decisions from within the club’s corporate structure, as both are now 






7.2.1 The Role of Football Governance  
As a result of the case studies, the importance of the rules and statutes in the form of the articles 
of association at Everton, along with Athletic and Schalke’s constitution are fundamental to the 
way each club governs. While all three sets of principles are comparable in the nature of a football 
club, the legal and regulatory responsibilities differ from case to case along with the jurisdiction 
of each board. This highlights the different ways each club governs as a consequence of club 
constitutions, which display a mixed approach to supporter interrelation, influence and powers. 
This is evident when Everton was compared to Schalke, which clearly shows a contrast in the way 
the latter defined supporters’ roles, responsibilities and processes throughout the club. Therefore, 
the findings suggest a constitution outlines the responsibilities of a football club, which sets out 
the expectation of how the club must govern. Furthermore, it also outlines the steps that a manager 
must take at Schalke to uphold the club’s historic procedures and processes, even the nature of the 
relationship with different groups of supporters. 
These findings lead us to have a closer look at the role of senior managers inside the three different 
cases. The findings suggest that Athletic and Schalke go further than Everton to outline the 
responsibilities of prominent individuals and how much influence these hold inside the club. As a 
consequence, all three of the club’s position prominent individuals into key roles on board of 
directors. For example, the president heads up the board of directors at Athletic and the chairman 
of the supervisory board at Schalke. However, a contrast between the case studies indicates the 
key positions on Everton’s board use share capital to elect directors or to instil a representative to 
monitor their interests. This implies the dynamic that governs Everton’s board of directors is based 
on the individualistic nature of share power and not through descriptive roles and responsibilities 
within a governance framework, similar to Athletic and Schalke. This has also been evident, in the 
absence of Mr Moshiri from the board who continues to make decisions on behalf of the club as 





Similar to Everton, Athletic has one main board of directors with the president used as a prominent 
figure, who is believed to influence the decisions at a senior level within the club. As the case 
studies point out, both Everton’s owner and Athletic’s president hold an air of authority over their 
clubs from within a structure that continues to influence business and sporting decisions. Yet in 
light of this, the evidence suggests Athletic’s transparent nature of how it governs the daily 
operations differs from Everton, as the club offers open access to sensitive information throughout 
the season. This comes from the transparent nature of how Athletic share information from 
contractual details to sponsorship agreements with its members, which is seen to build a closer 
rapport with the groups inside and outside the club. Ultimately, Athletic members hand over the 
operational control to the board of directors and similar to Everton incorporate holding companies, 
which derive from the club’s share capital. Therefore, the transparent and open way Athletic 
governs, along with the willingness to share crucial information on the club, portrays a sense of 
togetherness and reduces the areas of scepticism that can form between different groups of 
stakeholders. 
At Schalke, it is clear the naming of supporters in the constitution increase this group's legitimacy 
as stakeholders, due to their role and responsibilities at different levels within the club. Similar to 
Athletic, the inclusion of members at Schalke resonates throughout the club as the supporters keep 
a continual position in the club’s daily operations. Whilst, there are parallels between the role of 
Athletic and Schalke members, since they both can review a board’s performance and approve 
proposed club budgets at their general assemblies. A significant difference is that Athletic 
operationally removes the influence of its members from within the club after elections and can 
only influence the club at annual meetings. 
As the evidence points out, Schalke members continue in an active role after their election process 
with a position on the supervisory board. This inclusive position enables members to influence and 
participate in governance processes, which benefits the club from a direct link to a core group of 
supporters. Consequently, the members of the umbrella organisation hold a position on the 
supervisory board and as an active board member have operational responsibility at a senior level. 
This offers the club an avenue to capitalise on their relationship between different supporter groups 
and networks.  
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7.2.2 Embedded Socio-Historical Environments of Club Governance  
European countries of England, Spain and Germany are steeped in football history and their clubs 
are some of the oldest in the world. Taking this into consideration, the final analysis draws on the 
history of the three cases to understand the origins behind how these clubs are governed today. 
Historically, Everton was founded in 1878, Athletic in 1898 and Schalke in 1904 and these clubs 
are some of the oldest football institutions throughout European football. It is believed these clubs 
hold a traditional relationship with their supporters from their local community, formed from being 
part of the industrial cities of Liverpool, Bilbao and Gelsenkirchen - evident when Everton was 
established to keep the local boys entertained outside the cricket season and at Athletic as a pastime 
for the local dockyard workers. Similarly, the rise of industrialism also helped to spread football 
throughout Germany, as Schalke went on to draw its players and local support from their mining 
community.  
While all three clubs were originally created to serve their local working-class communities, it 
soon became evident that football was more than just a past time. Owning a football club became 
attractive to prominent local businessmen and entrepreneurs looking to capitalise on the growing 
popularity of football. Evident from the early investment into turnstiles at Everton made by their 
owner John Houlding, so the club could charge supporters to watch their home games. Even 
Schalke as an association has witnessed individuals making a profit off the back of the club, with 
the dubious reign of Gunter Eichberg (the sun king). While many believe the widespread 
mismanagement of club presidents throughout Spanish football lead to the financial crisis in 1990 
and the introduction of the SAD regulation. 
Over the years, clubs have continued to evolve alongside commercialisation in the football 
industry. While, Everton has welcomed foreign investment into their club, which some believe 
needs to remain competitive, as Athletic has stayed true to its local members, mainly made up of 
the Basque region. Many believe the Spanish Government has protected the sports membership at 
Athletic, as in 1990 other clubs were pushed into the hands of private owners. Yet, Real Madrid 
and Barcelona are still members clubs and have become two of the richest club’s throughout world 
football, under a different model to the way Athletic governs under the cantera policy. Similarly, 
in the Bundasliga, while clubs like Schalke continue to protect the rights of their members, in 
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conjunction with the 50+1 rule, other clubs have opted for the lure of private capital investment. 
Therefore, there is a need to understand these environmental factors in the cases before we can 
truly analyse the different ways each club governs and the subsequent influence of each group of 
supporters. 
7.2.3 Club Constitutions, Rules and Articles  
The findings from all three case studies suggest the constitutions at Athletic and Schalke and the 
Articles of Association at Everton are fundamental to how these clubs are governed. Constitutions 
set out the regulatory and legal requirements of a club, but also provide a set of rules, articles and 
process that stipulate how and what to govern. For example, the rules to elect the president at 
Athletic and the election process to vote supporters onto the supervisory board at Schalke. A 
common theme throughout the case studies was the wider set of roles for members in respected 
cases written into certain club rules. Evident at Athletic and Schalke, as both sets of members in 
the articles have stipulated roles to uphold the constitutional activities at the clubs.  
The findings suggest at Everton, the absence or even an acknowledgement of any other types of 
stakeholders, other than key shareholders can limit the power and influence of groups with any 
type of legal responsibility under Company Law (minority supporter-shareholders). Although 
Athletic and Schalke both have legal responsibilities to abide by the Basque Country Sports Law 
and the court of Gelsenkirchen respectively, their articles also outline how to govern the culture 
and philosophies within each club. For example, Schalke includes the role and responsibilities of 
its football department within the supervisory board, while Athletic outlines the cantera policy 
(Basque only players) within their articles of association. Therefore, the findings suggest that 
Athletic and Schalke’s constitution is not merely used as a document to stipulate its legal 
responsibilities, either individually or collectively as in the case of Everton, which sets the 
governance expectations for the whole club.    
Taking into consideration the Everton case, the club’s article of association holds a limited 
narrative on how and what to govern. Historically, throughout UK businesses, these articles are 
seen as a legal document stipulating the duties and responsibilities of its individuals. However, in 
the case of Everton, this means individual directors/shareholders, as their articles stipulate that the 
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power lies with a one share one vote rule to protect three main shareholders who own 70.96% of 
the club. Whereas, in the case of Athletic and Schalke their constitution sets out the nature of the 
business, through the purpose, mission, aspirations and relationship with different stakeholders 
within the local community. Therefore, these findings suggest that the articles at Athletic and 
Schalke set their own standard of governance through their constitution, based on how the club 
should govern. This inclusive narrative uses constitutions to set governance expectations, through 
a formal mechanism to govern the club, which challenges the actions of powerful individuals that 
act outside the club’s formal structures and rules. For example, the honorary board at Schalke. 
7.3 Theme Two - Ungoverned Roles on Boards and Executives 
All three football clubs have a recognised board at the top of their organisational structure, but the 
recruitment of representatives into senior roles without governance scrutiny (Table 7.2). Firstly, 
the director roles on the board at Everton result from the shares held in the club, as shown in 
director positions of Kenwright (12.16%) and Wood (8.9%). These share rights offer directors a 
position to protect their share capital and enforce their power as a result of Everton’s one share, 
one vote rule in decisions made at board level. Historically, the Everton director with the most 
shares is seen to own the club, as was the case with Kenwright between (1999 to 2016) who was 
seen to make solitary decisions as a consequence of his majority status. However, the 49.9% 
takeover of Everton by Blue Heaven Holdings has changed the dynamics on the board, reinforcing 
the role of shareholder directors with representatives and professional appointments. An added 
complication has been the role of Moshiri, who openly acts as Everton’s owner, yet has no position 
on the board. Therefore, the findings suggest that Moshiri continues to act outside of Everton’s 
main board to influence the club and uses the banner of Blue Heaven and its representative to 






Table 7.2. Defining Theme Two  
 
 
Theme Definition  
 
 
Ungoverned Roles on Boards and Executives 
 
 
Theme Description  
 
 
The key roles on boards and executives only 
incorporate a small number of individuals and 






Identifies issues around how the club governs  
 
Key Issues arising from the Evidence  
 
• Executive powers to sanction decision fall to 
the few  
 
• Limited information on agendas, discussions 
and decision-making process at board and 
committee level.  
 
• No mechanisms to challenge decisions  
 
• Limited representation of legitimate 
stakeholder groups at an executive level 
 




Athletic have one mainboard, similar to that of Everton, but the dynamics on the board come from 
the election of a president, as club members issue their elected nominee a mandate of power. Since 
2011, Jose Urrutia has been the elected president at Athletic and has been voted into position for 
two successive four-year terms of office, due to end in 2019. Additionally, Athletic’s president 
presides over a board of 17 directors, who make decisions as a group on behalf of the members. 
This level of trust in the current president was evident throughout the interviews with all Athletic’s 
members, aided with the team’s success and the opening of the newly constructed San Mames 
stadium. However, under the club’s articles, the re-election of the president takes place every four 
years and at the same time, the entire board is required to resign. This upheaval within Athletic, 
with a new board of directors, also has the possibility to threaten how the club is governed in the 
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future. As these proposed board changes may present a risk to the cantera philosophy, as witnessed 
with a change of football team coach in the past.  Therefore, the decision to keep the local policy 
is dependent on the next president’s future vision and direction for the club.  
In contrast with a single board structure at Everton and Athletic, Schalke governs with the use of 
multiple boards. These consist of an honorary, supervisory and executive board, which elect and 
appoint members as outlined in the club’s constitution and each board has its terms of reference. 
For instance, the executive board at Schalke’s conduct business and football operations on behalf 
of the club. A notable difference in Schalke to that of Everton and Athletic is the use of a 
supervisory board. This board at Schalke has the power to control club appointments, authorise 
payments exceeding €500,000 and to review procedures, financial plans and annual reports on 
behalf of the association.  
Another key distinction between the three cases is Schalke’s unique position of its supporters on 
one of the club’s mainboards. This role on the supervisory board offers the main umbrella group 
of supporters the opportunity to select one member to reside at a senior level within the club. 
However, while the majority of members commend the open nature of the supervisory board, many 
supporters remain sceptical on the role of Gazprom within the club. The constitution allows 
sponsor representative a non-executive position on the board to monitor Schalke’s key 
relationships, decisions and strategic plans. However, the findings suggest while the financial 
investment made by Gazprom is welcome by the members, the motives of a state-sponsored 
company from Russia with a position of power on the club’s mainboard remains unclear. As a 
consequence, members of the club continue to fear for the future of how Schalke is governed, as 
the association’s sponsorship with Gazprom’s enters into its 11th year - as in the future the company 





7.3.1 The Role, Influence and Power of Club Executives  
At Athletic, the board of directors’ acts as the club’s executive and its seventeen members vote on 
operational matters, which hold specialist roles on the board. Elected by the members at the same 
time as the president, these directors work under the same mandate of power issued at the time of 
club elections. Athletic directors operate similar to that of Everton, as the board hold the legal 
responsibility to govern the football club, but also control the operational elements of the business. 
In practical terms at Athletic, the board initiate and implement their own decisions, in the belief 
that prominent directors continue to govern the club in line with their elected manifesto. Yet, the 
president at Athletic has unlimited power to influence the club’s direction and therefore, decisions 
on the board. Aided by the close-knitted relationship with his directors, the president’s position on 
how to govern Athletic policies, politics, philosophies and strategies remains unchallenged from 
outside the board during the four-year election cycle.  
Along similar lines to Athletic, Everton also includes their executives on one main board of 
directors. On the first inspection, the inclusion of executive board members at a senior level seems 
to provide a critical eye on the actions of key shareholders. However, in reality, the executives on 
the board act as the owner’s link to maintain control of club operations. As the findings suggest 
the position of executive members on the board only serves to implement the decisions already 
made by Everton’s primary shareholders. Therefore, this suggests both Athletic and Everton are 
governed with the influence of powerful individuals, either by election or by ownership, who 
dictate club decisions under the guise of the board to maintain control of their executive powers. 
The fundamental difference between the three cases is that Schalke’s supervisory board appoints 
their executive as a separate entity to enact their own decisions, away from the main supervisory 
board that holds legal responsibility for the club. Schalke’s executives are responsible for different 
aspects of the business and their actions are accountable to the supervisory board through the 
members at the general assembly. This suggests that Schalke’s executive hold the power to control 
club operations as a separate entity, rather than as a vehicle to carry out the orders of individual 
directors, yet still accountable to the club’s supervisory board. 
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7.3.2 Governing Club Decisions, Power and Influence   
The three cases suggest there is a notable difference in the way each club governs its decision-
making processes, particularly in the way that power and influence are distributed throughout their 
structures. Firstly, Everton continues to make and disseminate the majority of its decisions at a 
board level. The power of director shareholders comes from a large share capital, which presents 
a small number of individuals with a position at the top of the club. Consequently, the power to 
make decisions reside with three main individuals, Moshiri, Kenwright and Wood. Although not 
present, a representative for Moshiri sits on the board of directors and there is little doubt the power 
lies with the principal owner. In reality, this makes Moshiri the key decision-maker at Everton, 
due to his majority shareholding and subsequent voting rights.  The evidence suggests that 
implementing Moshiri’s decisions through his representative has become the role of the chief 
executive, who resides on the mainboard to carry out operationally the orders of Everton’s main 
shareholder directors.    
Whereas, the election process at Athletic perceives to present its members with the power to elect 
a president and a board of directors. As a consequence, the evidence suggests that members with 
senior rights only hold the power to influence club decisions via the election process.  While it can 
be argued these members continue to hold the power to make decisions after the election, which 
is evident at Athletic’s general assembly, the findings from the Athletic case study suggest the role 
of members in club decisions cease when the mandate is transferred from the membership over to 
the president. Therefore, Athletic members become redundant and without a position to influence 
how the club governs over the four-year term of office, as this power now lies with the principal 
leader as the club’s president.  
Similar to Athletic, Schalke members hold an active role to elect prominent members onto the 
club’s main supervisory board. One of the many differences between Schalke and the other two 
clubs was the ever-present position of the supporter umbrella organisation written into the club’s 
constitution. Currently, the SFCV is nominated as Schalke’s umbrella organisation as this comes 
with the power to influence decisions at a senior level, which offers this group a responsible role 
as part of the club’s operations. For example, the power to distribute home and away tickets and 
to manage the largest group of members at games. As the findings suggest, Schalke continues to 
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make decisions under the banner of an association, yet the umbrella organisation fails to interact 
with groups that form outside the SFCV. Therefore, as the umbrella organisation does not represent 
the ¾ majority required to approve a club motion, it makes it difficult for the club’s supervisory 
board to make changes at a constitutional level.  
7.4 Theme Three – Weak Knowledge of Supporter Role and Responsibilities   
The case studies explore the relationship that materialises from how each club governs and to 
identify the salient influence of different groups of supporters in their respective clubs (Table 7.3).  
Table 7.3. Defining Theme Three  
 
 
Theme Definition  
 
 
Weak Knowledge of Supporter Role and Responsibilities  
 
Theme Description  
 
 
A club’s model of governance can marginalise supporter groups 






Talks about the relationship between the club and its supporter 
groups 
 
Key Issues arising from the Evidence  
 
• Supporters placed outside the club before the manager can 
engage with different groups 
  
• Lack of understanding of how to build a meaningful relationship 
with supporters 
 
• Unclear on the role supporter can take up to govern the club 
 








A cross-analysis based on the evidence from single case studies draws together the findings, which 
contrasts different types of supporters in each club to understand the unique relations between the 
club and each group. To present the findings from each case, the supporter groups are aligned 
together so a comparative approach can assess their salient attributes in the context of each club 
(Table 7.4).   
Table 7.4. A Cross-analysis of Supporter Groups at Everton, Athletic and Schalke  
 
Supporter Group and Club Type and Description of Supporter Group 
Group 1 - Everton Shareholder Association Members 
Group 1 - Athletic Members with Senior Rights 
Group 1 - Schalke Supporters who are members of the club and the SFCV (the 
umbrella organisation) 
Group 2 - Everton Groups of Official Affiliated Supporters 
Group 2 - Athletic Members with Junior Rights 
Group 2 - Schalke Supporters who are members of the club and alternative 
supporter groups (outside of the umbrella organisation) 
Group 3 - Everton Groups of Unofficial Supporters 
Group 3- Athletic Supporters Affiliated to peñas but not Members 
Group 3 - Schalke Supporters who are members with the club, but no affiliation to 
any supporter group 
Group 4 - Everton Groups of Unattached Supporters 
(no official or unofficial relationship with the club or supporter 
groups) 
Group 4- Athletic No association to the Club membership or peñas Group 







7.4.1 Group One Supporters  
This first group of supporters are classified as the most salient groups in each of the single case 
studies, as a result of their influence in how their respective club governs. At the heart of Schalke, 
is the first group of supporters who have direct access to influence the club’s supervisory board. 
This influence comes from being a member of the club, along with the affiliation to Schalke’s 
umbrella organisation. These powers are written into the club’s constitution and membership of 
Schalke’s umbrella organisation offer supporters more power, influence and responsibility to that 
of other groups in this study. Therefore, these findings suggest their position in the umbrella 
organisation instils and protects their right to influence key decisions, due to their ubiquitous 
relationship at every level of the club. More of interest to the research, this first group of 
stakeholders also hold the power to influence other supporter relationships throughout the club, 
which has the possibility to determine the salient attributes that other groups hold as potential 
stakeholders.  
Supporters at Athletic also hold a prominent role as members and hold an influence on how the 
club governs. A key difference between Schalke and Athletic's first group of supporters is that the 
members hold a position with different levels of influence written into the club’s constitution. 
During the election process, the majority of Athletic members have the opportunity to vote in the 
next president for a four-year reign, as the club’s prominent leader. Members also have the 
opportunity to vote in directors to key positions on the board, which makes them primary decision-
makers within the club. Therefore, the election process is seen as the way for Athletic to govern 
with members clearly influential every four years. However, as soon as members present the 
electoral mandate to a president, this group’s power and influence diminish as decision-makers, 
which transfers their role into annual supervisors without the power to influence those elected to 






Everton’s first group of supporters are shareholders with legal rights, but small in comparison to 
larger shareholdings held within the club. However, the evidence suggests this offers supporters 
no powers to influence any decisions at a board level. As supporters with share rights have failed 
to gain a role on the club’s main board of directors and these supporters continue as an organised 
group, but from outside the club. Ultimately, the board is governed as a result of Moshiri, 
Kenwright and Woods's higher share capital and majority vote. As a consequence, the previous 
conflict between the club and the shareholder association has revolved around a lack of 
communication and transparency at a board level. Although the club has opened a dialogue to 
improve relations with the shareholder association, this group remains outside of the club and any 
improved relations are dependent on the goodwill of the principal shareholder (Moshiri). 
Therefore, these findings suggest members of Everton’s shareholder association hold more salient 
attributes than that of other supporter groups from their legal rights as shareholders, who turn into 
a dissident group from their activities outside the club. The evidence from the case of Schalke 
suggests Everton also have the opportunity to capitalise on a meaningful relationship with this 
group of supporters, who continue to show a willingness to take on more responsibility in club 
operations, similar to Schalke’s first salient group of members.  
7.4.2 Group Two Supporters  
From the outside, all members at Athletic have been continually classified as club members, or 
non-members. Yet, the evidence points out that new Barria members hold a different type of 
relationship with the club to members with senior rights. A fundamental difference between 
supporters in groups 1 and 2 at Athletic is the right to vote in the next presidential election. While 
Athletic’s first group of members hold full rights within the club, the remit of the second group 
only permits junior members with limited rights with mainly a seat to watch the home games and 
a vote at formal meetings. Ultimately, the election of their president is fundamental to the way 
Athletic is governed, but in reality, new Barria members hold no power or influence to elect who 
makes decisions on their behalf at the club. This indicates a type of distant relationship between 
some Barria members and the club, as they only hold a supervisory role at general meetings. 
Therefore, the position of new Barria members seems contradictory to the way Athletic governs, 
as this group of supporters are asked to approve the previous actions of the president, whom they 
have not elected or issued with a mandate to make decisions on their behalf. 
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Schalke’s second group of supporters held a similar position to Athletic’s Barria members since 
this group also approve the previous performance of those elected at the club’s annual general 
assembly. In addition to these powers, this group of supporters reside outside the umbrella 
organisation, yet hold the power to elect candidates onto the supervisory board at Schalke, but not 
directly as in the case of the SFCV. This limits the ability of this group to influence decisions made 
at a supervisory level and also build a stable relationship as ever-present members, alongside other 
prominent board members and sponsor representatives. Furthermore, the rise of the ultra-group 
from outside the umbrella organisation also falls into this group of supporters and continue to 
challenge the prominent role of the SFCV. In terms of the club’s model of governance, the 
evidence suggests the well-organised ultra-group of supporters, now outside the supervisory board 
continues to threaten the monopoly of the umbrella organisation. This threat can influence the club 
at a senior board level on how Schalke governs its operations with SFCV in the future. 
In contrast to Schalke’s and Athletic’s groups covered previously in this section, Everton 
supporters in group two hold a limited role in the club. Although, this group of supporters are 
deemed as stakeholders within the Everton case study, similar to the other two clubs. There is a 
notable difference in this group’s ability to initiate any type of relations with any directors at a 
board level, mainly due to the distance of their relationship from a position outside the club. This 
evidence suggests this group has taken up a role as consumers in Everton’s model of governance, 
due to the nature of the club’s membership scheme. This scheme drives season ticket/merchandise 
sales and mirrors the agenda of the fan forum, which decides the topics up for discussion around 
the club’s commercial activities. Furthermore, as Everton’s first group of supporters fail to gain a 
position to influence the club even as shareholders, the second group of supporters start from a 
reduced position highlighted by the typology. Therefore, this second group at Everton hold no 





7.4.3 Group Three Supporters  
As expected, the influence of supporters that fall into this third group reduces in comparison to the 
others, due to the use of stakeholder typology. However, the attributes and relations of this group 
of supporters, in conjunction with how their club governs continue to draw findings that are of 
interest to the study. The case studies recognise the different salient attributes of supporters that 
form within each club, yet when contrasted against similar groups across the cases the nature of 
their influence starts to change. For instance, as Schalke's first group holds a prominent position 
at board level and the power to influence key decisions, this strong position raises the benchmark 
for other subsequent groups of supporters. Therefore, Schalke’s third group of supporters continue 
to hold more power to influence their club than Everton’s first group and Athletic’s second group, 
due to their strong position within the club. This influence at Schalke results from the strength and 
organisation of the club’s network of supporter groups within club operations, as it is believed 
Schalke members continue to feel part of an association even without any official affiliation to a 
supporter group.  
At Athletic, there is a notable difference between the influence of members in group one and this 
third group of supporters, as the club has a limited number of memberships (senior and junior 
rights). The waiting list for prospective members is lengthy and registration into one of the penas 
seems the only viable option for supporters to feel part of the club. Pena groups offer Athletic 
supporters an alternative to that of club membership, mainly due to the limited spaces on offer at 
a club level. In a sense, the findings highlight the strength of Athletic’s external supporter 
networks, which mainly represent the local football communities around Bilbao. Therefore, the 
evidence suggests the majority of Athletic supporters in this group are forced together, largely 
outside the club’s constitution to ally with a local or regional group. Furthermore, these supporter 







Whilst, at Everton this group of supporters hold the least amount of power, in terms of their 
position to influence how the club is governed. As a result, their position as the least influential 
group of supporters has extracted several unexpected findings, mainly from the group’s 
unidentified role in the club. The group has used this obscure role from outside the club for their 
advantage to build a network of unofficial supporter groups, namely Toffee Web and When Skies 
Are Grey. These unofficial supporters also act as protest groups against club actions. However, 
the evidence suggests, the club is happy to continue with this group of supporters as a protest group 
and to encourage the group to act outside the club. Evidence from these case results suggest the 
board at Everton have failed to capitalise on this channel of supporters as it represents the majority 
of groups at Everton, yet the club are happy to dismiss their concerns as merely disruptive action.   
7.4.4 Group Four Supporters 
Taking this group into consideration as a collective, these supporters across all three cases continue 
to hold no influence and are deemed not to influence their respective clubs. In the case of Schalke, 
this group of supporters does not hold a position as members of the club, the umbrella organisation 
or any of the unofficial groups. However, they do hold the power to change their relationship with 
the club as a result of how Schalke governs, which still offers this group of non-stakeholder 
supporters an opportunity to access the club with a position of influence. Critically, this places the 
emphasis on supporters to decide the level of relationship with the club and removes the 
assumption that it’s the club’s sole responsibility to engage supporters. This is evident, as Schalke 
supporters in group four still hold the capability to progress their relationship into group one and 
therefore increase their power and influence within the club.  
From the outside, it seems Athletic’s fourth group of supporters have the same access into their 
club as Schalke members. Yet, the evidence suggests the way Athletic governs can prevent similar 
access to a group of non-stakeholder supporters. Firstly, as Athletic members hand over the 
mandate of power to a president every four years, this reduces the contact points for any of the 
member groups to influence its operational decisions. Secondly, Athletic operates a two-tiered 
membership scheme with limited numbers that offer senior and junior rights, which from the outset 
marginalises one group over another group. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Athletic’s 
Barria members in group two, continually fail to get the club to upgrade their rights to the same 
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level as senior members, which seams at the discretion of the president (evident in the previous 
two elections). As a consequence of these factors, Athletic’s fourth group of supporters do not 
have the opportunity to progress their relationship into a higher salient group and therefore had no 
clear pathway to increase their influence, due to the limited amount of memberships on offer in 
the club. 
The way Everton governs also prevents non-stakeholder supporters from an access route to 
upgrade the nature of their relationship with the club. The findings show non-access to non-
stakeholders occurs in the first group of supporters at Everton, the fourth group at Athletic and at 
no time at Schalke. Furthermore, the evidence from the case of Everton suggests the principal 
owner continues to act outside the board of directors and therefore outside the club. This indicates 
Everton’s approach to governance revolves around a small number of key shareholders, who 
continue to view supporters as protest groups with no direct lines of communication or relationship 
with club directors. Overall, these findings seem to suggest that the way a club governs has the 
opportunity to interact with non-stakeholder groups and let them decide the nature of their 










7.5 Theme Four – Limited Knowledge on the Influence of Different Supporter Relations 
The first sets of analyses on supporters examine the position and influence of different groups as 
a result of the way each club governs. Throughout the research, the evidence suggests that each 
set of supporters hold several different relationships within their club (table 7.5).  
Table 7.5. Defining Theme Four  
 
 
Theme Definition  
 
 
Lack of Understanding of Supporter Relations 
 
Theme Description  
 
 
Clubs are falling to capitalize on the business and operational benefits 





Describes the role of supporters in club decisions 
 
Key Issues arising from the 
Evidence  
 
• Unstructured supporter groups prevent an active role inside clubs 
 
• Missed opportunities by clubs to use supporter groups as an 
operational resource  
 
• Failure of clubs to understand the beneficial attributes of supporter 
relations  
 
Weak communication and engagement by prominent members within 
clubs  
 
Therefore, the case findings start to identify different sets of supporters, but it is also important to 
analyse the attributes of each of these groups to deepen the knowledge on their relationship and 
influence within their clubs as stakeholders (Table 7.6).  
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Table 7.6. A Cross-analysis of Supporter Groups and Relationships at Everton, Athletic and 
Schalke  
 
7.5.1 Definitive Groups of Supporters  
Athletic and Schalke’s first group of supporters are deemed to hold a definitive relationship with 
both clubs. From the outset, Schalke supporters with a membership with the club and the umbrella 
organisation have a representation on the supervisory board to make decisions at a senior level.  
This definitive position within the club is further reinforced by the club’s constitution and any 
changes to the rules on how Schalke governs require buy-in from this group of supporters to 
sanction any changes to these rules. However, the findings suggest the 20+1 rule continues to pose 
a real threat to their definitive relationship to influence the club, as sponsors in the near future and 
present-day have the opportunity to take control of the club and bypass Schalke’s historic 
constitution.    
In the case of Athletic, the first group of supporters are also deemed as definitive, but from a 
different set of group attributes and relationships. While Schalke’s members hold the power from 
their position within the club and the constitutions, Athletic’s possess the power to elect a president 
and directors to govern the club. Throughout the election process every four years, the president 
builds a close relationship with this group as part of an election campaign. Once the election 
process concludes, Athletic members only hold influence to approve the club’s financial budgets 
and during one-off motions. In a contrast between both clubs, it suggests while both of these first 
groups are deemed definitive, the level of influence differs from that of Athletic members, who do 



















Definitive Dependent Discretionary Dangerous Non-Stakeholders 
Everton, Athletic & 
Schalke - Group 4
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7.5.2 Dependent Groups of Supporters 
Moving on, Everton’s first and Athletics’ second group fall into this category, as their relationship 
was deemed dependent within both clubs. In the past, the action of Athletic second group of 
members has reflected the second-class position in their respective clubs. The classification of 
Athletic’s supporters in this group reflects their position in the club, as this results from the club’s 
capital investment strategy. This was because these members were used as a way to raise the 
investment to lobby and finance the new San Manes stadium. As a consequence, these Barria 
members were welcomed into the club, but with limited rights as junior members against Athletic’s 
first group and with no powers to elect the next president.  The evidence suggests, while this group 
of supporters are dependent on the club, the club are also dependent on these members, due to their 
role in the new stadium that can affect the profitability of the holding companies. It is apparent 
from the analysis, this group of members hold a dependent stakeholder relationship with the club, 
which also become dependent on Athletic’s first group of members to elect the president to govern 
the club. 
The introduction of Everton’s first group of supporters presents several interesting findings when 
contrasted against the attributes of Athletic’s dependent group of supporters. At Everton, 
supporters do not hold a recognised role in how the club governs either within the articles, 
structures or in the operations, but does hold influence as minority shareholders. While the power 
of minority shareholders is recognised under the Companies Act, this is not the case at Everton as 
minority shareholders become dependent on the principal shareholder (Moshiri) to govern the club 
accordingly. Individually, this group of supporters hold no power in one share, one vote system at 
board level, but the rise of the shareholder association has scaled up their power and influence as 
a group. Yet, the evidence suggests Moshiri is also dependent on this group of minority 
shareholders, which maintains his sole power as Everton’s principal decision-maker from only 




7.5.3 Discretionary Groups of Supporters 
All three clubs have supporters that fall into this category but under at different levels. Firstly, the 
relationship between Everton’s second group of supporters and the club arises from their role on 
the fan’s forum. These relationships are at the discretion of the club, along with the type of matters 
up for discussion at monthly forum meetings. Although the forum is within the club, in reality, this 
group has no real power to influence any decisions made at a senior level. Therefore, this forum 
uses supporters in a discretionary nature to gauge their feelings and experience as consumers. In 
contrast, Athletic’s discretionary group of supporters come from their membership outside the 
club, but as members of local pena groups. This relationship forms from the direct link to members 
with senior rights who form part of a larger group, which in turn increases their influence on the 
club by association. Therefore, the evidence suggests, this influence arises from the group’s ability 
to vote in regional elections and nominate a candidate for the presidency to represent their 
hometown region.   
Following on, Schalke’s third group of supporters hold a different set of attributes to other 
discretionary groups in this section. Although this salient group at Schalke is classified as the third 
salient group within their club, these supporters still hold influence as club members. Surprisingly, 
the relationship between this group and the club only comes out as discretionary, even with their 
power to elect a supervisory board member at Schalke. Yet in reality, these members only have 
the power to attend and vote annually at a general assembly and do not contribute throughout the 
year in operational decisions. The results from this group of supporters suggest their influence 
forms outside the umbrella organisation and therefore, this group does not have the right to elect a 
supporter directly onto the supervisory board. Consequently, this group even has a limited 
influence at the club’s assembly, as the majority vote always resides with members inside 





7.5.4 Dangerous Groups of Supporters 
In the dangerous category are Schalke’s second group of supporters, who are members of the club. 
This group is affiliated with supporter associations that form outside the club’s umbrella 
organisation. One of the most influential groups is the Ultras, who are seen to influence the club 
from outside the SFCV. However, the Ultras continue to act outside the club and the umbrella 
organisation, yet even with relatively small numbers in comparison to the SFCV, this group 
continues to hold a growing influence in the club. The dangerous powers of this group were evident 
in a recent motion to make changes to the constitution. These changes were refused, largely 
because the Ultras voted against the club and the umbrella organisation. Furthermore, the Ultra 
movement continues to embody a younger group of members at Schalke from their own initiatives, 
namely Forward North Curve, which continues to challenge the internal dynamic amongst the club 
supporter groups. This evidence suggests the Ultras numbers and influence continue to rise from 
outside the club and the SFCV. The Ultras’ influence is dangerous to the future role of the umbrella 
organisation and important constitutional change, as the in-fighting between both groups opens the 
way for sponsors to capitalise on the 20+1 rule, namely Gazprom.  
Similarly, Everton’s third group of supporters are also deemed as dangerous, but from a different 
set of attributes. Whereas Schalke’s Ultra movement can influence decisions as part of the club’s 
association, this group of Everton supporters are dangerous from outside the club. This power 
results from a group of supporters who can influence the club by protests and unofficial action, 
normally aimed at Everton’s commercial activity. Indirectly, the unpredictability of these 
supporters and their position outside Everton continue to empower a group by the actions taken at 
a board level. While the evidence shows that clubs continue to label these supporters as protesters, 
the findings suggest the way Everton governs this group outside the club as protesters increase the 





7.6 Theme Five - Ungoverned Groups of Non-Stakeholder Supporters  
Unsurprisingly, each club had its own groups of supporters classified in the case studies as non-
stakeholders and it is believed these groups hold no power to influence how the club is governed 
(Table 7.7). In the case of Schalke and Athletic, these supporters are also non-members within the 
club and not formally affiliated to any supporter group. One of the key findings to emerge from 
the case studies was the different levels of access offered to different groups of non-stakeholders 
between the clubs to influence how the club governs. In the case of Everton, none of the club’s 
four groups holds any position to influence how the club governs and therefore, these supporters 
had no access to change their relationship with the club. At Athletic, the proximity of the club’s 
non-stakeholders to full members as regional penas does offer this group access to increase their 
salient relationship into a discretionary group, even without the added benefit of being a club 
member. Furthermore, this access also allows non-stakeholders at Athletic to become definitive or 
dependent stakeholders as a club member, but this is limited by the number of new memberships 
released by the club, which makes them difficult to obtain.  
Table 7.7. Defining Theme Five  
 
 
Theme Definition  
 
 
Ungoverned groups of non-Stakeholder Supporters  
 
 
Theme Description  
 
 
Football governance can prevent supporters from building an active 





Identifies the influence of supporters at the club  
 
Key Issues arising from the Evidence  
 
• Supporter are unable to build a meaningful relationship with their 
club 
 
• Ungoverned groups lead to protest and movements against the club 
 
• Groups that form outside of the club can affect business profits and 
operations  
 
Clubs have no means to engage, consult or manage non-stakeholder 




Schalke offers the quickest and most open access for non-stakeholder supporters to change their 
relationship with the club, with the opportunity to increase their influence from the bottom of the 
typology to the highest level. For example, the open access on membership numbers at Schalke 
and the position of the umbrella organisation offer this group of non-stakeholders, the opportunity 
to upgrade their influence into definitive stakeholders within the club. This evidence also suggests 
the way Schalke governs provides the quickest route for supporters to build a relationship with the 
club, as this offers all supporters the open access to increase their influence and responsibility. For 
instance, non-stakeholder supporters at Schalke can upgrade their influence into a dangerous group 
with membership to the club, or into a discretionary group from becoming a member of any 
supporter associations under the control of the umbrella organisation.     
7.7 Chapter Conclusion  
From the outset, the three case studies have researched the impact that governance models have 
inside all three clubs and the subsequent relationships with different groups of supporters.   The 
results from the single case reports identified that each club had a different set of supporter groups, 
which results from how each club governs. The findings suggest supporters hold different levels 
of interaction with their clubs. Furthermore, the salient position of supporters in the cases 
determines how much influence a group holds, but also the type of power a group must hold to be 
recognised as legitimate stakeholders by the club. This chapter sheds new light on the attributes of 
sub-supporter groups and how a group’s position, either inside or outside the club’s model of 
governance has the opportunity to determine a type of relationship each group holds with the clubs.    
It has become evident from the thematic analysis that supporters hold a set of stakeholder attributes 
as a result of how each group is governed. A number of previous supporter classifications with 
stakeholder typologies use managers to decide whether the salient attributes of groups warrant a 
legitimate relationship. However, the findings suggest before management classification, the way 
each club governs predetermines the position of supporters within each club and therefore can 
dictate their power, influence and urgency. The importance of a stakeholder position at Schalke 
gives access to non-stakeholders and this highlights the expected level of attributes required in 
football clubs to become a legitimate group of supporters. This suggests that supporters need 
access into the club to enable groups to legitimise the nature and influence of their own 
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relationship. Consequently, these findings interpret and explain these themes and draw conclusions 





















CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 Chapter Introduction 
This study has investigated two research questions, along with the aim and several and objectives 
to explore models of football governance and supporter relations. These research conclusions 
highlight the key findings, answer the research questions, address the aim and objectives and 
explain how the thesis contributes to new practical and theoretical knowledge.  The conclusion 
explains how the research has contributed, extended and conceptualised new knowledge as part of 
the research process. The practical and theoretical paradigms from this study have been captured 
in a new model of football governance, named the GLOVE model. Furthermore, it is also important 
to reflect on the research process, the role of the researcher and document any limitations in the 
study. Finally, the chapter will propose new areas of research in football governance and supporter 
relations to build on the knowledge from this study. 
8.1 What are the fundamental factors behind a club’s model of football governance?  
The thesis aims and objectives investigate different models of football governance to explore the 
gaps and limitations on the classification of supporter groups highlighted in the literature review. 
Furthermore, the research has focused on the fundamental factors behind a club’s model of football 
governance, as the literature suggests governance models have become too descriptive, with 
supporters left confused as to their role a club (Krabbenbos, 2013, Rohde & Breuer, 2016). From 
the outset, the use of football governance, in terms of the literature on football clubs, continues to 
remain wide and diverse. From a management perspective, the literature suggests football 
governance has been used: for clubs to capitalise on the financial revenue on offer throughout the 
industry (Madden & Robinson, 2012; Morrow, 2013; Wilson, Plumley & Ramchandani, 2013); to 
re-address the balance of supporter powers (Fitzpatrick, 2013); and  as frameworks of fan 
ownership (Dubal, 2010; Ward, 2015). Furthermore, the literature suggests football governance 
has been used to describe and identify ownership regimes (Robinson et al, 2012); the impact of 
football regulation (Garcia, 2016); and management strategies for co-creation with supporters 




The descriptive nature of football governance in the literature also highlights several weaknesses 
on the true meaning, definition and application of governance practices. Researchers claim 
governance methods provide the management answer to several problem areas within football 
clubs, from the action of protest groups (Millward, 2016) and impact of unlimited ownership 
powers (Ward, Hines and Scanlon, 2015) to the effects that different cultural aspects of supporter 
groups have on their club (Bryson, 2016).  Additionally, the literature review suggests the multi-
use of governance in football has evolved alongside the role of managers, as a result of the 
economic growth witnessed across the football industry (Ogbonna & Harris, 2014). Particularly, 
in the management of football business (See, Morrow, 2013) and business strategies (see, García 
& Welford 2015) and to improve a club’s commercial performance (Dimitropoulos, 2014).  
 
The literature suggests that directors and senior managers use a preferred model of governance to 
enhance their influence within the club to protect their position, power and financial investment in 
the club (Anagnostopoulos, 2011; De Siqueira et al, 2015). As a result, the case studies suggest 
that while there are a number of differences between how each club governs (Everton, Athletic 
and Schalke), there were also notable differences between the level of detail in each club’s 
constitutional governance frameworks. These club frameworks govern with their own set of rules, 
either from articles of association or a constitution. As the literature suggests these conventions 
reflect a club’s model of governance, either through ownership regimes (Robinson et al, 2012), 
constitutional powers (Oltermann, 2016) or football regulation (Garcia, 2016). Yet, this thesis 
suggests this level of discerption only partially explain how a club governs, due to the nature of a 
club’s administrative rules which set out the constitutional responsibility, the level of operational 
detail and the subsequent relationship of different stakeholder groups. Evidence from this study 
suggests the body of literature operates on a macro-level, whereas this study provides knowledge 
on the micro-level of football governance in operation within clubs.  Furthermore, this micro-level 
investigation highlights the gaps in knowledge of the previous literature (also described by Garica 
& Welford, 2015) on role and responsibilities of key individuals, the setting of management 
expectations within football businesses and how clubs classify key relationships and govern 





The literature suggests the Spanish model of governance uses its membership as co-creators to 
increase the value of an organisation (Zagnoli, & Radicchi, 2010), due to the affiliation with the 
local community. In Athletic’s case, the cantera policy plays a pivotal role to redress the balance 
between over-commercialisation and their community-based supporter-based approach. Although, 
this study partially agrees on the literature’s broader explanation of Athletic’s model as a 
membership, the case evidence highlight the power position of the president, fundamental to the 
way the club governs and make decisions. This thesis also highlights the influence of several 
members groups within Athletic’s constitutions, as separate groups (senior and junior members) 
hold a different level of influence in voting rights and decision making. Evidenced in presidential 
elections, as junior members (Barria members) do not hold the same powers to vote in a president 
to that of more senior members.  
 
The literature suggests the preferred model of governance throughout German football is that of 
the 50+1 (The supporter association that owns 50+1 of the ownership rights) either to describe the 
increase of private ownership (Rohde & Breuer, 2016) or the marginalisation of supporter powers 
(Geeraert, 2016). However, this study suggests there are several significant implications to the way 
Schalke governs within German football. Critically, this thesis suggests the 50+1 regulation is 
limited as an explanation of how German clubs govern, as again not all members in the 50+1 
association hold the same influence. Evident in the Schalke case study which highlights the power 
of the SFCV umbrella organisation (The 50+1 association at Schalke), named in Schalke’s 
constitution. The SFCV holds the most influential position at Schalke, as this group has an ever-
present position on the club’s supervisory board. This position grants the SFCV with power to 
influence other groups of supporter and board members to build closer ties with major sponsors 
partners and representatives.  
 
In the case of Everton, the research concurs with the literature that English football governance 
unable owners to hold unlimited power when making decisions at the top of club hierarchy 
(Krabbenbos, 2013; Fobes, 2018). However, the case study provides a further explanation of the 
role, impact and influence of the principal owner, identified as Mr Moshiri. The literature refers to 
English football owners as principal agents in the context of governance (Cocieru et al.,2019). 
However, the case evidence points out that Mr Moshiri neither holds a position on the club’s board 
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of directors or is registered as an individual with legal responsibility on the share register. One of 
the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that Moshiri continues to lead the club, 
but from outside its governance boundaries without any role, responsibilities or recourse.  
 
The case evidence suggests a new way of looking at football governance, in terms of the models 
that govern certain clubs. Evident with the Everton model of governance which suggests Moshiri 
holds the power as the principal decision-maker in the club. This also reflects most of the research 
around British based football clubs (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012; Dimitropoulos, 2014; Cleland et 
at., 2018). However, evidence from the Everton case highlights the use of a holding company used 
for share capital (ownership) and a board representative has been installed to control Moshiri’s 
influence from outside the club; somewhat making Everton's model more reflective as a 
“governance ghost” model of football governance. In the case of Athletic, their model of 
governance has been described as a membership, the cantera policy or even a sports club, but this 
study suggests these assumptions are limited and reflect the club’s environmental conditions. Case 
evidence also suggests that the influence behind how Athletic govern originates from a small group 
of members with senior rights and not all members. This position provides certain members with 
the power to elect a president, while other members-only play a subservient role in Athletic 
constitution. Therefore, Athletic’s governance model reflects a “barrier to rights” model of football 
governance; in a two-tiered governance structure which limits the number of new members and 
the powers of existing members.   
 
Similarly, at Schalke, their model has been categorised as the German model, the 50+1 (Rohde & 
Breuer, 2016) or even as a multiple fan-hybrid (Ziesche, 2017). However, case evidence shows 
these assumptions are limited, as the role of the umbrella organisation is critical to how Schalke 
governs. The umbrella association, the SFCV group of members-only reflect those signed up to 
the association and the case evidence suggests this marginalises other supporter groups. Therefore, 
the association may reflect the 50+1 regulation, but the findings suggest the club fails to capture 
all supporter groups within the umbrella organisation, mainly Schalke’s ultra-group. This 
influential position of the SFCV highlighted in this study, provides an insight into how the club 
governs supporters from the association's power on the supervisory board. Furthermore, it also 
reflects the group’s operational responsibilities inside the club. Therefore, this study provides new 
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knowledge on how Schalke governs, the influence of the association, the position of multiple 
supporter groups and the implication for German football 50+1 regulation. This thesis evidence 
also strengthens the findings which suggest Schalke’s approach to governance represents more of 
an “umbrella” model of football governance.  
 
8.2 What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types of 
supporter groups have as stakeholders in models of football governance? 
The literature claims that football clubs use governance against groups of supporters to maximise 
wealth (Senaux, 2008) as customers (Hewer, Gannon & Cordina, 2015) or even as custodianship 
(Page & Spira, 2016). As a consequence, many studies have either deemed supporters as irrelevant 
(Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015) or have developed an argument to govern these groups as 
activists (Taylor, 1992), even as a mechanism to protect an owner’s financial investment 
(Dimitropoulos & Tsagkanos, 2012). In light of this, there is a body of literature that has grown to 
use governance as a method to redress the balance between authoritative and capitalistic clubs and 
their supporters (Dimitropoulos, 2014); who are used by self-interested owners to maximize their 
wealth for vanity and greed (Bower, 2016).  Although, these studies reflect governance acts that 
effect supporter relations, as a weakness in these studies is the classification of football supporters 
as one group. This approach fails to understand multiple groups and therefore, different positions 
and influence within their clubs. However, the thesis highlights several gaps in the literature on 
the limited knowledge on sub-set groups of supporters, which fails to truly understand the 
influence of each group and their relationship with how their club governs.  
This thesis suggests each football club has several supporter groups, all with a different position, 
relationship and influence in how their clubs are governed. The study has identified new models 
of football governance that reflect how each club governs and the nature of a supporter power, 
urgency and legitimacy.  The case studies highlight four different groups in each club, which all 
hold a different position and therefore, a different relationship in their respective clubs. In the case 
of Everton, the evidence claims four supporter groups are identified. However, none of these 
groups held any influence at board level or any direct relationship with director shareholders, who 
make decisions on behalf of the football club. While the case evidence suggests a number of 
different supporter groups at Everton, all with different types of relationships with the club; the 
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non-position of Everton’s first group provides an insight into the effects that limited access has on 
current and future relations. Critically, the case evidence suggests the non-position of all four 
supporter groups at Everton mirror the role of the principal owners and therefore, both the owner 
and all the supporter groups have become “governance ghosts”, as neither groups hold any 
recognised position in how the club govern.  
Following on, the case evidence from Athletic’s group of supporters highlights a mixture of rights 
between membership groups with senior and junior status within the club and as a consequence 
hold different influences when contributing to club decisions.  The thesis suggests members with 
full rights hold the most salient position and influence in decision making processes at Athletic. 
Additionally, the evidence suggests that Athletic continues to govern members differently from 
group to group, under different levels of rights between members. Evident in the election process, 
which is critical to Athletics’ model of governance, as the case findings suggest there is a barrier 
to the level of influence each group can hold within the club. This study shows a small number of 
historic members (in terms of the support base) with full rights to vote against constitutional 
change. This study suggests junior members (Barria members) only hold an intermittent influence 
in club decisions and elections throughout the four-year presidential election cycle.     
At Schalke, supporters are offered the opportunity to become a member of the club as part of its 
association status. However, the evidence shows different groups of supporters hold several 
positions to influence how the club govern, particularly with the use of an umbrella organisation. 
It has become apparent that Schalke offers an unlimited number of memberships in the club, which 
concurs with the literature on association (50+1) models of football governance (Dietl & Frank, 
2007). However, this study shows that members of both the club and its umbrella organisation 
hold a unique governance position and influence within Schalke. This is empowered by the club’s 
constitution, as the SFCV continues to capitalise both at a senior and operational level from their 
position as the most salient group of supporters within the club. The role of the SFCV is critical to 
how Schalke governs, as this thesis highlights the importance of access levels the club provides to 
less salient supporter groups. Therefore, the evidence suggests Schalke’s umbrella model of 
governance provides all their supporters with the opportunity to build a relationship as legitimate 
stakeholders, either in the club or as part of the umbrella organisation.  
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Taken together, the case evidence and the research findings suggest the way a club governs can 
divide supporters into sub-groups and determined how much salient influence they hold within the 
club. When each of the club’s findings was contrasted, it was evident that not only did each club 
have different groups of supporters, but these groups held different positions and as a consequence 
a mixture of salient influences within each case.  This casts a shadow over the role of managers in 
previous studies and the premise of Mitchel et al framework, where individuals decide which 
groups hold influence, or which groups cannot be influenced by a football organisation 
(Giulianotti, 2002). The evidence from this study suggests that governance has the opportunity to 
predetermine the position of supporters. For example, in the case evidence collected and analysed 
on all three football clubs. Therefore, governance had either a positive or negative effect on the 
influence of supporter groups before club managers had the opportunity to classify stakeholder 
groups.  Witnessed in the cases of Schalke and Athletic as their managers (stakeholder 
classification models used in the previous studies) do not have the power to classify the attributes 
of different groups, as the nature of a stakeholder relationship is predetermined with how a club 
governs under its own unique constitution.  
Furthermore, this case evidence highlights the influence that governance has on the position of 
supporter groups in each club. A gap in the literature highlighted by this study shows previous 
research has failed to understand the influence of governance prior to salient supporter 
classification (Anagnostopoulos, 2011; Mainardes et al., 2012; Biscaia et al., 2018). However, this 
thesis suggests the way a club governs can offer supporters the access to build attributes to secure 
a legitimate position, prior to the salient classification (full at Schalke and intermittent at Athletic). 
Furthermore, this study also highlights the reverse as governance can also prevent certain groups 
from a meaningful relationship with a club (all groups at Everton). This evidence suggests the 
current stakeholder models that classify supporters have previously missed a critical stage in the 
process, as governance has been used as a tool to manage groups, rather than as boundaries of 
interaction. Evidence from this study suggests that before stakeholder classification can truly 
understand a supporter’s salient influence (Mitchell et al., 1997), it is paramount to understand the 
impact and access that governance offers supporter groups. Therefore, the cases show that before 
we can really understand their power, legitimacy and urgency - we must classify sub-groups of 
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supporters and the prospective influence of all groups within the boundaries of a club’s model of 
governance.  
8.3 Concluding on the Research Aim and Objectives  
The focus of the aim and objectives was to investigate how different models of football governance 
classify the relationship and influence of different supporter groups. Supporters have previously 
been classified in the literature as one group, as there was a common misconception that all 
supporters hold the same type of relationship, influence and power within a club. This became 
evident when supporters were classified, by later researchers, as non-stakeholder (De Siqueira, 
Pajanian & Telles, 2015) legitimate stakeholders (Anagnostopoulos, 2011) and primary 
stakeholders (Zagnoli & Radicchi, 2010). As these studies continue to classify supporter groups in 
conjunction with other stakeholders and against the salient influence of other groups, it is apparent 
from these findings, supporters may hold the attributes to influence a club, but may become 
marginalised when up against more salient stakeholder groups. Additionally, the conceptual lens 
used to classify supporters as stakeholders continue to place the power in selected groups, firmly 
in the hands of managers, all for the benefit of economic value of the organisation (Freeman, 
Harrison & Wicks, 2007). Furthermore, the literature also points governance practices towards the 
implementation of management strategies (Geeraert, 2015) or even to address the dilemma of 
multiple stakeholders within football (Ferkins & Shilbury, 2015), which can prevent supporter 
from having a meaningful relationship with their clubs.  
However, the case evidence provides an insight into the salient influence of different supporter 
groups present in all three clubs, which highlights differences in the types of supporter relations 
due to their position of influence within a club’s model of governance. This evidence suggests the 
position of supporters continues to affect the nature of their relationship and their subsequent 
influence within club decisions. This study has highlighted that different groups hold a mixture of 
salient powers, which shows the way a club governs can also predetermine the nature, position and 
relationship held with its supporters. Evidence shows that clubs are also dependent on one group 
of supporters more than others, as this is due to how the club utilises supporter groups in certain 




As the findings suggest, each club has a number of different supporter groups with mixed 
attributes, which helps to deepen the knowledge of the types of relationships within a football club. 
Taken together with a club’s governance model, the case studies have developed new knowledge 
on the access that supporters hold to influence how a club governs. Particularly, based salient 
power of each group when taken in the context of other supporter groups. It has become apparent 
from this study that some groups of supporters are dependent on the club, but more interestingly 
on other more salient supporter groups to govern its statutory and constitutional responsibilities. 
An example of this is the position of Athletics’ first group of supporters who are responsible to 
elect a president and the extra powers of members in the umbrella organisation at Schalke.      
The link between each model of governance and various supporter relations has produced some 
unexpected findings on the salient attributes of certain groups and the different levels of access for 
those deemed as non-stakeholder groups. Each club has several groups that fall into the category 
of non-stakeholder supporters. Critically, the evidence suggests the access provided to these 
groups can increase and decrease a group’s ability to build a meaningful relationship with a club. 
For instance, supporters deemed as groups of non-stakeholders can reach a discretionary position 
in Athletic (Group 3) and even propel themselves into dependent, the most salient group at Schalke 
(Group 1). Therefore, the case evidence strengthens the idea that governance predetermines the 
position of supporter groups, which offers the opportunity for less salient groups to understand 
their attributes in relationships to work towards a position of influence within their club.   
This thesis contributes to the knowledge of different supporter groups, which the evidence suggests 
form in each case as a result of the club’s model of governance. Before the study, it was difficult 
to understand the relationship that a mixture of supporters held with their club. Therefore, the 
cross-case analysis has provided an insight into the relationship between the club and its supporters 
to understand the relationship that different groups held within football governance. The study 
suggests the way a club governs can influence the subsequent position of a supporter group, which 
limits their ability to increase the nature of their relationship both positively (Athletic & Schalke) 
or negatively (Everton) based on the salient influence of their group. In the cases of Schalke and 
Athletic governance can provide supporters with access to build additional attributes to enhance 
their influence in a club, which offers the opportunity for individual supporters to transfer into a 
higher salient group to increase the nature of their relationship. Consequently, evidence suggests 
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the way a club governs can let supporters choose the nature of their relationship, predominantly 
witnessed at Schalke as non-stakeholder can formalise their relationship as a legitimate group of 
stakeholders. 
8.4 Summary of Contributions  
8.4.1 Contribution 1 – Insight into Models of Football Governance  
Previous studies on football governance have used one model of governance to understand how 
and why a club governs (Brown & Walsh, 2000; Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012; Morrow, 2015; 
Tobin, 2017).) This study contributes to knowledge with the use of individual cases that each study 
how a particular club governs in its own constitutional right. Furthermore, contrasting different 
football governance models has deepened knowledge on the role of different supporter groups. 
Furthermore, a focus on the fundamental factors behind how different European clubs govern 
provides an insight into the effects of football governance in different countries, leagues and clubs. 
This new knowledge has arisen from a multi description of football models (for example, the 
governance ghost, barrier to rights and the umbrella model of governance), which challenges the 
ideology used in previous studies (see Garica & Welford, 2015). Additionally, the study has 
contributed to the knowledge on how different clubs govern supporter groups and as a consequence 
has built a body of new knowledge on different types of relationships in each club, which focus 
on multiple supporter groups.  Another key contribution of this study was the level of access 
offered to supporter groups from club to club, which highlight that a model of football governance 
from its inception can predetermine the level of influence that particular supporter groups can hold 
inside their club, which results in an open (Schalke), closed (Everton) or intermittent (Athletic) 
approach used to govern stakeholder relations.    
8.4.2 Contribution 2 – New Academic Knowledge to Operationalising Stakeholders 
To identify supporter relations types and groups, the study has adopted a theoretical framework 
built from Mitchel et al (1997) (power, urgency and legitimacy) seminal classification of 
stakeholder’s salience. This three-case investigation was built from the assumptions of individuals 
on supporters as stakeholders, taken from managers or those in roles of responsibility used in 
previous football studies (Anagnostopoulos, 2011; De Siqueira, Pajanian & Telles, 2015; 
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Buchholze & Lopatta, 20170). The position of the lens on football supporters, in conjunction with 
governance enables the study to deepen the knowledge on these groups without the salient 
constraints of other stakeholders who are deemed more influential in previous studies.  This study 
has investigated supporters to deepen the knowledge on the relationship of supporters hold as 
stakeholders, which has identified the salient influence of each group within their club (Table 7.4). 
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that sub-groups of stakeholders exist in an organisation, all 
possessing different relationship attributes. Another key contribution from the study was the new 
knowledge gained on supporters who were deemed non-stakeholders as a group with no influence 
or are not influenced by the club.  However, this thesis provides an insight into the role of non-
stakeholders and the steps needed to upscale their relationship into a more salient group with a 
legitimate position to influence how a club governs. 
8.5.3 Contribution 3 – Methodological Contribution   
The design of the research has adapted the methodology to address the research questions and 
consequently has developed a multiple case study approach, which is different from that of other 
football governance studies. The study’s research design adds to the theoretical and practical 
contributions as this extensive qualitative perspective provides a framework for future studies 
across multiple football countries, leagues and clubs. As a result, this extended methodological 
approach provides a framework to classify supporter groups, relationship and influence against 
models of governance. Furthermore, the cross-case analysis presents the evidence from the single 
cases in a different paradigm to that of previous studies to gain new knowledge on football 
governance and the subsequent relationships held with supporter groups.  
8.5.4 Contribution 4 – The GLOVE Model of Football Governance  
The understanding of football governance, achieved through the case study analysis and the 
literature review, provides the basis for the development of a new model of governance, the 
GLOVE model. This model is now proposed, described and developed from the case evidence, 
findings and conclusions from the cross-case analysis on all three football clubs. This study 
contributes in several ways to understand football governance from a different perspective and 
provide the basis for the GLOVE model of governance. The concept behind the GLOVE model of 
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football governance draws its theoretical foundations from five stages established by the research 
and seems to have 5 stages as follows:   
 
Stage 1 - Governance Inception  
Stage 2 - Linking Club and Supporter Relations with a Stakeholder Board  
Stage 3 - Operational Executive  
Stage 4 - Validated Governance Position for Supporter Groups through an Association of 
Supporters (AoS)  
Stage 5 - Entry Point for Groups of Non-Stakeholder Supporter Groups  
A primary research objective of the study was to develop a model of governance to improve the 
relationship between a club and its supporter groups.  It was evident from the cross-case analysis 
that the three models of governance display different strengths and weaknesses between the cases. 
In the development of this model, the case evidence attained from individual clubs was analysed 
collectively under a theoretical framework, which reinforces the model’s academic validity. As a 
result, the GLOVE model enables clubs to govern and capitalise from a meaningful relationship 
with their supporters. This model also provides access to different stakeholder groups, types and 
relationships without compromising the integrity of the business. Furthermore, these beneficial 
effects of the model have the opportunity to improve the nature of the relationship between clubs 
and supporters and change the way football governs for the benefit of all its stakeholders. The 
theoretical areas of the GLOVE model have the opportunity to govern the legal and operational 
responsibilities of the club and incorporate the largest group of stakeholders, so they are able to be 







8.5.4.1 Stage 1 - Governance Inception in Football Clubs  
Each model of governance must have a starting point and the findings show the articles of 
association at Everton, Athletic and Schalke’s constitution are fundamental factors behind how 
each club governs. It is important to point out that ownership status has no bearing on the level of 
detail written into the club’s principal set of rules. This is evident from the cases, as all three clubs 
hold legal, statutory and regulatory responsibilities as a football club and a company. A key 
difference between Athletic and Schalke to that of Everton was the extra level of detail written 
into their rules, which go above and beyond its legal obligations and outlines how individuals in a 
responsible position are required to govern from a club perspective. Therefore, the inception of a 
detailed framework of governance acts as the statutory rules, which sets a level of expectations 
throughout the club to those that influence (managers and owners) or are influenced by actions 
(groups of stakeholders).   
From the inception of each governance model, the influence of the articles of association at 
Everton, as in the constitutions at Schalke and Athletic are fundamental to the way each club 
governs. It is evident from the cases of Athletic and Schalke their traditions, principles and 
practices are central to each of the club’s central conventions. These central rules in each club set 
out the legal responsibilities of key individuals (in the case with Everton’s directors) and outline 
the expectations of those with a special relationship with the club (members of Athletic and 
Schalke).  Furthermore, these main governance conventions at Athletic and Schalke go above and 
beyond the club’s legal responsibilities of ownership and set out the conditions, types and influence 
of different stakeholder groups. For example, the relationship with sponsors and the umbrella 
organisation at Schalke and the relationship with the Basque Government and regional supporter 
groups at Athletic.  
The findings show these expectations are written into the club’s constitution that states the position 
of various stakeholder groups and their relationship from inside Athletic and Schalke’s governance 
boundaries. It is believed these frameworks of expectations remove the classification of 
stakeholders from individuals in powerful roles, as previously clubs appoint managers to decide if 
a group warrants a meaningful relationship with the club as a legitimate stakeholder. Therefore, in 
order to form the boundaries of governance at Schalke and Athletic, the club’s constitutions 
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classify a group of supporters to dictate the nature of their relationship directly with the club, not 
with managers.  The evidence from the cases suggests the inception of stakeholder groups into the 
club’s constitution in conjunction with club regulation, traditional practices, club policy and 
commercial activity from the outset form legitimate relationship frameworks within the clubs.  
This removes the need for constant redefinition and reclassification of supporter groups from 
owners and managers to assess whether a certain group requires urgent attention from the club.  
8.5.4.2 Stage 2 - Linking Club and Supporter Relations with a Stakeholder Board 
In a contrast between the cases, it was clear that all three clubs govern from the mainboard with 
the use of individual roles, these were as a director, a president or elected a member. These 
mainboards incorporate a number of senior roles within a club, evident with the board of directors 
at Everton and Athletic and the supervisory board at Schalke. However, there are a few differences 
between the clubs on the role and remit of each board. Firstly, while members of the main boards 
of Athletic and Schalke are elected into the position, at Everton director shareholders hold the most 
power in club decisions. Yet, Everton’s appointment of non-executive directors onto the board 
shows a certain degree of alignment between the cases, since all three clubs appoint individuals 
with specialised knowledge, either strategically or operationally. It is apparent from the findings a 
club’s mainboard provides the opportunity to link together more than just those with legal 
responsibilities, as shown at Schalke with the relationship between elected members, sponsors and 
the supporters’ umbrella organisation who all form the supervisory board.  
Furthermore, the role of supporters on Schalke’s mainboard is seen to benefit the club on two 
counts. Firstly, the inclusion of supporters offers the club the opportunity to govern the majority 
of supporters from within one organisation (SFVC) to assist with how the club governs. For 
example, as evidenced in the areas of stadium management, fan protests and match day travel. 
Secondly, an organised association of supporters has several benefits to the club, not just 
financially in terms of member contributions and capital investment into the club, but to instil 
operational responsibility on its members.  For example, at Schalke through the distribution of 
tickets and with community initiatives such as the counter prevention of hooligan activity. 
Therefore, the main stakeholder board has the opportunity to incorporate several representatives. 
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This links different types of groups and relationships together to promote inclusive actions and 
spread the arm of club governance through its board representatives through to supporter groups.  
Across all three cases, there remains a contrast in the way each club govern different groups of 
supporters and the subsequent level of their relationship from club to club. At Schalke, the link 
between the club and its three most salient groups of supporters is evident, based on their 
connection to the supervisory board. This provides more supporters with access to contribute 
towards club decisions; the opposite of Athletic and Everton. In the case of Athletic, members with 
senior rights hand over a mandate of power to the president, while at Everton shareholders have 
no direct link to influence board decisions. Therefore, the findings suggest the umbrella 
organisation, while not representative of all supporters acts as a vehicle to link the majority of 
supporters with the club and plays an important role in governing different groups under Schalke’s 
constitution.  
Written into Schalke’s constitution, the umbrella organisation governs the two-way relationship 
between the club and supporters, which controls the broad nature of groups within the SFCV. 
While it is important to point out that not all of Schalke’s supporter groups fall under the umbrella 
of the SFCV, namely their Ultra group. The inclusive concepts of a highly organised umbrella 
group of supporters with operational responsibility to serve their members benefit both parties. 
However, a criticism labelled at the SFCV was the monopoly of power that comes with umbrella 
status at Schalke. Another criticism was the current threat to SFCV umbrella status, as internally 
the organisation does not have any mechanisms to challenge the under-performance of their 
representatives outside their term of office on the supervisory board.  
Surprisingly, the findings highlight the impact that the umbrella organisation had on other groups 
of supporters at Schalke. This evidence suggests the way Schalke uses the SFCV at the heart of 
the club reduces the power and influence of less salient groups. This makes all other groups outside 
the umbrella association dependent on the SFCV, so the club can continue to govern in line with 
their constitution. Athletic are also similar to Schalke in the way different groups of supporters are 
dependent on higher stakeholder groups, which originates from their salient position within the 
club. For instance, Athletics’ most salient group of supporters with senior rights to elect a president 
continue to make decisions on behalf of other less salient junior groups of supporters. Therefore, 
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these findings suggest the constant position of supporters in the club can present different groups 
with varying influence, as this powerful group can also block a meaningful relationship between 
the club and salient groups of supporters.     
8.5.4.3 Stage 3 – Operational Executive  
It is clear from the Everton case study, the non-executive roles on the board are merely to 
implement the operational decisions made by the principal shareholders. Similarly, Athletic make 
the majority of club decisions under one board, which fails to separate legal responsibilities, away 
from operational control. A key difference between all three cases is the way Schalke separates 
the executive operations away from the club’s main board of directors. In all three cases, there are 
several prominent individuals in powerful roles throughout the club. For example, a principal 
owner at Everton, the election of a president at Athletic and a chairman of the supervisory board 
at Schalke. However, case evidence suggests the way Schalke governs the operational decision 
away from the mainboard offers several advantages to the club. Firstly, the mainboard which 
includes several stakeholder relationships (owners, sponsor, supporter groups), may help diversify 
the knowledge held on the mainboard and to incorporate wider influential groups of supporters in 
club decisions. Secondly, an executive board that separates the club operations away from the 
mainboard as in the case at Schalke provides a framework in which to appoint key individuals into 
a role with specified responsibilities to make informed decisions. Besides, the devolvement of 
operational responsibility down to an executive level, also offer the opportunity for key individuals 
(owners, elected representatives on behalf of the members) to govern their financial investments 
and legal responsibilities from a higher supervisory position. 
All three clubs govern with an alternative approach at an executive level, which differs in how 
each club appoints individuals to senior roles. The approach taken at Everton has been to integrate 
key executive members as non-directors on the club’s main board of directors. However, these 
appointments to executive roles on the board are advisory and hold no power to vote on the club’s 
main issues. The evidence suggests the three majority shareholders make unchallenged decisions 
and the role of the chief executive is merely to carry out the actions of the directors. This position 
suggests this executive role at Everton is as an implementer, merely to carry out the decisions 
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made by the principal owner without any published rationale on why Everton take a certain course 
of action.  
Athletics’ executive governs with a structure similar to Everton, from one mainboard. Yet, the 
dynamics of the board are in contrast, as the key decision-makers take up a position as an elected 
leader within the club. Although the mandate of power provides board members with the authority 
to make decisions on behalf of its members, the dynamics on the board are different from Everton’s 
mainboard. It is short-sighted to believe the election of a president diversifies the decisions that 
are made at board level as the power remains with one individual, either by ownership at Everton 
or by-election at Athletic.  Another possible explanation for Athletics’ close-knitted relationship 
with its supporters is the openness and transparent nature on display throughout the club, from the 
board down to its football team. However, while the transparency within Athletic is commendable 
from a supporter perspective, the unlimited access to sensitive information by its competitors 
increases the risk of the club (for example, player contractual information).  
In contrast, Schalke appoints and governs its executive from a supervisory board, which consists 
of various stakeholder groups, members and sponsors. A notable difference between all three cases 
is the way Schalke governs its executive differently to that of the principal owner at Everton, or 
the elected president and directors at Athletic. All three members of Schalke’s executive team are 
appointed by the supervisory board, which makes their actions accountable and transparent to 
others throughout the club. This evidence suggests Schalke’s approach to its executive separates 
the legal responsibilities away from the operations, which transfers club decision-making into 
areas of expertise (for example, the sporting department), yet governed under the watchful eye of 
the supervisory board.   
8.5.4.4 Stage 4 - Validated Governance Position for Supporter Groups through an 
Association of Supporters (AoS) 
In the context of the research, the evidence identifies the majority of supporter groups were deemed 
to hold a legitimate relationship, which went on to influence how their clubs govern. As the 
findings show, the levels of legitimacy between the supporters differ as each group holds a 
different set of attributes, either from description or rights. For example, there are different sets of 
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member rights at Athletic, while Schalke's umbrella organisation only incorporates 60% of the 
club’s members. As a consequence, the evidence suggests the club govern supporter relationship 
differently across the cases. The findings point out the cases identified several supporter groups 
who hold different relationships. Therefore, this resulted in supporters in multiple groups with 
different types and influences, which has become extremely complex to govern for many clubs. 
These complexities were evident in all three cases and the evidence suggests the concept of an 
umbrella organisation provide a governance boundary that stretches from a club through to the 
majority of supporters. Although independently governed as a professional association, their 
governance framework should align with the club’s constitution.      
A key difference between the study’s proposed Association of Supporters (AoS) model to that of 
Schalke’s is the duplication of membership status to the club and the umbrella association. This 
duplication adds to the complexity of the attributes required to formalise a legitimate relationship 
in their club. More importantly, the new AoS model streamlines the stakeholder attributes and 
expectations required to achieve a meaningful relationship. The evidence shows one main 
organised group of supporters in an umbrella association can be beneficial to both the club and 
supporters. Firstly, the umbrella organisation has the opportunity to govern a large body of 
supporters from within the club’s boundaries. This enables the club to interact, communicate and 
consult with supporters, which capitalises on a closer working relationship both operational and 
financial. Finally, the development of an umbrella organisation can position the majority of 
supporters inside the club to aid the transparent sharing of information, decision-making and 
management responsibilities between the clubs and different groups.  
The findings taken from the three cases are contrary to previous studies, which suggest stakeholder 
attributes form as a result of one group entity with all supporters holding the same relationship 
with their club. Yet, the conceptual lens has highlighted that different groups can hold several 
relationships with a club. In turn, this suggests that different supporters require different access 
into the club to legitimise their relationship. In the case of Everton, no supporter group, even the 
shareholders association have access to the board of directors. A possible explanation for this 
might be that supporters are viewed as a protest group by the club. Athletic from the outside seem 
to provide all members with a position to influence the club as part of member elections, but the 
two-tiered nature of different groups is dependent on their level of rights (senior/junior). Besides, 
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only a limited number of full members are active during the club’s election cycle every four years, 
therefore the majority of Athletic supporters hold an intermittent position within the club, normally 
at general meetings.   
Schalke offers both new and existing supporters the opportunity to position themselves, either 
inside the club or with an affiliation to a member’s association. This open access for different types 
of supporters validates these groups as legitimate stakeholders, as the club can also capitalise on 
the position of the SFCV inside Schalke to their advantage. Despite these findings, the evidence 
suggests Schalke had the opportunity to govern its entire supporter network from a position within 
the club, by spreading the remit and power of its umbrella organisation across all its groups. These 
proposed changes have the power to defuse the influence of a populist body of supporters to bring 
the Ultras inside the club’s governance boundaries, so both parties could work together for the 
benefit of Schalke.  
8.5.4.5 Stage 5 – Entry Point for Groups of Non-Stakeholder Supporter Groups  
As the findings point out, all three clubs are deemed to have groups that are classified as non-
stakeholder supporters. As witnessed throughout the cases, the evidence suggests this group of 
supporters reflects their non-influential position outside the club. Therefore, when contrasted 
against each other, the study started to understand the non-position of these groups in more detail 
and the next step required to increase the nature of their relationship with the club. Critically, the 
findings suggest the way a club governs can limit the level of relationship a supporter can hold to 
influence a club. As a result, a club must hold the ability to govern all supporter groups and have 
access to a range of supporters relations, as this removes the barriers into the club. Therefore, the 
GLOVE model offers the clubs the opportunity to govern non-stakeholder supporters from a 
position within club boundaries, as and when supporters decide to increase the nature of their 




















Stage 4 – Validated Governance 
Position for Supporter Groups 
through an Association of 
Supporters (AoS) 
Umbrella organisation of the club, but 
govern as its own association separate to 
the club, with one membership (both club 
and supporter association) through the AoS 
Stage 1 – Governance Inception in Football Clubs 
Framework of responsibilities, rights, actions and expectations-more 
than just legal responsibility 
 
Stage 5 – Entry Point for Non-
Stakeholder Supporter Groups 
Open access for all supporters to join the 
AoS and formalised their own relationship 
with the club 
Stage 2 – Linking Club and 
Supporter Relations with a 
Stakeholder Board 
Consists of those with legal 
responsibilities, AoS representative and 
groups of stakeholders 
Stage 3 – Operational Executive 
Separate from the main board with a 
mandate of responsibility to make 
operational actions, reviewed annual by 

















OPEN ACCESS TO 
CLUB GOVERNANCE 
Index for the GLOVE Model of Football Governance 
Governance Inception (Stage 1)  
Linking Club and Supporter Relations with a Stakeholder Board (Stage 
2)  
Operational Executive (Stage 3) 
Validated Governance Position for Supporter Groups through an 
Association of Supporters (AoS) (Stage 4) 
Entry Point for Groups of Non-Stakeholder Supporter Groups (Stage 5) 




8.6 Research Reflection   
This section aims to reflect on the position of the researcher throughout the study to understand 
the systematic effect at every stage in the research process. This process has provided the research 
with a stakeholder framework to identify new knowledge from the cases and remove any bias from 
the researcher, as the theoretical framework provides a conceptual lens to understand the angle of 
the research. From the outset, the position of the researcher has been neutral without any 
preconceived ideas that may benefit any club or supporter group involved in the case studies. To 
protect the study against the human preconceptions of the researcher during the field visits, the 
case protocol and stakeholder typologies protect the validity of the evidence gathered on each club.  
The use of a multiple case approach in the study provide the researcher with the opportunity to 
explore different football avenues within the research, but which reflect the phenomena outlined 
in the theoretical questions. This kept the researcher focused on the fundamental research question 
from case to case to shine the conceptual lens on replicated areas with the protocol to deepen the 
knowledge on the relationship that multiple supporters hold within their own club context. It was 
evident from the cases, the conceptual lens (Mitchel et al) used as a set typology in a governance 
context helped to identify different groups and therefore the nature of their relationship and 
influence held within a club. On reflection, the use of the conceptual lens used against an axis of 
club governance, rather than the use of human behaviours (managers in Mitchel et al study) 
eliminated any pre-classification of stakeholder attributes from an individual view, as this reduced 









To learn from the multiple case studies and “interpretational nature of this type of research, self-
disclosure and reflexivity regarding researcher involvement have become a more common practice 
when summarizing the findings” (Lewis, 2015, p.474). Therefore, it becomes critical to understand 
how the researcher felt during the field visits and how the methodology incorporated direct 
observation into the research to capture the cross-case findings. In addition, the triangulation of 
evidence from respondent interviews and documentation, alongside new interpretations were used 
to reinforce or reject the observations made from the researcher. Furthermore, the views of key 
respondents were used to reduce areas of misinterpretation that develop from a researcher’s 
perspective, particularly when writing-up the thesis, in order to review and reflect on the evidence 
presented in single case reports. This was designed to validate the transfer of knowledge and 
further reinforce the cross-case thematic analysis addressed by the conceptual GLOVE model.  
8.7 Limitations of the Research 
It is important for the researcher to understand the limits to the research and reflect on the design, 
collection, sample and the evidence presented in the study. Yin (2013) claims case study research 
is similar to other types of research and must openly acknowledge the strengths, but most 
importantly any limits that fail to address the different needs and situations in the investigation of 
social science. A key factor behind the research was to live through the experience of people within 
their clubs to understand the effect that governance has on different groups. While, the multiple 
approaches used in the case design was aimed to deepen the knowledge of supporter relationships 
and in practical terms how each club governs, as it may have inevitably narrowed down models of 
club governance with the selection of three football cases. To justify this, three cases were selected 
in line with the theme of triangulation throughout the study, as these cases reflect the current 
situation across much more than three leagues, as the selected models of governance are replicated 







From the outset, the use of the research question and subsequent theoretical questions were 
embedded within the case protocol to focus the research on a phenomenon currently taking place 
within the football industry. The use of theoretical questions helps design case studies to explore 
the research’s original research question. However, at the same time this can limit the study’s 
ability to unearth different areas of knowledge, which may address the phenomena, but from a 
different approach or perspective. In addition, the use of Mitchel’s framework of power, urgency 
and legitimacy used to classify supporter relationships into salient groups can also limit the 
findings, particularly when the conceptual lens is shone on governance and not the actions of 
managers. Similarly, while the conceptual lens adds to the knowledge on supporter groups, it may 
limit the study’s ability to understand the impact of different salient groups of stakeholders in their 
own right within each club, other than supporters. 
As the research design has conducted field visits to the European cities of Liverpool (England), 
Bilbao (Spain) and Gelsenkirchen (Germany), this may have inevitably limited the size of the 
sample to three clubs. Yet, football as an area of research is wide and diverse with supporters in 
different clubs having a range of issues. Therefore, the saturation of evidence on the side of 
supporter respondents took longer to achieve in terms of the number of interviews to that of club 
managers. To maintain a balance between both sets of respondents during primary interviews, as 
the transcripts were coded to achieve parity between supporters and manager's responses in all 
three cases (evident in appendix 1). There was an acknowledgement from the interviews the 
responses by the supporter were far more fragmented to that of club representatives. The study 
used open access to those willing to take part in case interviews, but this may have inadvertently 
bypassed those with more knowledge on the research issues. On reflection, the interview settings 
and the language barrier during a small number of supporter interviews made some responses 
difficult to transcribe. While these respondent issues were overcome during the interviews, it may 
have inadvertently failed to capture some key pieces of information, which may have contributed 






8.8 Recommendations for Future Research   
The study’s conclusion provides insight into different models of football governance and the 
subsequent relationship between clubs and their supporters. This helps to deepen the knowledge 
of different supporter groups and helps to understand the salient influence of different supporter 
groups. Therefore, it is important to understand how the new knowledge attained in the research 
can help to extend and progress the research area in future academic studies.  
8.8.1 Future Research Question 1: Can the way a sports organisation governs increase the 
participation of supporters as stakeholders and enhance the type and nature of a 
group's relations?  
As the evidence shows, in football the way a club governs is suggested to influence the type of 
relationship a group may hold with their club. As a consequence, this has shown to affect the level 
of relationship that a certain group can achieve in their clubs. It would be beneficial to the research 
area to conduct a similar piece of research in another sports industry, but to pinpoint a different 
model of governance, which is unique to their own sport. This study would analyse the attributes 
of supporters from different sporting backgrounds. As an alternative approach to this study, a 
singular focus on one model of governance without a conceptual lens may extend the knowledge 
on the effects that governance has on stakeholders, which has the possibility to extend the 
knowledge on stakeholder groups identified in this study.       
8.8.2 Future Research Question 2: Can the GLOVE model of football governance 
improve relations between a board of directors and the detachment of their 
supporter groups? 
As the GLOVE model of football governance from this study is in the early stages of its theoretical 
development, it would also be beneficial to conduct action research about it within a football club. 
The key point of such a study would be to focus on a football club, forward-thinking and looking 
to improve their relations with different groups of supporters. Similar to this study, the model of 
governance would be used as an axis to understand the type of supporter groups and their 
subsequent relationship and influence, but in one club. The proposed action research has the 




and after a period of time when the GLOVE model has been implemented. This would further help 
to understand the effect that governance has within football clubs, while actively seeking to deepen 
the knowledge on different groups of supporters.  
8.8.3 Future Research Question 3: Does football regulation across Europe 
predetermine the type of relationship a supporter will hold with their club?    
As a follow on from the findings in this study, a model of governance has the opportunity to dictate 
the level of influence a supporter group holds within a club. This study was conducted across three 
European countries and it has deepened the knowledge on why each club governs - it also helps to 
identify the fundamental factors behind each case's constitution. Yet, it was evident from the cases 
there was an undercurrent of change in regulation and legislation in football, particularly in 
Germany and Spain. In Germany, several clubs under the 50+1 rule (ownership) are starting to 
reach the 20+1 sponsor threshold, which has the opportunity to change the nature of a supporter’s 
relationship overnight, as witnessed in Spain with the introduction of the SAD regulation. 
Similarly, Company Law has shown in this study to reinforce the power of the shareholder director, 
as club articles are fundamental to how English clubs govern. Therefore, a study on two clubs with 
different approaches to governance, but under the same legal framework has the opportunity to 
develop further knowledge two-fold; to understand the impact that regulation has on supporters 










8.9 Proof of Concept - The GLOVE Model of Football Governance  
This proof of concept section provides the rationale behind the conceptual GLOVE model of 
football governance and how the academic model can enhance governance practices and methods 
in football clubs. Practical application of the GLOVE model seeks to develop the concept as a 
commercial idea throughout the football industry, to engage with external collaborators and gain 
further investment towards commercialisation and the delivery of impact (The University of 
Sheffield, 2019).  
8.9.1 Rational of the Glove Model of Football Governance  
The academic concept aims to provide a governance model to enhanced and replaced business 
processes within football clubs. The GLOVE model offers clubs the opportunity to adopt best 
practice business processes and decision making, as the vehicle to enhance relations with different 
supporter groups. The GLOVE model can replace outdated systems within clubs with an easy to 
use a framework of governance, which also maintains a clubs legal and regulatory responsibilities. 
Additionally, it will facilitate different stakeholder groups and relationships through a model of 
football governance, which can manage various levels of supporter engagement and operational 
responsibilities within the club.   
8.9.2 Prototype and Development   
The GLOVE concept has resulted from four years of an academic research project into models of 
football governance across Europe, which has resulted in the creation of a new football governance 
model. This new innovative model of governance will provide the blueprint to develop and transfer 
knowledge from the research project to enhance football industry practices. The GLOVE model 
can provide the structural framework to enhance the application and administration of semi and 
professional football clubs while enhancing relations between a key group of stakeholders, its 
supporters. This platform has the ability to engage a range of football stakeholders within the 
governance framework of a club, from legal constitutions, the construction of boards, the 
administrations of their decisions, through to the implementation of processes and policy 
throughout the club. The GLOVE model can either develop a new football business or innovate 




8.9.3 Market Assessment 
The European football market worth a record of €25.5 billion (£21.9bn) as the Premier League 
leads the way in a new era of financial stability. Alone, the Championship clubs generated 
combined revenue of £720m in 2016/17, a 30% increase on the previous season, rising season on 
season. Yet, the inherent lack of governance across the football industry has led historic clubs 
receiving winding-up orders, or even face administration. This has left many football supporters 
feeling detached and without a say in how they club make decisions. Simply, many professional 
and semi-professional football clubs have weak or no governance structures in place, leaving the 
business open to financial risk, a lack of regulatory compliance and weak management.  This 
platform will offer the opportunity to streamline business processes and management systems with 
a virtual governance platform. Aiding legal and financial compliance with the opportunity to 
include several stakeholder groups in management decisions, which can contribute directly to club 
financial decisions. The step next in the proof of concept process would be to roll out the model in 
a forward-thinking club to transfer the knowledge acquired from this study into practice, as 
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Appendix 2 – Table of Codes, Themes, Sub-Themes and Data Evidence   




Talks about how the club 
governs (Code 1.1) 
Describes the influence that 
governance has in the club 
(Code 1.2) 
Describes the influence 
that governance has in 








Influence of Executive Power 








Constitutions, rules and 
responsibilities within the 
club 
 
Executive rights, the role of 
the board and individuals   
 
Power of ownership, 




“We have always had a 
government framework to 
comply with company law 
legislation” (E) 
 
“on the board, we had a chairman 
he has been an owner chairman, 
we also have an owner-director 
(Wood) in the group, we then 
have Mr Moshiri who has his 
advisor on the board” (E) 
 
“We really feel we understand 
football and not just only 
football, but life and more 
importantly we are able to 
explain how we understand 
football to our members” (A)  
 
“the president does not have any 
extra powers on the club board, 
he chairs the meeting and then 
we vote on the issues raised in 
the agenda, so the board has no 
need for a casting vote” (A) 
 
the election committee decides 
which people can be elected by 
the general assembly, there’s a 
discussion that it may be too 
powerful, however, they (the 
members of the committee) are 
elected by the general assembly 
in a democratic process” (S) 
 
“the representative of the 
supervisory board should 
objectively and independently 
decide on possible candidates 
and not under the influence of 
the executive” (S) 
 
“football in England has changed 
and the owners now own clubs 
on commercial grounds to protect 
their investment and their revenue 
streams, yes these are risks, but 
there's always going to be a price 
to be paid for success” (E) 
 
“transparency is the key with 
commercial deals and after the 
event, there should always be 
limits in terms of how you engage 
fans before you make a decision” 
(E)  
 
we trust the president to act in the 
traditions of the club and to 
represent its members with the 
pride of the Basque people” (A) 
 
the directors are mainly 
professional people and they 
would not feel they are 
representing the interest of the 
club they love unless they 
challenge decisions, they don’t 
feel are right”! (A)  
 
“the executive board represents 
the members, not the other way 
around” (S) 
 
the election committee decides 
which people can be elected by 
the general assembly, there’s a 
discussion that it may be too 
powerful, however, they (the 
members of the committee) are 
elected by the general assembly in 
a democratic process” (S) 
 
“doesn’t have much rigour in 
terms of subcommittees and 
reporting styles, or even the 
opportunity to share 
minutes” (E) 
 
“We (supporters) don't want 
them (the board) making the 
wrong types of decisions as 
you can't run a football club 
just with your heart” (E) 
 
“The club management team 
has to make lots of urgent 
decisions, and it is 
impossible to consult all the 
members with every 
decision – more importantly, 
they have appointed a 
president to make the clubs 
day to day decisions” (A) 
 
“yes it is true, we had the 
right to vote on a decision, 
but it seems to me on less 
important decisions – we had 
just renamed the San Mamés 
press room, but to name the 
next manager or a 
player…..never!” (A) 
 
we say that the most 
important day in the year is 
the general assembly; they 
can elect the boards, the 
supervisory board and they 
still have the power to 
decide on decisions where 
they can say no we don't like 





“we signed with Viagogo the 
online ticket platform, the 
illegal black-market selling 
tickets and the members said 
that it wasn't possible to 
have a relationship with such 
a sponsoring company. So, 
then the club cancelled the 
contract, which proves that 
the members still have the 




























Appendix 3 – Table of Codes, Themes, Sub-Themes and Data Evidence  
Research Question 2: What salient influence (power, legitimacy and urgency) do different types 






Talks about the relationship 
between the club and its 




Describes the role of 
supporters in club 
decisions (Code 2.2) 
 
 
Identifies the influence 
of supporters at the 









Different Types and 
















influence and power  
 
 
Supporter relations and 




“Everton would really like to 
enhance the power of the 
fan base, why wouldn't you 
like to hear what your fans 
have to say” (E) 
 
“Sometimes you just can't 
afford this (following 
Everton) whether you're 
emotionally tied to the club or 
not, actually as an Evertonian 
it is probably actually cheaper 
now just to get a Skybox” (E)  
 
“We don’t get to pick our 
football team, we are born 
into the club; it is passed 
down from our fathers” (A)  
 
“We had to work with the 
fans to improve the 
relationship as it’s not easy to 
explain, but we had to talk to 




“a few of the members on the 
supervisory board have 
“I would say that we are 
more than a customer, 
different to other 
businesses where you 
are a customer and you 
should get the right 
treatment” (E) 
 
“The new owners don't 
communicate with the 
supporters that much, 
but I don't worry about 
that because at the end 
of the day it is a 
business” (E) 
 
“the assembly is a good 
opportunity not only for 
the members to check 
the records but as the 
board it provides us with 
confidence that we are 
getting things right off 
the field” (A) 
 
“normally each area has 
a president of a 
supporter group and 
these are the individuals 
“supporters with shares 
have the opportunity to 
motion through annual 
general meetings, as we 
don’t have fan 
representation on the 
board” (E)  
 
“I think there's a limit 
to the responsibility 
that fans should have, I 
think it's more about a 
role of listening, rather 
than a roll of 
negotiating - I would 
say it’s active listening 
from the fans and you 
have to leave the club 
to the people in charge 
of running the club” 
(E) 
 
“it would be a brave 
president that changed 
the club’s policies – 
many of the old 
members (senior) have 
been involved for years 




spoken in the press like it’s 
their own club, but it’s not it’s 
the members’ club, they are 
there to protect the club’s 
interests, not to profit 
individually from their role in 
the club” (S) 
 
“We protect the history of the 
club and any changes need to 
get our approval as this is our 
club and any change without 







that progress into the 
club elections – I always 
vote for the southern 
section because this is 
my community” (A)  
 
I thought we had all 
understood each other 
but we are far too 
concerned with 
ourselves and some are 
drawn to the questions 
of the constitutions and 
rules of the organisation; 
Unfortunately, attempts 
to achieve more 
togetherness and better 
co-operation have not 
been successful so far” 
(S) 
 
“These supporters have 
the opportunity to 
influence decisions not 
only at the assembly but 
during the week, or 
during the year as they 
just to talk with 
members of the board 
(SFCV board) and also 
members of the 
supervisory board; so 
they have very good 
connections with the 
supporters and it's a 
close connection” (S) 
the board. It will never 
happen in my lifetime!” 
(A)  
 
“We had to listen to the 
membership that we 
represent and if they 
want to raise an issue 
we had to listen, even if 
we don’t agree or it 
goes against the board 
aims” (A)  
 
“the co-determination 
of the members is an 
important asset in the 
registered 
association. Therefore, 
we are happy to 
comply with the wish 
of our members not to 
reform the Electoral 
Committee and to vote 
for the vote as good as 
it is” (S) 
 
“the umbrella 
organisation for the 
supporters was decided 
way in the past because 
we were the first 
organisation 
(supporters’ group) to 
do work as supporter 





















































within the club 
 
Executive 
rights, the role 
of the board 
and 
individuals   
 






















Talks about how 





has in the club 
(Code 1.2) 
Identifies issues 
around how the club 
governs (Code 1.3) 
 
Talks about the 
relationship 
between the 


























“on the board, we 
had a chairman 
he has been an 
owner chairman, 
we also have an 
owner-director 
(Wood) in the 
group, we then 
have Mr Moshiri 
who has his 
advisor on the 
board” (E) 
 
“We really feel 
we understand 
football and not 
just only football, 
but life and more 
importantly we 
are able to 
explain how we 
understand 
football to our 
members” (A)  
 
“the president 
does not have 
any extra powers 
on the club 
board, he chairs 













these are risks, 
but there's 
always going 
to be a price to 




is the key with 
commercial 




limits in terms 
of how you 
engage 
fans before 
you make a 
decision” (E)  
 
we trust the 
president to 
act in the 
traditions of 
the club and to 
represent its 
“doesn’t have much 
rigour in terms of 
subcommittees and 
reporting styles, or 
even the opportunity 
to share minutes” (E) 
 
“We (supporters) don't 
want them (the board) 
making the wrong 
types of decisions as 
you can't run a 
football club just with 
your heart” (E) 
 
“The club 
management team has 
to make lots of urgent 
decisions, and it is 
impossible to consult 
all the members with 
every decision – more 
importantly, they have 
appointed a president 
to make the clubs day 
to day decisions” (A) 
 
“yes it is true, we had 
the right to vote on a 
decision, but it seems 
to me on less 
important decisions – 
we had just renamed 
the San Mamés press 
room, but to name the 




really like to 
enhance the 
power of the 
fan base, why 
wouldn't you 
like to hear 
what your fans 
have to say” (E) 
 
“Sometimes you 





to the club or 
not, actually as 
an Evertonian it 
is probably 
actually cheaper 
now just to get a 
Skybox” (E)  
 
“We don’t get 
to pick our 
football team, 
we are born into 
the club; it is 
passed down 
from our 
fathers” (A)  
 
“We had to 
work with the 
fans to improve 
the relationship 
as it’s not easy 
to explain, but 
“I would say 
that we are 




where you are a 
customer and 









much, but I 
don't worry 
about that 
because at the 
end of the day it 
is a business” 
(E) 
 
“the assembly is 
a good 
opportunity not 
only for the 
members to 
check the 
records but as 
the board it 
provides us with 
confidence that 
we are getting 
things right off 
the field” (A) 
 
“supporters with 
shares have the 
opportunity to motion 
through annual 
general meetings, as 
we don’t have fan 
representation on the 
board” (E)  
 
“I think there's a limit 
to the responsibility 
that fans should 
have, I think it's more 
about a role of 
listening, rather than a 
roll of negotiating - I 
would say it’s active 
listening from the fans 
and you have to leave 
the club to the people 
in charge of running 
the club” (E) 
 
“it would be a brave 
president that changed 
the club’s policies – 
many of the old 
members (senior) 
have been involved 
for years and long 
before most of the 
board. It will never 
happen in my 
lifetime!” (A)  
 
“We had to listen to 
the membership that 
we represent and if 




then we vote on 
the issues raised 
in the agenda, so 
the board has no 






people can be 
elected by the 
general 
assembly, there’s 
a discussion that 
it may be too 
powerful, 
however, they 
(the members of 
the committee) 
are elected by the 
general assembly 












not under the 












they would not 
feel they are 
representing 
the interest of 




don’t feel are 












people can be 











elected by the 
general 




we say that the most 
important day in the 
year is the general 
assembly; they can 
elect the boards, the 
supervisory board and 
they still have the 
power to decide on 
decisions where they 
can say no we don't 
like this or yes we like 
this” (S)  
 
“we signed with 
Viagogo the online 
ticket platform, the 
illegal black-market 
selling tickets and the 
members said that it 
wasn't possible to 
have a relationship 
with such a 
sponsoring company. 
So, then the club 
cancelled the contract, 
which proves that the 
members still have the 
power to influence 
decisions” (S) 
 
we had to talk 






“a few of the 
members on the 
supervisory 
board have 
spoken in the 
press like it’s 
their own club, 
but it’s not it’s 
the members’ 
club, they are 
there to protect 
the club’s 
interests, not to 
profit 
individually 
from their role 
in the club” (S) 
 
“We protect the 
history of the 
club and any 
changes need to 
get our approval 
as this is our 
club and any 
change without 









area has a 
president of a 
supporter group 
and these are 
the individuals 
that progress 
into the club 
elections – I 
always vote for 
the southern 
section because 
this is my 
community” (A)  
 
I thought we 
had all 
understood each 




some are drawn 
to the questions 
of the 
constitutions 

















only at the 
assembly but 
during the 
week, or during 
the year as they 
just to talk with 
members of the 
board (SFCV 
board) and also 
members of the 
supervisory 
board; so they 




it's a close 
connection” (S) 
issue we had to listen, 
even if we don’t agree 
or it goes against the 
board aims” (A)  
 
“the co-determination 
of the members is an 
important asset in the 
registered 
association. Therefore, 
we are happy to 
comply with the wish 
of our members not to 
reform the Electoral 
Committee and to vote 
for the vote as good as 
it is” (S) 
 
“the umbrella 
organisation for the 
supporters was 
decided way in the 
past because we were 
the first organisation 
(supporters’ group) to 
do work as supporter 













Lack of Constitutional 




Ungoverned Roles on 




of Supporter Role 



















consultations are the 
catalyst for weak 
governance structures  
 
The key roles on boards 
and executives only 
incorporate a small 
number of individuals 
and exclude other 








from a meaningful 
relationship with 
their clubs  
 
 
Clubs are falling to 
capitalize on the 
business and 
operational 
benefits of an 
active supporter 






building an active 
relationship with 




Talks about how the 
club governs (Code 
1.1) 
Identifies issues around 
how the club governs 
(Code 1.3) 
Talks about the 
relationship 
between the club 
and its supporter 
groups (Code 2.1) 
Describes the role 





supporters at the 
club (Code 2.3) 
Describes the influence that governance has in the club (Code 1.2) 
 
Key Issues 
arising from the 
Evidence  
 





• Feelings of 
unlimited power for 






• Mixed levels of 
transparency can 
have a negative 
impact on the club. 
 
 
• Executive powers to 
sanction decision fall 
to the few  
 




process at board and 
committee level.  
 
• No mechanisms to 





stakeholder groups at 
an executive level 
 
• Weak consultation 








the club before 




• Lack of 
understanding 





• Unclear on the 
role supporter 
can take up to 

















by clubs to use 
supporter 

















within clubs  
 
• Supporter are 
unable to build 
a meaningful 
relationship 
with their club 
 
• Ungoverned 






• Groups that 
form outside 





• Clubs have no 
means to 
engage, 
consult or 
manage non-
stakeholder 
supporter 
groups  
 
